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National Security and the free flow of information are both vital to the preservation of 
South Africa’s open democracy. However, the two are often in tension, as the 
protection of National Security requires secrecy. This places it at odds with the rights 
to access, receive and impart information. In adjudicating this tension, the courts are 
hampered by the lack of a clear definition of National Security. The imprecision of this 
term could result in state abuse, or in leaving important security interests unprotected. 
Against this background, the thesis examines the constitutional rights to access, 
receive and impart information in view of the values that underlie them. It also explores 
the meaning of National Security with reference to legislation, case law, academic 
literature, and international and comparative law. On the basis of this study, it 
proposes a definition of National Security, which identifies the security interests that 
are to be preserved and the kinds of threats against which they must be safeguarded. 
Next, the thesis examines the tension between openness and secrecy within the 
judicial process in cases involving conflicts between the free flow of information and 
National Security. To that end, it considers the requirements of the constitutional 
principle of Open Justice with reference to case law. It examines legislative provisions 
which limit Open Justice in cases in which the disclosure of sensitive information in 
open court could compromise South Africa’s National Security, analyses the 
constitutionality of those measures, and proposes legislative amendments which 
would remedy the constitutional defects. Finally, the thesis examines the capacity of 
the judiciary to adjudicate, in a principled manner, conflicts between the free flow of 
information and National Security, in view of debates about courts’ institutional 
capacity and the perceived need for judicial deference in areas in which the executive, 
and not the judiciary, has special expertise. It also asks whether the procedures used 
to adjudicate conflicts between the free flow of information and National Security 
enable courts to decide these cases in a principled manner, and to avoid overstepping 




Nasionale veiligheid en die vrye vloei van inligting is beide noodsaaklik vir die behoud 
van ’n oop en demokratiese samelewing in Suid-Afrika. Die twee is egter gereeld in 
spanning, omdat die beskerming van nasionale veiligheid geheimhouding vereis. Dit 
plaas dit in stryd met die regte op toegang tot, en die ontvangs en oordra van inligting. 
Wanneer howe hierdie spanning bereg, word hul deur die gebrek aan 'n duidelike 
definisie van nasionale veiligheid belemmer. Die onduidelikheid van hierdie begrip kan 
tot misbruik deur die staat, of ŉ versuim om belangrike veiligheidsbelange te beskerm, 
lei. Teen hierdie agtergrond ondersoek die proefskrif die grondwetlike regte op 
toegang, ontvangs en oordrag van inligting in die lig van die waardes wat hierdie regte 
onderlê. Dit ondersoek ook die betekenis van Nasionale Veiligheid met verwysing na 
wetgewing, regspraak, akademiese literatuur en internasionale en vergelykende reg. 
Op grond van hierdie studie stel dit 'n definisie van Nasionale Veiligheid voor, wat die 
veiligheidsbelange wat bewaar moet word, identifiseer, asook die soort bedreigings 
waarteen dit beskerm moet word. Vervolgens ondersoek die proefskrif die spanning 
tussen openheid en geheimhouding binne die regsproses in gevalle waar die vrye 
vloei van inligting met Nasionale Veiligheid bots. Met die oog daarop oorweeg dit die 
vereistes van die grondwetlike beginsel van Oop Geregtigheid (Open Justice) met 
verwysing na regspraak. Dit ondersoek wetgewende bepalings wat Oop Geregtigheid 
beperk in gevalle waarin die openbaarmaking van sensitiewe inligting in die ope hof 
Suid-Afrika se nasionale veiligheid in die gedrang kan bring. Dit ontleed ook die 
grondwetlikheid van daardie maatreëls en stel wetswysigings voor wat die 
grondwetlike gebreke sal regstel. Laastens ondersoek die proefskrif die vermoë van 
die regbank om botsings tussen die vrye vloei van inligting en Nasionale Veiligheid op 
'n beginselvaste wyse te beoordeel, in die lig van debatte oor die institusionele vermoë 
van die howe en die waargenome behoefte aan geregtelike agting (deference) in 
gebiede waarin die uitvoerende gesag, en nie die regbank nie, spesiale kundigheid 
het. Daar word ook gevra of die prosedures wat gebruik word om botsings tussen die 
vrye vloei van inligting en Nasionale Veiligheid te bereg, die howe in staat stel om 
hierdie sake op 'n beginselvaste wyse te beslis en om te verhoed dat hulle die grense 
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1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The advent of democracy in the Republic of South Africa has brought about a major 
shift in the relationship between information rights and the protection of state interests. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter ‘the Constitution’) 
guarantees the rights to access, receive and impart information, and thus promotes 
the constitutional values of democratic openness, accountability and responsiveness.1 
Section 16(1) of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to free 
expression, including the right to receive and impart information. Section 32 
guarantees the right to access information. A general right to information was not 
available to persons prior to democracy.2 Section 32 was fleshed out and was given 
effect to by the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA), which sets 
out the scope, content and limitations of the right of access to information.3 Sections 
16 and 32 of the Constitution, together with PAIA, thus aim to preserve the free flow 
of information. 
Despite the contribution that the constitutional rights to access, receive and impart 
information make to open government and democracy, the unrestrained free flow of 
information can place the state in harm’s way.4 For example, publicising the location 
of the Republic’s defence capabilities, its critical infrastructure, or the storage site of 
its key economic information could allow a threat to compromise an important state 
interest. In fact, guaranteeing the uninhibited free flow of information could place the 
                                      
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 S1(d), S16 & S32; Ex Parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
1996 4 SA 744 (CC) [82]. 
2 Y Burns Communications law 2ed (2009) 117. 
3 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 [83]. 
4 AL Schuller “Inimical Inceptions of Imminence - A New Approach to Anticipatory Self-Defense under 




state in grave danger. In recognising the need to protect this state interest, the 
Constitution requires that: 
National Security must be pursued in compliance with the law […].5  
To this end, sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and sections 3 and 4 of the 
Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982 (PIA) authorise the state to limit the rights to 
access, receive and impart information, purportedly to preserve South Africa’s 
National Security.6 The underlying purpose of this limitation is to reinforce and protect 
South Africa’s constitutional democracy.7 If the state elects to limit the free flow of 
information for reasons of National Security in terms of the provisions of these acts, 
this decision may give rise to a legal dispute. In such instances, the South African 
judiciary is responsible for resolving disputes between the free flow of information and 
National Security. It is obligated to resolve these disputes in a manner which promotes 
Open Justice.8 
There are several aspects which could affect the judiciary’s ability to resolve a 
dispute between the free flow of information and the state’s duty to preserve South 
Africa’s National Security in terms of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and 
sections 3 and 4 of PIA. 
The first difficulty is the legislature’s failure to expressly define the meaning of 
National Security in terms of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and sections 
3 and 4 and PIA. While the state could potentially rely on these provisions to limit the 
free flow of information, the imprecision of the meaning of National Security could 
impair the judiciary’s ability to resolve these types of disputes. These provisions in 
                                      
5 Constitution S198. 
6 Please note that while the applicable legislation uses different terminology, the interests that they aim 
to protect are the same as those associated with National Security, as will be argued in clauses 2.4.2.1 
and 2.4.3 below. 
7 S Coliver “Commentary on the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information” in S Coliver, P Hoffman, J Fitzpatrick & S Bowen (eds) Secrecy and Liberty: 
National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (1999) 11: 12. 
8 Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 S41(1)(a)(i) & S41(1)(a)(ii); Protection of Information 




their current form do not provide the judiciary with any firm guidance on (i) what the 
content of the interests are that should be protected, (ii) if it is appropriate to preserve 
these interests from being compromised, (iii) if it would be appropriate to preserve 
other security interests, and (iv) what threats these interests should be protected 
against. A corollary danger is that the lack of a clear definition could allow the state to 
conceal or engage in malfeasance. For the judiciary to be able to resolve disputes of 
this nature, it is necessary for the meaning of National Security to be defined.9 
The second difficulty in disputes of this nature, is that the courts may expose the 
state to severe risk if they resolve these matters in a manner which promotes Open 
Justice.10 The judiciary must resolve these disputes in a manner which is open and 
transparent.11 In other words, litigants have to prove their case in a public forum. At its 
elementary level a party exercising his information rights will have to prove he has the 
right to access and disseminate state-held information,12 while the state will have to 
prove that it is entitled to restrict access to information for reasons of National Security 
in terms of PAIA or PIA.13 The judiciary as the independent adjudicator will have to 
decide if the state record should be concealed for purposes of National Security, or 
ventilated in an open forum.14 It is important to note that the state in its attempt to keep 
its information secret may have difficulty in discharging its onus. This is because the 
state would not rely on the content of the requested record in order to make out its 
case. To do so would result in the ventilation of state secrets in open court, which 
could compromise National Security. 
Open Justice may also result in a third drawback for the judiciary when it resolves 
disputes of this nature. If the executive is expected to argue its case in open court and 
use the contested record to do so, what then is the purpose of placing a legislative 
                                      
9 Coliver “Commentary on the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression 
and Access to Information” in Secrecy and Liberty: National Security, Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information 12. 
10 PAIA S41(1)(a)(i) & S41(1)(a)(ii); PIA S3 & S4. 
11 S80(1), S80(3) & S82; PIA S13; Constitution S16(1)(a), S16(1)(b), S34, S35(3)(c) & S165(2). 
12 Constitution S16(1) & S32; PAIA S11. 
13 PAIA S41(1)(a)(i) & S41(1)(a)(ii); PIA S3 & S4. 




restriction on the free flow of information? It would seem that adherence to the principle 
of Open Justice could compromise National Security. To guard against this, sections 
80(1), 80(3)(b) and 80(3)(c) of PAIA, and section 13 of PIA permit the judiciary to 
employ secret proceedings to resolve the dispute. In the event that the tension 
concerns the right to access state-information, section 80 of PAIA sets out the specific 
procedure that the courts must follow to resolve the dispute. This section specifically 
enables the judiciary to employ secrecy to resolve the dispute. Like PAIA, section 13 
of PIA also provides for secret court proceedings to resolve the dispute. It is important 
to note that there are slight differences in these procedures.15 Notwithstanding the 
differences, both PAIA and PIA’s secret procedures are seemingly aimed at assisting 
the judiciary in determining if the contested record should be protected for purposes 
of National Security, or released.16 There is nevertheless a danger that the procedures 
could possibly impair Open Justice more than necessary. While the purpose of 
information legislation should be to assist the judiciary in resolving the tension, the 
legislation may end up impeding the judiciary’s ability to determine if a record should 
be concealed or ventilated. In view of this, sections 80(1), 80(3)(b) and 80(3)(c) of 
PAIA, and section 13 of PIA must be evaluated to determine whether they provide 
courts with an appropriate methodology to resolve the said disputes. 
Lastly, the judiciary may lack the necessary operational security capacity to enable 
it to resolve the tension between information and security. While the judiciary’s duty is 
to resolve disputes, the doctrine of the separation of powers recognises that the 
executive also plays a unique operational role in the National Security context.17 In 
fact, it is recognised internationally that the protection of National Security is an 
executive function.18 This role gives the executive unique insight into whether a state-
held record should be prevented from being publicised for reasons of National 
Security.19 In recognition of the executive’s role in security matters, the legislature has 
                                      
15 PIA S13. 
16 PAIA S80(1), S80(3) & S82; PIA S13. 
17 Constitution S100(1)(b)(iii) & S198(d); S Seedorf & S Sibanda “Separation of Powers” in S Woolman, 
M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2ed (2011) 12-1: 12-11. 
18 Anonymous “Keeping secrets: Congress, the courts, and national security information” (1990) 103 
Harvard Law Review 906: 909. 




authorised it to deny a request to access a state-held record in terms of sections 
41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA.20 Additionally, sections 3 and 4 of PIA also enable 
the state to place an embargo on the free expression of state-held information for 
reasons of National Security.21 The executive jealously guards this duty. In fact, it has 
criticised the judiciary for becoming involved in matters which concern state security. 
In this view, the judiciary should refrain from participating in matters where it lacks the 
necessary capacity. The executive therefore submits that courts are ill suited to 
resolve the tension between the free flow of information and National Security.22 The 
inference to be drawn from this is that matters of National Security should rather be 
left to the expertise of the state.23 
However, it is clear that it is the function of the South African judiciary in terms of 
PAIA and PIA to resolve disputes between the free flow of information and National 
Security in a manner which promotes Open Justice and therein lies the problem. How 
can the judiciary resolve disputes between the free flow of information and National 
Security in terms of PAIA and PIA where (i) the meaning of National Security is vague, 
(ii) Open Justice proceedings may impair state security, (iii) secret proceedings may 
compromise open and transparent proceedings, (iv) the lack of judicial competence 
may impact the effective resolution of the dispute, and (iv) PAIA and PIA’s procedures 
may prevent the resolution of the dispute instead of facilitating it. 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In light of the preceding shortcomings it is necessary to: 
i. Determine what National Security should mean in the context of sections 
41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and sections 3 and 4 of PIA. The outcome 
of this examination will contribute to the judiciary’s ability to determine if a 
                                      
20 PAIA S41(1)(a)(i) & S41(1)(a)(ii). 
21 PIA S3 & S4. 
22 WH Freivogel “Publishing National Security Secrets: The case for “Benign Indeterminacy”” (2009) 3 
J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 95: 98; Anonymous (1990) Harvard Law Review 909; M Kirby “Judicial review in 
a time of terrorism - business as usual" (2006) 22 SAJHR 21: 29; M Du Plessis “Removals, terrorism 
and human rights - reflections on Rashid” (2009) 25 SAJHR 353: 358. 




record should be concealed for reasons of security, disclosed or publicised. 
Additionally, it may also prevent the state from engaging in malfeasance. 
ii. Determine which of PAIA or PIA’s procedures should be relied upon to enable 
the judiciary to resolve disputes between information and security in a manner 
which promotes Open Justice without placing National Security in any further 
danger. The outcome of this analysis will bring a measure of certainty on how 
openness and secrecy should be balanced in the judicial arena. 
iii. Determine if the judiciary possesses the capacity to resolve disputes between 
the free flow of information and National Security, and to the extent that it does, 
if PAIA and PIA’s procedures impair the courts’ ability to resolve disputes 
between security and information. This analysis will identify what the role of the 
judiciary is, and determine if the preceding statutes enable the judiciary to make 
a determination on the nature of the protected record. 
1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
This thesis consists of 4 substantive chapters, in addition to the introduction and 
conclusion. Chapter 2 aims to identify the challenges the judiciary faces when 
resolving disputes between the free flow of information and National Security. To this 
end this chapter will commence by briefly analysing the role of South Africa’s judiciary. 
It will also analyse the shift in the relationship between information rights and the 
protection of security interests. Thereafter it will analyse the tension between the free 
flow of information and National Security. 
Chapter 3 commences by considering what National Security should mean in terms 
of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and sections 3 and 4 of PIA. The thrust 
of this analysis is aimed at identifying the content of the security interests which PAIA 
aims to protect, namely the ‘security and defence of the Republic’.24 It then continues 
to determine what the ‘security of the Republic’ should mean in terms of PIA.25 
Following this examination, the chapter analyses other South African and relevant 
international conceptions of National Security. The purpose is to determine if PAIA 
and PIA should preserve additional security interests so as to avoid having an under-
                                      
24 PAIA S41(1)(a)(i) & S41(1)(a)(ii). 




inclusive definition. To this end, the chapter aims to identify the content of the other 
conceptions of National Security. It then juxtaposes PAIA and PIA’s notions of security 
against these other conceptions of National Security to identify the interests which the 
acts should protect. To determine how these interests should be protected by the acts, 
this thesis then considers if sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and sections 
3 and 4 of PIA lend themselves to an interpretation which would allow the judiciary 
and the state to preserve the seemingly unprotected security interests. 
To enable the judiciary to effectively resolve the tension between the free flow of 
information and National Security, a definition of National Security should not only 
protect clearly identified and appropriate security interests, but it should also guard 
against specific threats. Following an assessment of what security interests should be 
protected, chapter 3 also aims to identify the threats the acts should guard against. 
The overarching purpose of this chapter is to use the applicable security interests, 
together with the threats which must be guarded against to determine what National 
Security should mean in terms of PAIA and PIA.  
The objective of chapter 4 is to identify the appropriate procedural mechanism 
which would enable the judiciary to resolve disputes in a manner which promotes 
Open Justice without any further risk being posed to National Security. This chapter 
commences by examining the content of Open Justice and assessing its impact on 
judicial proceedings. It then shifts its focus to how sections 80(1), 80(3)(b) and 80(3)(c) 
of PAIA and section 13 of PIA insert secrecy into judicial proceedings. Following this 
assessment, the chapter will critically analyse and evaluate both of these procedures 
to determine where the balance between openness and secrecy should lie.  
The final chapter of this thesis aims to determine if the judiciary has the capacity to 
resolve disputes between the free flow of information and National Security in terms 
of PAIA and PIA. This chapter also aims to determine if PAIA’s procedure actually 
enables the judiciary to determine if a state record should be publicised, or protected 







THE JUDICIARY, FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the Apartheid era, the state employed National Security as a defence to 
justify the limitation of information rights under the pretext of protecting an important 
state interest. However, the real intention of the Apartheid government was to protect 
white-minority interests and to conceal malfeasance by placing an embargo on 
information rights.26 When National Security and information rights conflicted in the 
judicial arena, the courts saw it as their function to endorse the security position of the 
state, rather than resolve the tension between information and security in an impartial 
manner.27 
The advent of democracy resulted in a shift away from state secrecy to state 
transparency.28 The Constitution altered the information rights regime by specifically 
granting all persons the rights to access and express information.29 These rights allow 
commentators to have access to, and publicise information relating to the activities of 
the democratic state. 
Despite the Apartheid government’s misuse of National Security, this concept 
remains an important consideration in the constitutional era.30 However, the 
Constitution does not expressly identify what National Security means.31 
Disappointingly, laws aimed at limiting the free flow of information for security reasons 
do not expressly define the concept either. Sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA 
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and sections 3 and 4 of PIA authorise the state to limit the rights to access, receive 
and impart information, purportedly for reasons of National Security. However, these 
acts do not set out with any certainty what this concept means and therein lies the 
danger. Coliver points out that the failure to define the meaning of National Security is 
the primary cause for state abuse when this concept is relied upon.32 
A problem arises when PAIA and PIA’s indistinct conceptions of National Security 
limit the rights to access, receive and impart information.33 While the courts are 
obligated to resolve disputes impartially and independently,34 their ability to resolve 
the tension between the free flow of information and National Security is potentially 
hindered by the imprecise meaning of National Security in terms of PAIA and PIA. 
In light of this shortcoming, this chapter will demonstrate that South Africa’s judiciary 
can only resolve the tension between the free flow of information and National Security 
in a manner which promotes the values underlying an open and democratic society, if 
National Security has a specific meaning in terms of PAIA and PIA. To this end, this 
chapter will argue that the judiciary’s difficulties in mediating the tension between the 
free flow of information and National Security is not attributable to any vagueness on 
account of the content of the rights to access, receive and impart state-held 
information. Rather it will show that the vagueness of PAIA and PIA’s security 
interests, their potential failure to protect appropriate security interests, and their failure 
to identify the threats that can compromise National Security are the reasons why 
courts would have difficulty in resolving disputes between the free flow of information 
and National Security. 
2.2 THE SHIFT FROM SECRECY TO AN OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 
Prior to democracy, the Apartheid government unjustifiably relied on National 
Security to limit the free flow of sensitive information. Ever since the mass 
dissemination of information was made possible by the printing press, governments 
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and other institutions of power have viewed the free flow of information as a threat to 
their power base and have employed a variety of measures to limit its reach.35 They 
have relied inter alia on National Security in an attempt to justify restrictions on the 
free flow of information in the public domain.36 Given the racist and authoritarian nature 
of the Apartheid government, its reliance on National Security as a mechanism to 
control the free flow of information took on a particularly sinister cast. The government 
invoked National Security to restrict the free flow of information under the guise of 
protecting some important state interests, when in reality its aim was to conceal the 
corrupt, racially biased and oppressive nature of the regime.37 Apartheid laws favoured 
the white population socially, economically and politically to the detriment of the black 
population.38 The free flow of information represented a real threat to the 
administration since it aimed to expose its true nature not only locally, but also 
internationally. The different liberation movements’ advocacy of social, economic and 
political change posed a direct threat to the Apartheid government. The dissemination 
of information regarding the Apartheid government’s actions, measures, plans and 
mechanics cast daylight onto the factual nature of the regime’s inner workings,39 
publicising its true oppressive nature. To guard against the oppressiveness of its 
regime from being exposed, the Apartheid government was obsessed with cloaking 
the exact nature of its administration in secrecy.40 The government feared that the 
publication and broad dissemination of information revealing the true nature of its 
regime would excite and foster dissatisfaction among the majority of the people, 
entrench liberal solidarity, and ultimately galvanise the majority of South Africans 
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against it.41 To prevent this,42 the regime introduced specific methods to regulate the 
free flow of information,43 under the auspices of protecting South Africa’s National 
Security.44 Yet, its true objective was to silence free thinking actors from expressing 
their dissatisfaction with the regime and propagating for change.45 
The Apartheid apparatus prevented state-held information that was considered 
sensitive from being accessed, received and disseminated. The law did not recognise 
a general right to access state-held information.46 Additionally, the Apartheid 
government attempted to increase the scope of its information blackout through 
censorship.47 Its purpose was to silence political dissent and prevent potential listeners 
from receiving information or ideas and disseminating it further.48 It also aimed to 
prevent authors from receiving feedback from their listeners.49 Closely linked to that, 
the government imposed state sanctioned silence on government activities, which if 
publicised, would ultimately fuel the opposition’s criticism against it.50 A variety of 
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censorship methods were used during the Apartheid epoch to lock away information.51 
Marcus partitions the different types of censorship into three main categories - self-
censorship, extra-legal censorship and legal censorship. The first category of state 
censorship was directed at individuals and institutions that considered disseminating 
undesirable information. Various internal and external factors were used to pressurise 
individuals and institutions into voluntarily censoring themselves. Extra-legal 
censorship used a variety of acts and practices that resulted in censorship, but were 
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unsanctioned in terms of the law of the land. Lastly, legal censorship was 
implemented, enforced and controlled by the police and the judiciary.52 
South African courts played an instrumental role in countenancing state abuse 
under the pretext of protecting the Republic’s National Security when information and 
security were found to be in tension.53 Instead of fulfilling the role of an independent 
arbitrator, the judiciary tended to defer to the state without considering if National 
Security would in fact be compromised if information was accessed or expressed. The 
courts did not even see National Security matters as falling into its sphere of 
competence. In sketching the role of South African courts in matters of National 
Security, Diemont J in Real Printing and Publishing Co (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Justice 
held that: 
“Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole judges of what the national 
security requires.”54 
To put it differently, the courts’ sole function in matters of National Security was to 
rubber-stamp the assertions of the state. This allowed the state to cloak security 
justifications in the dressings of judicial legitimacy.55 The answers as to what and who 
represented a threat to South Africa’s National Security, and if National Security was 
actually threatened, was left within the purview of the state.56 
The adoption of a democratic Constitution marked an attempt to break away from 
Apartheid’s obsession with secrecy. The Constitution created a political environment 
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in which government must be open, responsive and accountable.57 For the first time 
in South Africa’s history, the rights to access and express information were guaranteed 
in the Bill of Rights to create and foster a constitutional democracy.58  
Despite these important democratic changes, the Constitution still deemed it 
necessary to protect South Africa’s National Security. On closer analysis of the 
constitutional text it is strange that this concept is not defined in light of the many 
abuses that have occurred in its name.59 Nevertheless, as a matter of logic and in light 
of South Africa’s new democratic dispensation, National Security cannot carry the 
same meaning it did under Apartheid, or be used to achieve the same purpose.60 
An additional change is that the Constitution requires South African courts to be: 
 “[…] independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply 
impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice”.61 
In the context of disputes concerning National Security, the judiciary is no longer 
expected to be deferential in favour of the executive. If the free flow of information and 
National Security are in conflict, it is the duty of the courts to resolve the conflict in a 
manner which promotes freedom, equality and human dignity,62 and to do so in an 
independent and impartial fashion.63 Notwithstanding that the Constitution has 
fundamental implications for the role of the judiciary, the nature of information rights 
and National Security, it is not immediately clear exactly how the judiciary should 
resolve the tension between information and security in cases in which they are in 
conflict with each other. 
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2.3 THE JUDICIARY AND FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.3.1 THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION 
The first port of call for South Africa’s judiciary when mediating the tension between 
free flow of information and National Security is to determine the content of the 
information right. Following this examination the judiciary must determine if the right 
authorises actors to express state-held information. It is important to note that South 
Africa’s Constitution does not specifically refer to a right to the free flow of 
information.64 Notwithstanding this, the Constitution provides for the free flow of 
information by granting everyone the rights to access and express information in terms 
of sections 16 and 32 of the Constitution. These two constitutional rights form the 
foundation of the free flow of information, by empowering any person to access, 
receive and disseminate information.65 These rights are inextricably linked, since the 
efficacy of one is dependent on the activation of the other. This thesis therefore uses 
the phrase free flow of information to refer either to an event where the rights to access 
and express information operate in unison, or to the broad circulation of information 
as a corollary effect of the right/s operating singularly or together, as the context may 
indicate.  
The right to free expression is partitioned into two sections in the Constitution. The 
first part, section 16(1), identifies certain forms of expressions that are constitutionally 
protected. It holds that:  
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes:- 
(a) freedom of the press and other media; 
(b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; 
(c) freedom of artistic creativity; and 
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(d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.” 
The freedoms listed in section 16(1) are an illustration, not a closed list of protected 
freedoms. Other forms of expression, although not specifically listed in the provision, 
will also receive constitutional protection.66 The term ‘expression’ is often used 
interchangeably with the term ‘speech’.67 However, the meaning of the former term is 
more nuanced than the latter. ‘Expression’ refers to any speech or act which conveys 
a thought, idea, opinion, message, viewpoint, belief, desire or grievance.68 Speech is 
a human vocal activity that is used to convey a message,69 but expression is elastic 
enough to include not only verbal, but also non-verbal activities that convey a 
message.70 In South Africa, free expression is an umbrella concept that includes 
speech, the right to receive and impart information and ideas, and other expressive 
acts.71  
The right to free expression does not only allow persons to articulate themselves in 
a variety of ways, but also permits others to receive and impart their information and 
ideas.72 This thesis will specifically focus on the right as set out under section 16(1)(b) 
of the Constitution, i.e. the right to receive and impart information. In stark contrast to 
the Apartheid dispensation, individuals inter alia now have a constitutional right to 
convey their expressions and to receive feedback from listeners or interested parties. 
The feedback from the receivers could reinforce their opinions, prompt them to 
manicure the rough edges of their viewpoints, or encourage them to make substantive 
changes to their perspectives. On the other hand, listeners (or readers) may not be 
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prohibited from receiving or being exposed to an author’s ideas or information. The 
receivers can now procure information irrespective of whether the information will 
reinforce, influence, or contradict their personal viewpoints,73 or whether it reflects 
mainstream, peripheral or marginalised perspectives.74 Naturally, they should also not 
be prohibited from responding to the ideas or information of proponents. This 
exchange of information contributes to enhancing the robustness of South Africa’s 
democracy, by fostering political activity.75 Any state or private act that impairs the 
right to express and receive information or ideas vitiates the right of proponents and 
receivers of information.76 
The second part of the right to free expression is an internal modifier, which reduces 
the scope of the right to free expression.77 Section 16(2) lists several types of 
expression that are not constitutionally protected. The provision reads: 
“The right in subsection (1) does not extend to:- 
(a) propaganda for war; 
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or 
(c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes 
incitement to cause harm.” 
These types of expressions were deliberately excluded from the ambit of protection 
since they have the potential of destroying the type of society that the Constitution 
aims to build.78 The courts have held that the second part of the provision sets out a 
closed list of excluded expressions. No further exclusions may be added to this list. 
Unless an expression falls within one of the specific categories of the closed list, it will 
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receive constitutional protection.79 Since the types of expression listed in section 16(2) 
are not constitutionally protected, the courts can restrict expressions of this nature. It 
is also important to note that such limitations are not subject to the proportionality test 
in terms of the general limitation clause of the Constitution.80 In light of the above, the 
meaning of the right to receive and impart information and the information which 
cannot be protected under the right seems to be sufficiently clear in South African law. 
The content and meaning of the rights to receive and impart information should not 
cause the judiciary major interpretational difficulties when resolving disputes between 
information and security.  
The burden of showing that the receipt and dissemination of security information 
falls within the ambit of the right to free expression, will be on the party who challenges 
restrictions on the free flow of information.81 The Constitutional Court expressly stated 
that: 
“[…] any expression that is not specifically excluded by S16(2) enjoys the protection of the right.”82 
Section 16(2) of the Constitution does not exclude the receipt and dissemination of 
information that may compromise National Security from the ambit of the right. The 
expression of such information is therefore protected in terms of section 16(1). That is 
the case regardless of the way in which access was gained to state-protected 
information (for example, by receiving it from a whistle-blower or activist,83 or by 
accessing it directly or indirectly before deciding to disseminate it).84 
However, the right to receive and impart information is not absolute. Even if the 
reception and dissemination of security information falls within the purview of section 
16(1)’s protection, this is not the end of the matter. Section 36 of the Constitution 
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permits the limitation of the right to free expression, if such limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom, equality and human 
dignity. Unlike during Apartheid, the Constitution prohibits the state from limiting these 
rights arbitrarily. The state will have to show why the expression of the information 
must be limited for purposes of National Security.85 A key consideration for the 
judiciary in resolving such disputes is to determine if the information’s publicity could 
actually compromise South Africa’s National Security.86 
In view of the above it should be clear that the constitutional right to receive and 
impart information makes a radical break from the Apartheid dispensation in several 
ways. Firstly, the right allows any actor the right to freely express any information, 
including state-held information. Secondly, the right is defined with sufficient clarity 
that actors are aware of what their rights are and lastly, an actor’s right to free 
expression cannot just be unjustifiably censored in a court of law. In South Africa’s 
new democracy, the state will only be able to limit the right to free expression if it can 
convince the judiciary that the restriction of the information is reasonably justified in an 
open and democratic society based on freedom, equality and human dignity.  
2.3.1.1 THE VALUES UNDERPINNING THE RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION 
The rights in the Bill of Rights must be interpreted in view of the constitutional values 
underpinning them. Section 39(1)(a) provides that: 
“(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum:- 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom”. 
The right to free expression ensures that specific values are introduced into and 
permeate through the South African society, in addition to the promotion of the general 
values of freedom, equality and human dignity.87 The Constitutional Court in South 
African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence set out the values that 
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specifically inform the right to free expression. Writing for the majority, O' Regan J 
penned that: 
“Freedom of expression lies at the heart of a democracy. It is valuable for many reasons, including 
its instrumental function as a guarantor of democracy, its implicit recognition and protection of the 
moral agency of individuals in our society and its facilitation of the search for truth by individuals and 
society generally. The Constitution recognises that individuals in our society need to be able to hear, 
form and express opinions and views freely on a wide range of matters.”88 
The founders of South Africa’s Constitution envisaged a society in which free 
expression would ensure that the truth would not be supressed, the full potential of 
each individual could be realised and government rests in the hands of the people. 
These are the values that are widely believed to underpin free expression, and that 
must guide the interpretation of section 16(1) of the Constitution.89  
Spitz opines that the new democratic South Africa allows information to enter the 
public domain in order for the people to test ideas, norms and values against opposing 
ones.90 He goes on to argue that the meeting and competing of these different 
narratives result in a collision of opposing ideas and norms, which ultimately brings 
about the truth.91 To put it differently, the free receipt and dissemination of diverse 
types of information and the expression of conflicting ideas will establish what truth or 
error is.92 The search for truth is an on-going process. Information, norms, values and 
ideas are continually running the gauntlet of opposing ones in order to identify the 
truth. Unlike under the Apartheid dispensation, South Africans are now free to debate 
the public values on which South Africa is based, and redefine its commitments 
through dialogue and contestation.93 The search for truth has several other benefits. 
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This process of introducing new ideas and challenging old norms in the interests of 
finding the truth ensures that society is continually developing. Additionally, it also 
prevents dogma from controlling the lives of the people.94  
The right to free expression also seeks to ensure that all people have the 
opportunity to reach their full potential and determine their own destiny. This 
represents a sharp break with the Apartheid legal order, which expressly denied the 
majority of the population the freedom of self-actualisation.95 O’ Regan J in Khumalo 
v Holomisa stated that free expression is constitutive of individual self-autonomy.96 It 
plays a central role in unlocking the true potential of all individuals.97 It is human to 
think, learn, challenge, debate and grow intellectually.98 Free expression is what 
permits individuals to shape and solidify their personalities.99 An individual’s exposure 
to a multiplicity of thoughts, dogmas, ideas, morals and cultures will ultimately 
determine the choices the person makes concerning their identity.100 The free receipt 
and dissemination of information and ideas101 also allows individuals, should they 
deem it necessary, to transform into a different version of themselves.102 
Free expression in a democracy also protects the right of the people to self-
government.103 Sovereign power lies with the people in a democracy. They may 
choose to exercise their power directly or through the medium of representative 
government.104 Regardless of the system of government – representative or direct – 
the people will only be able to participate effectively in a democracy if information is 
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readily available. Protecting the right to free expression overcomes this difficulty. It 
ensures that available information on government policies, decisions, ideas and 
performance can enter into and permeate through the public domain. It also ensures 
that this information can be the subject of robust political debate, thereby enabling the 
people to make informed decisions on how they would like to be governed.105 
State censorship employed for purposes of National Security not only limits the 
constitutional right to receive and impart information, but also the values which the 
right ensconces. Censorship effectively removes information and ideas from the public 
domain. In doing so, it impedes the discovery of truth and undermines the fostering of 
individual autonomy and self-government,106 thereby seemingly undoing the very 
society that the Constitution aims to protect.107 
Conversely, Coliver points out that limiting the free flow of information in the 
interests of National Security could have the effect of preserving the very society which 
the state aims to protect.108 Providing unlimited protection to the free flow of 
information could endanger the nature of the Republic as an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.109  
The power to limit free expression in the interests of National Security is however a 
double-edged sword. Instead of using their authority to bring about security, states can 
and have often used this power in ways that are inconsistent with the public interest.110 
This happens when they invoke National Security to cover up malfeasance instead of 
protecting some fundamental state interest.111 There are also fairly recent examples 
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where the South African government relied on National Security in an attempt to place 
unjustifiable limits on the free flow of information.112 Such appeals to National Security 
afford states the opportunity to conceal any form of malfeasance under the pretext of 
security,113 and to make it appear as if their actions were necessary. National Security 
gives states the opportunity to put forward a positive explanation for security activity, 
including in instances where there is a cover up.114 The effect of this is the suppression 
of truth, the impairment of individual self-actualisation, massive inroads into 
democracy and the unjustified limitation of the rights to receive and impart information.  
The text of section 16(1), and the values that underpin it, provide the judiciary with 
a sufficiently clear understanding of the scope and content of freedom of expression. 
The point is not that there will never be disagreement about the meaning of the right, 
as there are certainly instances in which reasonable people could disagree about 
whether or not a particular type of expression falls within the scope of section 16(1)’s 
protection, or within the categories of expression listed in section 16(2). The point is 
rather that the constitutional text is clear enough to enable courts to establish, in a 
principled manner, whether an expression falls within the realm of its protection, and 
whether a limitation is reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36. 
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2.3.2 THE RIGHT TO ACCESS INFORMATION  
2.3.2.1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ACCESS STATE-HELD INFORMATION  
The right of access to information was granted to everyone in South Africa at the 
close of the 20th century.115 Notwithstanding its fairly recent enactment in the Republic, 
the provenance of the right to information can be traced back to the East, specifically 
to the Ch’ing dynasty.116 The Finnish statesman and clergyman, Anders Chydenius,117 
who lived in the 18th century, was the progenitor of the right to access information in 
the West. His conception of the right to access information was heavily influenced by 
the Chinese. Two of their practices caught his attention. The first was the obligation 
placed on Chinese emperors to admit and acknowledge their flaws as evidence of 
their love for the truth and the spurning of ignorance. Secondly, the primary objective 
of the Imperial Censorate was to scrutinise government and its officials with the 
intention of exposing state corruption, malfeasance, inefficiency and mismanagement. 
Sweden was the first country to grant the public a right to access information in 
1766.118 Despite these early origins, the right to access state-held information was 
introduced only recently in other jurisdictions.119 
The right to access information is guaranteed under section 32 of the Constitution. 
Section 32 of the Constitution expressly states that: 
“(1) Everyone has the right of access to:- 
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(a) any information held by the state; and 
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights. 
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide for reasonable 
measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state.” 
The right to access information is viewed as an independent constitutional right. It 
is not a right which just reinforces other fundamental rights.120 The intention of the 
constitutional drafters, by including this right in the Bill of Rights, is to ensure 
substantive openness and accountability in government, by permitting everyone to 
access state-held and, in some instances, privately held information.121 Although the 
right to information was included as an independent constitutional right, Parliament 
was given the authority and duty by section 32(2) of the supreme law to give effect to 
the right to access information by passing national legislation. 
Consequently, Parliament enacted PAIA to give effect to the constitutional right of 
access to information.122 It is important to note that the operation of section 32 of the 
Constitution was suspended until Parliament passed national information legislation, 
or until a period of three years after the passing of the Final Constitution had 
expired.123 This meant that although the Final Constitution empowered everyone at a 
textual level to access information, the right as set out in section 32 would only become 
operational once PAIA came into effect. PAIA was promulgated on the 2nd of February 
2000, but only became operational on the 9th of March 2001.124 It thus seemingly left 
a gap in the enforceability of the right to access information between the passing of 
the Final Constitution and the legal enforceability of the right in terms of PAIA. 
However, during this interim period, the right to access information was governed by 
a transitional provision. The Final Constitution was passed with two rights to access 
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information, namely a transitional provision found in section 23(2)(a) of Schedule 6, 
and the primary provision contained in section 32. 
The text of the transitional right to access information under the Final Constitution 
reads: 
“Every person has the right of access to all information held by the state or any of its organs in any 
sphere of government in so far as that information is required for the exercise or protection of any of 
their rights.”125 
This transitional right to information is very different from the right to access 
information as set out in section 32. First, it only applies to state-held information. 
Secondly, access would only be granted if requesters could show that they required 
the information in order to exercise or protect their rights. Requests would be refused 
if access were sought for any other reason.126 The wording of the transitional provision, 
save for a few small differences, is identical to the wording of the Interim Constitution’s 
right to access information.127 There is no substantive difference between the two 
rights, but the changes in the transitional provision were made for two reasons. Firstly, 
to ensure that the transitional provision reflected the plain language drafting 
conventions of the Final Constitution, and secondly to ensure consistency with the 
term ‘spheres’ which appears in the Final Constitution’s text.128 Consequently, the right 
to access information as set out in the Interim Constitution continued to govern the 
right to access information, under the auspices of the transitional provision, until PAIA 
was enacted by Parliament.129  
As pointed out earlier, section 32(2) of the Constitution instructed Parliament to 
create national legislation to give effect to the Constitution’s right to access 
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information. The phrase ‘give effect to’ means that Parliament was to determine the 
scope, nature and limits of the right to information.130 Parliament fulfilled this 
constitutional duty by enacting PAIA.131 This act gives effect to the constitutional right 
by creating the necessary legal mechanisms for everyone to access state and privately 
held information.132 The act also contains a number of textual indicators – in the long 
title, preamble and section 9 – which expressly acknowledge that PAIA was created 
to give effect to the constitutional right.133 
With the introduction of PAIA, the transitional provision fell away and can no longer 
be used to request access to information.134 The right to information is governed by 
the provisions of PAIA.135 South African courts are now obligated in terms of PAIA to 
resolve any disputes between an actor’s right to access state-held information and the 
state’s denial of a request to access state-held information for National Security 
purposes in terms of this act.136 
2.3.2.2 THE RIGHT TO ACCESS STATE-HELD INFORMATION IN TERMS OF THE 
PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT 
In terms of PAIA, before courts can adjudicate on a dispute between an information 
requester and the state, requesters are required to exhaust all of the act’s procedural 
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requirements. They should first aim to procure the information directly from the state 
before they apply to the courts for relief.137  
A requester’s right to access state-held information is governed by section 11 of 
PAIA. This section allows a person to request access to any information in the 
possession of a public body. The provision reads: 
“A requester must be given access to a record of a public body if- 
(a) that requester complies with all the procedural requirements in this Act relating to a request for 
access to that record; and 
(b) access to that record is not refused in terms of any ground for refusal contemplated in Chapter 
4 of this Part.” 
An initial request must be made to the relevant information officer of a public body, 
who must decide in terms of PAIA whether to grant the request.138 If the official refuses 
access, the official is legally compelled to provide reasons, with reference to the 
provisions of the act relied on.139 The state is only authorised to grant access to state-
held information if a requester has satisfied all of the procedural requirements of PAIA 
and no reasons exist which justify the state’s decision to deny a request for access to 
information.140  
It is important to note that PAIA does not require requesters to provide reasons to 
support their request for access to state-held information. Neither is the state permitted 
to deny access to information on the grounds that requesters lack reasons, or that the 
reasons disclosed do not justify access.141 Hence, a request made in terms of PAIA, 
subject to certain limitations,142 will permit requesters to procure access to all state 
information, explanations, decisions or preparatory work which formed the foundations 




140 S3, S9(a)(i) & S11. 
141 S11(3). 
142 Constitution S36; PAIA. Both legal instruments permit for the limitation of the right to access 




of their decisions,143 provided that such information is recorded,144 and that the 
requested information is in the possession or control of the public body.145 Recorded 
information is a defined term. PAIA states that this word means: 
“[…] any recorded information- 
(a) regardless of form or medium; 
(b) in the possession or under the control of that public or private body, respectively; and 
(c) whether or not it was created by that public or private body, respectively”.146 
Requesters are only permitted to procure access to state information from an entity, 
if the requester can demonstrate that it is a public body. If a requester cannot prove 
that the petitioned entity is a public body then the entity may deny the request for 
information. Additionally, the judiciary may also deny a request for information if the 
requester is unable to demonstrate that the entity it is requesting information from is a 
public entity when called upon to resolve a dispute. Proving that an actor is a public 
body can be a difficult task in certain instances. 
The first difficulty is caused by the difference in the terminology used by the 
Constitution and PAIA, which creates uncertainty as to the meaning of ‘public body’. 
PAIA allows requesters to procure information from public bodies,147 while the 
Constitution makes provision for requesters to access state-held information. The term 
‘public body’ does not appear in section 32 of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the 
variance in terminology, this difference should not be a cause for concern. The 
legislature has effectively developed the meaning of the term ‘state-held information’ 
to include information in the possession of any ‘public body’. PAIA’s definition of the 
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term public body is essentially the same as the Constitution’s definition of an organ of 
state.148 
The second difficulty lies in actually identifying if an institution qualifies as a public 
body. According to section 1 of PAIA, a public body is: 
“(a) any department of state or administration in the national or provincial sphere of government or 
any municipality in the local sphere of government; or 
(b) any other functionary or institution when - 
(i) exercising a power or performing a duty in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation”. 
Identifying if an institution is a public body in terms of sections 1(a) and 1(b)(i) of 
PAIA’s definition is fairly unproblematic. The problem arises when section 1(b)(ii) is 
used to determine if an actor is a public body. It is not always clear which bodies are 
public or not in terms of this section. The solution to this problem is found in the courts’ 
jurisprudence. Two methods were developed by the courts to determine if an entity 
qualifies as a ‘public body’, namely the functional and control tests. Since PAIA’s 
definition of a ‘public body’ is identical to the Constitution’s definition of an ‘organ of 
state’, save for several literary differences, the interpretation given by our courts to the 
term ‘organ of state’ originally under the Interim Constitution and again under the Final 
Constitution is of importance when interpreting the meaning of ‘public body’ in terms 
of PAIA. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) captured this interpretational approach 
the best when it stated that: 
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“Decisions on the meaning of 'organ of state' in the interim Constitution and the Constitution, of which 
there are several, are therefore of considerable assistance in determining what the legislature had 
in mind when it referred to 'public body'.” 149 
Mdumbe, in his analysis of the relevant provision in the Constitution, argues that a 
two part test must be used to determine if an entity qualifies as an ‘organ of state’. 
Firstly, it must be determined if the power or function is exercised in terms of 
legislation. Secondly, it must be established if the power or function is of a public 
nature. The Constitution itself does not define the term ‘public power’ or ‘public 
function’.150 Mdumbe opines that these terms refer to powers or functions which affect 
the members of the public, and which are exercised by an entity whose authority to 
perform those acts can be traced back to legislation.151 The SCA has labelled this the 
functional test,152 and has applied this test in Minister of Education, Western Cape v 
Governing Body, Mikro Primary School.153 
However, it is not always that easy to determine if a body exercises public powers 
or performs public functions. It is perhaps for this reason that the courts have also 
developed a control test to assist in determining if an entity is a public body or not. The 
control test was first used under the Interim Constitution. The court in Directory 
Advertising Cost Cutters v Minister for Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting, 
using the control test, held that the term ‘organ of state’ included two types of 
institutions only, namely entities which are intrinsically part of government and those 
institutions which fall outside of the realm of public service, but are controlled by the 
state.154 State control could be exercised in several ways. The state could wholly own 
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and control an institution, or it could have the majority of control over an institution155 
or regulate the institution’s operational requirements.156 The control test found 
purchase in many decisions before finally being endorsed by the SCA in Mittalsteel 
South Africa Ltd v Hlatshwayo.157 The control test is useful to examine if the functions 
or actions of identified entities are controlled, or governed by the state. If it is found 
that the state is effectively in control, its actions or functions are deemed to be of a 
public nature for the duration of the period for which it performs those actions or 
functions.158 The reason for this is that a controlled entity exercises its powers or 
functions at the instruction of the controlling entity. If the controlling entity is a public 
body, by extension all of its controlled bodies are public bodies for the duration of the 
period for which they are controlled. To put it differently, the powers or functions of a 
controlled entity are really the powers and function of the controlling body.159 
These tests do not eradicate all of the problems associated with public bodies. An 
associated difficulty is determining which test to employ. If an entity performs a public 
power or function in terms of any law, despite being independent from the control of 
the state, it will qualify as an organ of state.160 This is the end of the matter and it is 
unnecessary for information requesters or the judiciary to invoke the control test. 
However, things are not always that straightforward. Sometimes the entity under 
consideration is a private entity that is controlled by an organ of state. In such 
situations, the control test must be employed. If, while carrying on its business, an 
entity exercises a seemingly private power or function while under the control of an 
organ of state, the controlled entity is considered to be an organ of state.161  
The meaning of the right to access information as contemplated by PAIA is fairly 
straightforward. It clearly sets out the content and procedure which must be complied 
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with in order for an actor to access state-held information, prior to the judiciary being 
called upon to resolve a dispute.162 
Requesters who have satisfied all of PAIA’s procedural requirements and proved 
that the body they are requesting information from is a public body, can still be denied 
access to state-held information. PAIA has a number of exemptions which legally 
entitle a public body to turn down a request for information.163 Yet, access to publicly 
held information can still be granted despite the fact that an initial request for access 
to information has been denied by an information officer.164  
The first instance in which this will be possible is if a requester is granted access to 
information on appeal to the relevant authority. A requester may lodge an internal 
appeal against an information officer’s initial decision to restrict access to state-held 
information.165 The relevant authority can reverse the original decision of the 
information officer, on appeal. It may also confirm the original decision.166 In that case, 
the relevant authority must provide the requester with reasons for its decision to deny 
access to information. Additionally, it must also set out the provisions that it relied upon 
to justify its decision to deny access to information.167 Requesters must be informed 
that they will have the right to appeal to the courts if they are dissatisfied with the 
decision taken by the relevant authority.168 Only after exhausting these procedural 
requirements can the court be called upon to resolve a dispute in which the right to 
access information has been limited by the state.169 
Secondly, access to exempted information can be granted if it is in the interests of 
the public. Where the disclosure of such information is in the public’s interest, an 
information officer, or the relevant authority as the case may be, is legally obligated to 
disclose such information to a requester in terms of section 46 of PAIA. However, an 
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officer/authority will only be able to make exempted information available if the public’s 
interest in granting access to the information outweighs the harm that will ensue if the 
information is made available. This action by the information officer will only be legally 
permissible if: 
“(a) the disclosure of the record would reveal evidence of- 
(i) a substantial contravention of, or failure to comply with, the law; or 
(ii) an imminent and serious public safety or environmental risk; and 
(b) the public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the harm contemplated in the 
provision in question.”170 
Lastly, access to non-threatening information must be made available if the 
information forms part of a blended record. On analysing a requested record an 
information officer, the relevant authority, or the judiciary may find that a record 
contains two types of information, namely information which can be protected by a 
justifiable exemption in terms of PAIA and information which cannot be protected in 
terms of the act. If the record is composed of blended information, the information 
officer, the relevant authority, or the judiciary as the case may be, will be obligated to 
sever the threatening part of the information from the non-threatening part. The 
relevant actor will not be permitted to restrict access to the entire record by virtue of 
the fact that parts of the document can be protected by a justifiable exemption.171 
Provided that National Security information is in recorded form and in the 
possession or under the control of the state, a requester in terms of section 11(1) of 
PAIA can request access to the record. While section 11(1)(b) permits the state to 
refuse a request for access to information in terms of Chapter 4 of Part 2 of the act, 
none of the statutory exemptions in PAIA empowers the state to deny a request for 
information expressly on the grounds of National Security. In fact, neither the act nor 
any of its regulations even mention the words National Security.172 Although PAIA 
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does not expressly permit the state to deny access to state-held information for 
purposes of National Security, sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of the act permit the 
state to deny access to information if its publicity will compromise the ‘security or 
defence of the Republic’. It will be argued later in this chapter that these sections 
permit the state to deny access to information for reasons of National Security.173 It 
will also be shown that there is uncertainty concerning the meaning of the phrase 
‘security or defence of the Republic’.174 As a result, the meaning of National Security 
is vague and imprecise in terms of the act. While the content of the right to access 
information in terms of PAIA is fairly clear, the same cannot be said of PAIA’s 
references to the security interests that must be protected. This could create difficulties 
for the courts in deciding disputes relating to access to information that have a bearing 
on security interests. 
It is important to point out that the state has and will in the future continue to enter 
into relationships with private bodies to complete state work. These relationships can 
take on a variety of forms – contractual,175 incorporated or unincorporated joint 
ventures, inter alia. In the National Security context, private bodies may be given 
access to records protected for purposes of National Security. PAIA permits actors to 
petition to gain access to such records from these private bodies. Although matters of 
this nature concern the tension between the right to access information and National 
Security, this thesis will not examine how the judiciary should resolve the tension 
between the free flow of information and National Security in the context of private 
bodies. It is however important to be aware that the right to access National Security 
information is not only limited to matters concerning state entities. 
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2.3.2.3 VALUES UNDERPINNING THE RIGHT TO ACCESS INFORMATION 
Just as the rights to receive and impart information in terms of section 16(1)(b) of 
the Constitution are founded upon specific values that add further content to the 
meaning of these rights, the right to access information is also based on specific 
values. 
The right of access to information was constitutionalised in order to guarantee open 
and accountable administration at all levels of government and to move away from the 
Apartheid regime’s obsession with secrecy.176 The right counteracts the effects of 
secrecy by providing for open and accountable government. To put it differently, the 
right prevents official secrecy from hampering South Africa’s political transformation 
and from working against democracy.177 It exposes the operations of the state to the 
public eye and safeguards against government corruption, aberration and 
incompetence.178 James Madison clearly understood the importance of information in 
the hands of the people when he wrote that: 
“Knowledge will forever govern ignorance and a people who mean to be their own governors must 
arm themselves with the power knowledge gives.”179 
Information in the hands of the people gives them the power to hold their 
representatives to account for their actions.180 Access to information is the ingredient 
that makes democracy effective.181 Conversely, secrecy makes it impossible for the 
people to examine state mischief carried out under the cover of obscurity.182 State 
representatives and government employees are susceptible to being tempted to 
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misuse or abuse their station. State corruption, ineptitude, abuse of authority and 
oppression would flourish if secrecy could always be used to conceal state mischief.183 
The right to access information has several objectives. Firstly, it specifically enjoins 
the public administration to be open and to foster openness in the performance of its 
duties. The objective of openness protects against state action that aims to conceal 
information in order to avoid public oversight. The values compel the state to make 
available information concerning its activities. In light of the right to access information, 
government is open if accurate information can be accessed by the public in a timely 
fashion.184 Openness is also responsible for promoting and fostering accountability. It 
ensures that information concerning state activity or inactivity enters the public domain 
where it can be scrutinised by the people.185 The Constitution specifically instructs the 
public administration to be accountable to the people.186 It enjoins the state to have a 
specific relationship with the governed. All state authority is derived from the people.187 
The elected government’s actions are seen as an expression of the people’s will.188 
The elected representatives are expected to promote and protect the interests, values, 
and political positions of the people.189 Therefore, where the state has exercised a 
particular power it must give an account of it to the people.190 Accountability places 
two duties on the state. The state must provide an account of its decisions or activities 
and the exercise of these public powers must be underpinned by rational 
considerations. In an open and democratic society, the state must identify the 
decisions that it took and explain why it exercised its power.191 
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Secondly, the right to access information allows for greater government 
transparency by combating secrecy.192 Transparency obliges government to give an 
account of its work.193 This means that the state must keep records of all official 
decisions and actions and must make them available on request.194 Consequently, 
this makes it more difficult to keep unlawful state actions, agreements and decisions 
out of the public domain.195 
The rationale for making state information available to citizens is simple. All state 
information is created, aggregated and utilised by public institutions that are publicly 
funded.196 In a democratic polity, ownership of this information does not belong to the 
state, but to the public. A state generates information not for its own benefit, but to rule 
in the best interests of the public.197 Naturally, the public must be able to examine any 
information that led to the exercise of public power.198  
Courts are therefore under an obligation to be guided by considerations of 
openness and transparency. These values provide the judiciary with sufficient 
guidance as to the meaning of the right of access to information. The rights and the 
values also provide the courts with sufficient clarity as to the types of information that 
can be procured from an organ of state. 
2.3.2.4 THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONSTITUTION’S RIGHT TO ACCESS 
INFORMATION FOLLOWING THE ENACTMENT OF THE PROMOTION OF 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT 
The question arises whether a freestanding constitutional right to access state 
information still exists. If so, two additional and interconnected questions arise. First, 
can a requester rely on this fundamental right directly where information and security 
are in tension? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, a second question 
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comes to the fore. Given that PAIA gives content to the constitutional right, does the 
rights provision itself lack clarity which could affect the resolution of the dispute 
between information and security if it is relied upon directly? 
Klaaren and Penfold are of the view that fundamental rights occupy a special 
position in the field of law. Their constitutional entrenchment provides these rights with 
a status above other rights in South African law. The elevated position of a 
fundamental right would be subtracted from if legislation could be introduced which 
would alter the content of a fundamental right. This would allow fundamental rights to 
be relegated to the realm of ordinary rights by legislative amendment. The 
constitutional text does not support this type of rights substitution. It holds that national 
legislation must be created to give effect to the constitutional right. Parliament gave 
effect to the right to access information by enacting PAIA, which sets out the legal 
framework for the right to access information. Nowhere in the text does it indicate that 
national legislation must be created to replace the fundamental right. On the strength 
of the above reasoning, the authors conclude that the constitutional right to information 
has not been rendered obsolete by the enactment of PAIA, but that the right continues 
to exist independently.199 It must be pointed out that any requester claiming that his 
right to access information has been infringed must first rely on PAIA to resolve the 
dispute. The requester will be prevented from directly relying on section 32 of the 
Constitution. This is known as the principle of subsidiarity. This principle entails that, 
where legislation has been adopted to give effect to a constitutional right, a person 
seeking to enforce that right must rely on the legislation in question, rather than relying 
directly on the constitutional right. 
Notwithstanding the above, there are certain instances in which a requester can 
rely on section 32 of the Constitution directly. In the first place, Van der Walt points out 
that a constitutional right can be relied upon directly where a litigant challenges the 
validity of the legislation that was enacted to give effect to the right.200 Section 32 can 
thus be used to challenge any provision of PAIA which is deemed to be 
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unconstitutional.201 An example of this is the apparent tension between section 32 of 
the Constitution and section 12 of PAIA. The Constitution holds that a requester may 
access any state information. Yet, PAIA ensures that the records of Cabinet, its 
committees, members of Parliament and of the provincial legislatures are outside of 
the reach of the right to access information. These bodies and members generate 
information using public funds for public benefit. It is hard to imagine why their records 
should be kept out of the public domain. In such instances, the constitutional provision 
could be used directly to challenge a provision of PAIA,202 as confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services,203 in which it was called upon to determine if the Constitution entitles South 
Africans to know who funds their political parties.204 
Secondly, the constitutional right can also be used to challenge any subsequent 
legislation which may attempt to unjustifiably limit the right of access to information.205 
The state introduced the Protection of State Information Bill (PSI).206 In its earlier form, 
PSI posed a number of problems for the right to access information under PAIA. Its 
most invasive provision aimed to make this bill, rather than PAIA, the standard for 
access to confidential state information.207 If the bill were to be enacted, the 
constitutional text could be relied on directly to challenge the constitutionality of some 
of its provisions. 
Thirdly, the constitutional right can be used in instances where the statutory 
provision does not give full effect to the right to access information.208 The 
Constitutional Court in My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services requires that the applicant first make out a case for the constitutional invalidity 
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of the legislation and if successful,209 the court will direct that remedial action be 
undertaken by Parliament to address any shortcoming in PAIA.210 The effect of this 
decision is that the judiciary requires that the applicant abide by the principle of 
subsidiarity to resolve disputes of this nature.211  
However, an argument can be made that the appropriate procedure should be for 
Parliament to pass additional legislation to supplement PAIA insofar as the act fails to 
give effect to the constitutional right. In fact this was the position of the applicants in 
this matter. The litigants submitted that the Constitutional Court is entitled to do so 
since section 167(4)(e) of the Constitution holds that: 
“Only the Constitutional Court may […] decide that Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a 
constitutional obligation,” 
which in the context of PAIA entitles the Court to call upon Parliament to rectify the 
act’s shortcoming by enacting remedial legislation.212 The Constitutional Court refused 
to adopt this position.213 Cachalia has heavily criticised the judiciary’s decision. She 
submits that the consequence of the Court’s decision is that it effectively bars every 
applicant from seeking the introduction of remedial legislation in terms of section 
167(4)(e) of the Constitution in instances were subsidiary legislation is in place. In the 
author’s view the court has inserted the principle of subsidiarity where it does not really 
belong and has impaired the efficacy and efficiency of our law.214  
Finally, the constitutional provision can be relied upon directly if a lacuna is found 
in PAIA.215 PAIA only allows access to information which has been reduced to 
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recorded form.216 Yet, the Constitution allows access to any information.217 
Additionally, section 39(2) of the supreme law provides that legislation must be read 
in such a way as to conform to the Bill of Rights. The effect is that the constitutional 
right must be used to interpret PAIA’s provisions.218 Despite PAIA’s exclusion of 
access to unrecorded information, the constitutional right could be used to access 
information which is not recorded,219 in spite of the practical difficulties that may attend 
such an event. 
A litigant may therefore rely on section 32 directly in specific instances. It is difficult 
to imagine circumstances in which a requester of information will have to do so in the 
National Security context. However, in the event that it happens, the court will be 
guided by the text of section 32, together with the general and specific values which 
inform the right. That should provide sufficient clarity as to the meaning of the right 
and the information that may be accessed in terms of it. The Constitutional Court in 
My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services has also helped 
to flesh out the meaning of the right.220 However the right is not sacrosanct and can 
be limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
2.4 NATIONAL SECURITY, THE JUDICIARY AND FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION 
2.4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Even the most dogmatic proponents of an open and accountable government 
should recognise that publicising certain information could compromise the Republic’s 
National Security. Notwithstanding Coliver’s view set out in paragraph 2.3.1.1, the 
counterargument is equally persuasive, namely that the limitation of the free flow of 
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information in circumstances where its publicity will compromise National Security, 
does not impair democracy, but rather serves to reinforce and protect it.221  
National Security is ultimately a defence raised by the state to limit the free flow of 
information, to ensure national survival. Mandelbaum points out that states have 
always borne the responsibility of protecting their National Security.222 History shows 
that states limit individual and collective rights to preserve National Security.223 More 
specifically, states restrict the ability of actors to access, receive and impart 
information in the interests of National Security.224 In fact, it is universally accepted 
that states are justified in limiting the free flow of information to preserve their National 
Security.225  
While South African law protects the rights to access, receive and impart state-held 
information, it also requires South Africa’s National Security to be protected,226 and 
places this duty firmly in the hands of the state.227 Sections 198(c) and 198(d) of the 
Constitution states that: 
“(c) National security must be pursued in compliance with the law, including international law. 
(d) National security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive.” 
Thus, the state may limit the free flow of information for reasons of National 
Security. There is clearly a tension between the rights to access, receive and impart 
information, and the state’s duty to protect National Security. The courts, which are 
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regarded as the appropriate forum in which these disputes must be resolved,228 must 
do so in terms of applicable law and in a manner which promotes Open Justice.229 The 
judiciary should protect such sensitive information from being accessed and/or 
expressed by limiting these rights in the interests of National Security.230 PAIA and 
PIA are the two acts that permit the state to limit an information actor’s rights to access, 
receive and impart information, ostensibly for reasons of National Security.231 
2.4.2 NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO ACCESS STATE-HELD 
INFORMATION IN TERMS OF THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
ACT 
While PAIA guarantees the right to access state-held information, it also permits 
the state to deny access to the requested record in specific instances.232 If the 
requester contests the decision of the state to withhold the requested record and 
provided that all of PAIA’s procedural requirements have been satisfied,233 the courts 
can be called upon234 to resolve the tension between a requester’s right to access 
state-held information and the state’s limitation thereof.235 
Sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA grant the state the authority to limit a 
requester’s right to access state-held information, presumably for purposes of National 
Security. Sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA authorise an information officer 
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of any public body to deny a request for information if it is reasonably expected that 
making a record publicly available could prejudice: 
“(i) the defence of the Republic; or 
(ii) the security of the Republic; [...]”236 
Additionally, in order to assist the state in its protection of the ‘security and defence 
of the Republic’, section 41(2) of PAIA identifies specific information which, if 
publicised, may compromise these interests. The state may deny a request for access 
to a record containing such information if there is a reasonable expectation that the 
publicity of the record would compromise the ‘security or defence of the Republic’ or 
put it at risk.237 In terms of section 41(2), it is important to note that the publication of 
specific state-held information will not automatically compromise the Republic’s 
‘security or defence’. Rather, the act requires the state to apply its mind to determine 
if it can be reasonably expected that the publicity of the information will lead to the 
prejudice of the security or defence of the state. It is only when the state reaches that 
conclusion, based on its assessment of the record, that it should deny a request to 
access state-held information, provided that mandatory disclosure is not required in 
terms of section 46 of PAIA.  
Naturally, this limitation places the preservation of the ‘security or defence of the 
Republic’ at odds with everyone’s right to access any state-held information.238 
Provided that all of PAIA’s procedural requirements have been satisfied,239 the courts 
can be called upon to resolve the tension between a requester’s right to access state-
held information and the state’s limitation thereof.240 The act authorises the court to 
make any order that is just and equitable, including confirming, amending or setting 
aside the state’s decision to deny a request for access to information.241 The judiciary 
                                      
236 S41(1)(a)(i) & S41(1)(a)(ii). 
237 S41(2). 
238 S11(1), S41(1)(a)(i) & S41(1)(a)(ii). 
239 S11(1). 
240 S78(1). 




in its resolution of the dispute must determine if the state’s limitation of an actor’s right 
to access state-held information for reasons of National Security is justified.242  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the right to access state-held information and 
the values which underscore it are defined with a sufficient degree of clarity. They 
should therefore not prevent courts from deciding cases on a principled basis. The 
difficulty for the judiciary in resolving disputes between access to state-held 
information and security is caused, rather, by PAIA’s failure i) to specifically define the 
content of the security interests it aims to preserve, i.e. the meaning of ‘security and 
defence’; ii) to identify the threats which the act aims to guard against; and iii) to protect 
the appropriate security interests. Each of these drawbacks will be considered below. 
2.4.2.1 VAGUE MEANINGS: SECURITY AND DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC 
Sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA empower the information officer of a 
public body to deny a request to access state-held information if its disclosure could 
reasonably be expected to compromise the defence of the Republic or the security of 
the Republic.243 These provisions do not expressly refer to National Security. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, neither PAIA nor its regulations mention the words 
National Security.244 CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd v Fakie NNO – the first matter to be 
decided in terms of these provisions – did not even consider whether National Security 
and the ‘security or defence of the Republic’ are synonymous concepts.245 It 
nevertheless appears as if sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA are aimed at 
preserving South Africa’s National Security. This is so in view of (i) the historical 
context of National Security, (ii) the general scheme of PAIA, and (iii) the views 
expressed by academics and courts.  
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First of all, sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) seek to prevent prejudice to the 
defence and security of the Republic. Section 41(2) makes it clear that the protection 
of these interests extends to records containing information relating to, inter alia, 
military tactics and strategy, the deployment of weapons, or the deployment of a 
military force or unit. It also refers to information related to military and other forms of 
intelligence, and information that constitutes diplomatic correspondence with other 
states or international organisations.  
These interests correspond closely to Cold War conceptions of National Security. 
During the Cold War, National Security was associated with a state’s capacity to use 
force to deter military aggressors246 and to protect itself from violent threats.247 It was 
further concerned with the capacity of the state’s intelligence apparatus to identify and 
assess security threats,248 to measure the ability, limitations and motives of foreign 
states,249 and to help enable the military to counteract threats.250 In addition, National 
Security was also linked to foreign policy. The principal aim of a state’s foreign policy 
was to protect its independence and preserve and promote its political, social and 
economic policies.251 In times of crisis, foreign policy negotiations were used in an 
attempt to counteract a threat to a state’s National Security.252 The intelligence 
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apparatus had a direct impact on the tenor of foreign policy during the Cold War.253 It 
furnished state diplomats with essential information which influenced security 
negotiations significantly.254 Diplomats could show their enemies the vast losses they 
could suffer if they decided to engage in all-out war as a result of a state’s powerful 
military force and its strategic intelligence in an attempt to dissuade any aggressor 
from using force as an instrument to resolve disputes.255  
The references in section 41(2) to information relating to sensitive military, 
intelligence and diplomatic (foreign policy) matters are a clear indication that the terms 
defence and security of the Republic, as referred to in sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 
41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA, encompass state interests that have been associated with 
National Security since the Cold War epoch. Even though these sections do not 
specifically mention National Security, the interests which they aims to preserve have 
long been considered to form part of the Traditional conception (which will be 
discussed more comprehensively in the following section) of National Security. For 
this reason, it is submitted that National Security and the ‘security and defence of the 
Republic’ are interchangeable concepts.  
Secondly, this interpretation is supported by the general scheme of the legislation. 
Section 11 of PAIA provides that a requester must be given access to a record held 
by a public body if the requester has complied with the procedural requirements of the 
act, and if access to the record is not refused in terms of any of the grounds of refusal 
as set out in the act. Sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) are the only provisions in the 
act which can conceivably be raised to deny access to information for reasons of 
National Security. No other provision of PAIA provides the state with an exemption to 
deny a request for information on these grounds. To argue that these provisions do 
not extend to the interests traditionally protected by National Security just because 
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they do not include the latter term, would ignore the substance of the provisions and 
defeat their clearly expressed purpose.  
Thirdly, this view has also found academic and judicial support. Balule argues that 
sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) have to do with South Africa’s National Security.256 
Moreover, it is submitted that the High Court in Right2Know Campaign v Minister of 
Police recognised that the meaning of ‘defence and security of the Republic’, as 
contemplated in terms of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA, is synonymous 
with National Security. The court stated: 
“[…] disclosure could reasonably be expected to endanger’ anyone, or was ‘likely to prejudice or 
impair' any security measure of a building or a person, or to use the language of section 41, 
disclosure 'could reasonably be expected to cause prejudice’ to the state’s security.”257 
Even though the court used the term ‘state’s security’, it has long been held that 
‘National Security’ and ‘state security’ are identical concepts.258 The judgment thus 
confirms that sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA are concerned with South 
Africa’s National Security.  
While sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA are aimed at preserving National 
Security, the concept is still vague and open to abuse. One problem concerns the 
relationship between the security and defence of the Republic. These terms should 
ideally be interpreted in a way which does not make either of them tautologous or 
superfluous.259 However, it is not clear how they differ in meaning. Security can be 
understood to mean the offensive and defensive abilities of the state, while defence 
seems to hold the same meaning.260 There thus seems to be considerable overlap 
between the two terms. Regrettably, neither PAIA nor applicable case law defines 
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these terms or indicates how they differ.261 The net effect is that there is considerable 
uncertainty over the meaning of ‘security and defence’, and it is unclear what important 
security interests need to be preserved through an information blackout. 
The vagueness surrounding PAIA’s conception of National Security is cause for 
concern. There is a danger that the judiciary in resolving a dispute, or the state in 
deciding on an information request may unjustifiably limit the fundamental right of 
access to information to protect a vaguely defined state interest. Reference has 
already been made in the introductory chapter of this thesis to Coliver’s view that some 
of the worst human rights violations, attacks on democracy and threats to peace for 
the last 60 years have been a direct result of states’ reliance on vague conceptions of 
National Security to cloak their negative actions in secrecy.262 Romm hypothesises 
that states deliberately preserve the ambiguity of the term. He argues that its 
imprecision allows states to continue to execute specific actions without having to 
worry about or be burdened by public scrutiny of their activities.263 
If the judiciary is to guard against this state of affairs in terms of PAIA and satisfy 
the constitutional requirement set out in section 198(c) of the Constitution, the meaning 
of National Security (i.e. security and defence) must be clear. This is especially 
important since the South African executive has already attempted to rely on vague 
notions of National Security in the democratic epoch in an attempt to limit the free flow 
of information. This is clear from cases like Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister for Intelligence Services; Freedom of Expression Institute In re: Masetlha v 
President of the Republic of South Africa (the Masetlha decision),264 Right2Know 
Campaign v Minister of Police265 and Mandag Centre For Investigative Journalism v 
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Minister of Public Works.266 If South Africa is to avoid slipping back into its old habit of 
unjustifiably limiting the free flow of information to conceal malfeasance, Coliver and 
Romm’s warnings must be heeded. Failure to address these shortcomings could result 
in the unjustified restriction of rights that are directly responsible for fostering 
democracy.267  
A corollary drawback of PAIA’s imprecise definition is that it enables the state to 
continue misusing its National Security powers. Vague notions of National Security 
have enabled states to keep their actions secret268 and to make it appear as if their 
actions were legitimate and necessary. As pointed out earlier, many states, including 
South Africa, have misused their National Security powers in this fashion.269 Naturally 
this needs to be avoided. Clarifying the meaning of National Security may contribute 
to the reduction of the abuse of this term by the state since what needs to be protected 
will be clearly recorded within the law. 
2.4.2.2 THE FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AND DEFINE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS 
The second obstacle which could impair the judiciary’s ability to resolve the tension 
between the right to access information and National Security, is the failure of sections 
41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) to identify the threats that the courts must guard against 
when denying access to a request for information. Section 41(1), read together with 
section 82 of PAIA, permits the judiciary to deny a request for access to state-held 
information if the record’s disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause prejudice 
to the Republic of South Africa’s security and/or defence. 
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The purpose of the limitation is to prevent a threat from compromising National 
Security. The problem with the current provision is that not every publication of 
information that is reasonably expected to compromise National Security, should be 
concealed by the judiciary. There are threats which will compromise National Security, 
but which do not necessitate the limitation of an actor’s right to access state-held 
information. The reason for this is that, notwithstanding the limitation on the free flow 
of information, the threat will still compromise the target - i.e. National Security.270 This 
is best explained by providing a short analysis of National Security threats and several 
examples highlighting the need of PAIA to only protect against certain threats. 
During the Cold War, conceptions of National Security were concerned only with 
military threats. This approach was known as the ‘Traditional’ conception of National 
Security.271 At the close of the Cold War, a variety of actors became dissatisfied with 
this narrow conception of National Security. They noted that it did not extend to a 
number of emerging threats, and still viewed military security as dominant. They 
started to challenge the ‘Traditional’ conception of National Security and proposed 
expanding the concept to include other issues.272 The kernel of their argument was 
that new emerging issues of a non-military nature, could also threaten the National 
Security of a state.273 This post-Cold War debate, which inquired into what other issues 
should be identified as National Security threats, is known as the ‘Wide’ debate.274 
‘Wideners’ have argued for the securitisation of a number of different issues including, 
but not restricted to food security, mass migration, human rights issues,275 
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transportation, technology, terrorism,276 cyber-terrorism, transnational organised 
crime,277 market forces,278 free flow of information,279 narcotics, arms trading, money 
laundering280 and political posturing by other countries.281 Notwithstanding these 
debates, military security remains a key part of their notion of National Security.282 
If National Security is given such a wider meaning and if the term is understood 
inter alia to protect the people of a particular state, on such an understanding, it could 
be argued that the lack of water due to drought, threats to food security due to an 
insect invasion, and mass migration into a country are all threats which can 
compromise the lives of the people, and thus National Security. The wording of section 
41(1) of PAIA nevertheless suggests that the judiciary during proceedings and the 
state when considering information requests would not be permitted to deny access 
to state-held information in the above circumstances, as the containment of 
information will not prevent the security threats from compromising National Security. 
In these cases, the limitation of the right to information will not prevent the ‘Wide’ 
threats from compromising the target, i.e. the people.283 By contrast, National Security 
would be protected if the judiciary denied access to an information request by a hostile 
foreign army that would reveal the location of the state’s ballistic missiles. The same 
would apply if the courts prevented access to records on the state’s strategic defence 
protocols where an air raid by a hostile state is imminent, since the publicity of this 
information would allow potential or existing threats to compromise National Security.  
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In other words, there are only certain threats that necessitate that information be 
embargoed to preserve National Security. However, section 41(1) of PAIA does not 
identify what those threats are, or should be. All that this provision aims to do is to 
contain information where it is reasonable to expect that its publication can cause 
prejudice to National Security. There is unfortunately no clarity on the prejudice that 
needs to be avoided. Unsurprisingly, the state argued in Right2Know Campaign v 
Minister of Police that state-held information should be contained where there are ‘dark 
forces’ which can put the Republic at risk despite the vagueness and remoteness of 
the threat.284 If the courts are to resolve the tension correctly, it should have clarity on 
the types of threats it must neutralise by limiting the right to access state-held 
information. The rejection of a request to access information cannot be permitted to 
stand on account that a disclosure is reasonably expected to result in some mysterious 
prejudice to the state. Only once there is clarity on the nature of the threat will a 
decision maker be able to assess if a disclosure of state-held information can 
reasonably be expected to compromise National Security.285 Failing to identify 
National Security threats with sufficient specificity, could lead to judicial error or abuse. 
Additionally, the act in its current form preserves the state’s opportunity to misuse 
National Security by either over-protecting National Security or concealing state 
abuse.  
2.4.2.3 THE FAILURE TO PROTECT APPROPRIATE SECURITY INTERESTS 
The final drawback that could impair the judiciary in its ability to resolve the dispute, 
is the potential failure of PAIA to protect appropriate security interests. 
As mentioned earlier, sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA only protect the 
‘security or defence of the Republic’. There are however several other conceptions of 
National Security in South African law that protect security interests that are on the 
face of it different from those which PAIA aims to preserve.286 It may be appropriate 
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for PAIA to protect these interests. The former DCJ Moseneke in the Masetlha 
decision described National Security as: 
“[…] our collective safety and security.”287  
Yacoob J, on the other hand, viewed National Security as a state interest targeted 
at benefiting the people.288 Van der Westhuizen J stated that National Security is 
aimed at protecting the people, the Republic’s democratic order and state 
sovereignty.289 The 2013 amendment to the National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 
1994 (NSIA) recorded that National Security includes the protection of the Republic’s 
people, its constitutional order and its territorial integrity.290  
There are also international instruments which protect and give content to security 
interests that are seemingly different from those embedded in PAIA. The act does not 
seem to take cognisance of these established conceptions of National Security. The 
Siracusa Principles (SP) and the Johannesburg Principles (JHBP) are the most 
notable examples. Admittedly, a number of commentators have pointed out that a 
universally accepted definition of National Security does not exist.291 Be that as it may, 
the SP and the JHBP are non-binding international instruments that should be used 
as a mechanism to determine if PAIA protects the appropriate security interests. The 
rationale for this view will be set out below.292 
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The Constitution requires that National Security be pursued in terms of international 
law.293 In an attempt to determine what National Security should mean, guidance must 
be sought from international treaties and customary international law.294 A number of 
international human rights treaties deal with the tension between information and 
National Security. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR),295 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,296 both of 
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which have been ratified by South Africa,297 the European Convention on Human 
Rights298 and the American Convention on Human Rights299 which have no application 
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in South Africa, but provide examples of how other regions resolve this tension.300 
Unfortunately, none of these international instruments shed light on the meaning of 
National Security. The same applies to customary international law.301 
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As a consequence of the lack of a fixed definition in the ICCPR and other 
international human rights treaties, international law experts came together on two 
separate occasions to define what National Security means.302 The first took place in 
1984. A symposium was convened by the International Commission of Jurists, the 
International Association of Penal Law, and interest groups.303 What was eventually 
produced was the SP.304 The purpose of the SP is to provide uniform interpretations 
of limitations on the rights in the ICCPR.305 One such interpretation provided by the 
SP is a definition of National Security. The SP takes the position that National Security 
protects three interests, namely a ‘state’s political independence’, its ‘territorial 
integrity’ and the ‘existence of the nation’.306 In terms of the Covenant, states are thus 
permitted to derogate from their duty to protect the free flow of information if it will 
compromise any of these interests. The SP are not binding on states. Nevertheless, 
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they have been endorsed by the United Nations (UN).307 If a new conception of 
National Security is to be developed, or if the appropriateness of a conception of 
National Security needs to be tested, cognisance should be taken of these principles 
for two reasons. Firstly, the meaning of this conception of National Security was the 
product of expert contributions that drew from a variety of experiences.308 Secondly, 
the UN endorses the definition and thus recognises its value on an international 
level.309  
The second attempt to identify what National Security means at an international 
level was undertaken at the behest of Article 19, the International Centre against 
Censorship. Their endeavours resulted in the adoption of the JHBP in 1996.310 The 
purpose of the JHBP was to provide a set of guidelines that gives adequate protection 
to both the right to the free flow of information and the state’s obligation to protect 
National Security.311 The JHBP was meant to fill an important gap despite the fact that 
international law permits the right to free flow of information to be limited in the interests 
of National Security.312 However, National Security is not defined in international 
treaties.313 The inspiration for these principles was drawn from various sources of 
international and comparative law.314 One of the aims in crafting these principles was 
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to set the benchmark on how international law should develop in light of the tension 
between the free flow of information and National Security.315 Nevertheless, like the 
SP, the JHBP, despite being endorsed by the UN, does not have any binding effect 
on states, but can and should act as a guideline to be used to construct, or test the 
appropriateness of a South African definition of National Security. The reason for this 
is that these documents have become soft law. The endorsements of the JHBP and 
the SP came through reports by the special rapporteurs of the UN.316 Often the special 
rapporteurs’ reports set the standards and norms on specific matters.317 These reports 
are considered to be secondary soft law and can be used to assist in determining the 
meaning of National Security.318 
The Tshwane Principles is another instrument which is concerned with National 
Security and the free flow of information. On the 12th of June 2013, The Global 
Principles on National Security and the Right to Information, which for the remainder 
of this thesis will be referred to as the Tshwane Principles, were created. The purpose 
of this document is to set out norms for states engaged in the process of enacting laws 
which would enable them to withhold information on the grounds of National Security. 
The Tshwane Principles is based on international law, national law, expert 
contributions, and applicable norms and standards. This document is the product of 
contributions by 22 organisations and academic centres, 70 countries around the 
world, 500 experts, four special rapporteurs on freedom of expression and media 
freedom and the special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights.319 Two 
additional objectives of the Tshwane Principles were to produce a document which 
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would guide states when employing National Security as a defence and to guard 
against state abuse when employing this concept in the information context.320 One 
would have expected that, in order to achieve these objectives, the Tshwane 
Principles would at the very least put forward a definition of National Security. 
However, the Tshwane Principles’ sole contribution to debates on the meaning of 
National Security is found in Principle 2(c) which states that: 
“It is good practice for national security, where used to limit the right to information, to be defined 
precisely in a country’s legal framework in a manner consistent with a democratic society.”321 
Disappointingly the Tshwane Principles does not indicate what National Security 
means, or should mean, and does not assist decision-makers in defining the term in 
the South African context. 
Sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA do not expressly refer to some of the 
state interests that are referred to in the above definitions of National Security. They 
do not explicitly authorise the executive or judiciary to limit a requester’s right to access 
information if the information’s publicity will compromise our collective safety and 
security, the people, the Republic’s democratic order, territorial integrity, state 
sovereignty, the state’s political independence, the existence of the nation or the 
country’s existence.  
The omission of potentially important security interests from PAIA’s conception of 
National Security could have adverse consequences for the protection of National 
Security.322 The failure to protect the appropriate interests also leads to several 
additional problems. Firstly, no clarity exists as to what a state should protect when it 
limits the right to access state-held information. Secondly, it impairs the ability of states 
to identify threats accurately. National Security threats only exist if there is a target. 
Targets therefore need to be identified to determine which threats can compromise 
them.323 Thirdly, a corollary problem is that the state cannot focus its actions on 
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counteracting National Security threats from compromising the targets since these 
objects are not clearly defined. 
It could nevertheless be argued that the terms ‘security or defence of the Republic’, 
as referred to in sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA, can and should be 
interpreted to include the other security interests embedded within the other South 
African and international conceptions of National Security. Conversely, if the act is not 
reasonably capable of being interpreted in this fashion, it should be assessed if the 
security interests are of such importance that it warrants amending the act in order to 
protect them.  
It is therefore necessary to consider what security interests PAIA should protect in 
view of the different local and international conceptions of National Security and the 
uncertainty of the meaning of the term ‘security and the defence of the Republic’. 
2.4.2.3.1 FOREIGN CONCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
In addition to the South African and international conceptions of National Security 
referred to above, foreign law may shed further light on the possible meanings of 
National Security. The United Kingdom (UK) and the (USA) are two foreign 
jurisdictions which have developed various strategies for the preservation of their 
National Security.324 In order to determine if PAIA’s conception of National Security 
protects the appropriate security interests, the UK and the USA’s conceptions of 
National Security will be examined to determine if there are any additional security 
interests which the act should preserve. 
2.4.2.3.1.1 THE UNITED KINGDOM 
National Security has never been defined in the legislation of the UK.325 The 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which has been incorporated into the 
                                      
324 PF Scott The National Security Constitution (2018) 1-36; CA Watson U.S. National Security: A 
Reference Handbook (2008) 1-14. 
325 J Wadham & K Modi “National Security and Open Government in the United Kingdom” in The 




UK’s domestic law, does not define this term either.326 Despite this, the English courts 
did start to define National Security in Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Rehman. In this matter the House of Lords was called upon to hear an appeal against 
a decision by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, which held that Mr 
Rehman, a Pakistani National who had stayed in the UK since 9 February 1993, should 
not be deported on the basis that his continued presence represented a threat to the 
UK’s National Security.327 The appeal was heard by Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Steyn, 
Lord Hoffmann, Lord Cyde and Lord Hutton. The appeal was unanimously dismissed 
by all of the Lords. Of the five judges, only Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Hoffman 
engaged with the meaning of National Security.  
Lord Slynn of Hadley was of the view that National Security should not be limited to 
protecting the U.K, its people and its system of government,328 but was a far broader 
concept which included the protection of foreign states which, if overthrown, could 
result in reprisals against the United Kingdom.329 Scott argues that Lord Slynn of 
Hadley incorporated international security under National Security.330 He took a very 
broad view by holding that the meaning of National Security should not be limited to 
specific state interests only, but should also extend to international security.331  
Conversely Lord Hoffman took a much narrower view of the meaning of National 
Security. He stated that: 
“But there is no difficulty about what "national security" means. It is the security of the United 
Kingdom and its people.”332 
                                      
Balance (2003) 75:78; see also L Nomikos “Are We Sleepwalking into a Surveillance Society” (2017) 
vol 4 BLR 111: 113. 
326 Wadham & Modi “National Security and Open Government in the United Kingdom” in The Maxwell 
School of Syracuse University (ed) National Security and Open Government: Striking the Right Balance 
75:78. 
327 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman (AP) [2001] UKHL 47 [1]. 
328 [15]. 
329 [16]. 
330 Scott The National Security Constitution 282. 





Lord Hoffman did not indicate in his judgement if the concept was open to a broader 
interpretation.333 He agreed with Lord Slynn of Hadley that National Security 
concerned the protection of the UK and its people, but there was no consensus on 
whether the protection of the government was a state interest worthy of protection, or 
whether international security formed part of the UK’s conception of National Security.  
Despite the indistinct meaning of National Security in the UK,334 it is clear from the 
analysis of Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Hoffmann that the English conception of 
National Security includes, at a minimum, the UK and its people. In this, it overlaps 
with some of the South African conceptions of National Security referred to above. For 
example, Moseneke DCJ, Yacoob J, Van der Westhuizen J and NSIA all acknowledge 
that the people of South Africa are among the interests to be protected under National 
Security. Moreover, even though it is not immediately apparent what exactly the UK 
encompasses in this context, it appears to include its territorial integrity. NSIA also 
recognises that South Africa’s territorial integrity must be preserved. However, the 
identification of these protectable interests does not really take matters forward in the 
South African context, as they are formulated at a high level of generality, without 
unpacking the different meanings of these terms, and as they stand they do not really 
add anything new to the South African conceptions of National Security referred to 
above.  
2.4.2.3.2 THE UNITED STATES 
Despite the importance attached to National Security in the USA, there is sharp 
disagreement on what it means.335 The USA does not have a nationally accepted 
definition of National Security. Sarkesian, Williams and Cimbala have attempted to 
close this gap by providing a definition for this term. They submit that the concept 
should be defined as the ability of the US’ institutions to prevent harm to Americans, 
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their national interests and their confidence.336 However, this definition is not 
uncontroversial. Jordan, Taylor Jr., Meese and Nielsen opine that National Security 
means the preservation of the people, their way of life and the territory.337 Contrary to 
both views, Watson argues that the concept will never have a fixed meaning, and that 
its interpretation will fluctuate over time.338 In contradistinction to these authors, 
Ibrahim defines National Security as the national defence, economic interests, or 
foreign relations of the United States.339 
The failure to define what National Security means in the US will give rise to all of 
the problems which Coliver cautions against. Due to the inconsistent definitions of 
National Security, the lack of a fixed definition and the fluidity of the term, US 
conceptions of National Security are of limited use in assisting with what National 
Security should mean in the South African context. 
2.4.3 NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE AND IMPART STATE-
HELD INFORMATION IN TERMS OF THE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ACT 
PIA is one of the primary pieces of legislation that permits the state to protect 
sensitive information by restricting its receipt or dissemination. PIA was enacted to 
replace the Official Secrets Act 16 of 1956.340 Notwithstanding that both PAIA and PIA 
allow for the limitation of the free flow of information for security reasons, the two 
pieces of legislation are products of different time periods in South Africa’s history. 
Additionally, they are also considered to have different statuses. 
The introduction of PAIA into South Africa’s constitutional democracy was geared 
towards promoting a transparent constitutional democracy without compromising 
South Africa’s security interests.341 As set out earlier in this thesis it was enacted to 
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give effect to the constitutional right to access information.342 Prior to PAIA’s 
enactment Johannessen, Klaaren and White opined that this act should bring about 
two important additions to South Africa’s law in the information and security context. 
Firstly, the act ought to ensure that government store and preserve its information, 
and secondly, it should prevent the South African government from relying on secrecy 
laws to the detriment of individuals.343 Following the enactment of PAIA, the act gave 
effect to both of the above suggestions. PAIA obligated the state to provide access to 
all of its recorded information344 and additionally ensured that the state could deny 
access to state-held information if it would impair the Republic of South Africa’s 
security interests.345 Most importantly PAIA is constitutional. 
It is unusual that one of the central legislative documents used to restrict the 
expression of sensitive information originated from the Apartheid era.346 Originally, 
PIA was used by an undemocratic and oppressive government which saw threats to 
its powers coming from the different liberation movements.347 The act was employed 
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to manage internal security information and ensure that it was not disseminated. PIA 
was specifically employed to maintain the Apartheid government’s control over race 
relations.348 Klaaren argues that, in its current form, PIA provides the South African 
government with very broad powers in pursuit of security.349 These powers are so 
broad that Currie states that the act is a throwback to the Apartheid era and there have 
been many calls for it to be completely repealed.350 The reason for this is that PIA is 
considered to be unconstitutional. Despite the above criticisms of PIA, the act is still 
on South Africa’s statute books and can be utilised by the state to prevent the free flow 
of information, for reasons of National Security. The High Court in Mandag Centre For 
Investigative Journalism v Minister of Public Works recognised that PIA can be used 
to deny access to state information on the grounds of National Security. However, the 
court failed to set out which specific provisions of the act allow for this.351 Despite this, 
it is submitted that the primary provisions which allow for the limitation of information 
for National Security reasons can be found in sections 3 and 4 of the act. 
Section 3 of PIA aims to criminalise the receipt of information from or relating to any 
prohibited place, armaments, the defence of the Republic, any military matter, any 
security matter, the prevention or combating of terrorism, or any other matter or article, 
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which was procured for the purpose of dissemination to hostile states and actors, as 
the publicity of the information would compromise the ‘security of the Republic’.352  
Section 4(1) of PIA aims to prevent the publicity of sensitive information to specific 
actors, while section 4(2) criminalises the receipt of the same information. Klaaren 
opines that section 4 of PIA makes no distinction between information that, by virtue 
of its importance, should not be published or disseminated on the grounds of National 
Security, and information that should not be published or disclosed on any other 
grounds. He is nevertheless of the view that section 4 of PIA can be invoked by the 
state to restrict the publication of information that could compromise the Republic’s 
National Security.353 Ultimately, sections 3 and 4 of PIA permit the state to limit an 
actor’s right to free expression to protect the ‘security of the Republic’.354 
While the judiciary is entitled to limit an actor’s right to receive and impart state-held 
information in terms of PIA,355 the courts will have difficulty resolving disputes between 
information and security for the same reasons as set out in paragraph 2.4.2 above. 
The first difficulty is caused by the indistinctness of the security interest that PIA aims 
to protect. Sections 3 and 4 of PIA empower the judiciary to limit the rights to receive 
and impart information if doing so would preserve the ‘security of the Republic’. It is 
not immediately clear what the meaning of ‘security’ of the Republic means.356 As 
pointed out above, this uncertainty may lead to state abuse, and may impede the 
courts in their attempts to resolve the tension between the rights to receive and impart 
state-held information and National Security in a principled manner. In addition, the 
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act was adopted to protect the parochial interests of the Apartheid government.357 
Today, however, its provisions must be interpreted to promote the values underlying 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.358  
Like PAIA, PIA does not use the term National Security, nor do its provisions or 
relevant case law expressly indicate that the ‘security of the Republic’ and National 
Security are identical concepts. Additionally, PIA also does not contain an express 
definition of National Security or ‘security of the Republic’.359 Klaaren nevertheless 
argues that the relevant provisions of PIA are geared to assist the state in protecting 
South Africa’s National Security.360 The judiciary and the state can therefore rely on 
sections 3 and 4 of PIA to freeze the receipt and dissemination of state-held 
information for purposes of National Security.361 His view is borne out by the history 
of the concept of National Security, as referred to above. Historically, the use of this 
concept was linked closely to a state’s military capacity, intelligence and foreign 
relations. The term ‘security of the Republic, as used in PIA, seems closely aligned to 
these interests. For instance, the state can rely on these sections to prevent the 
publication of information concerning the intelligence operations of the state.  
The second difficulty is caused by PIA’s failure to identify the threats that it aims to 
guard against. Sections 3 and 4 of PIA contemplate that the state can limit the rights 
to receive and impart information, if it can show that there is a reasonable 
apprehension that the publicity of information will cause irreparable harm to the 
Republic’s National Security. However, PIA does not identify the threats that the state 
should protect against.362 If the courts are to resolve the tension correctly, they should 
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clarify the types of threats it must neutralise by limiting the right to receive and impart 
state-held information. The failure to identify National Security threats with sufficient 
specificity, could lead to judicial error or abuse as demonstrated earlier under 
paragraph 2.4.2.2. It has been shown under PAIA that not every threat to National 
Security is a National Security threat which requires that the free flow of information 
be limited in order to prevent a threat from compromising a target.363 This statement 
also rings true in PIA’s context. The reason for this is that PIA, like PAIA, does not list 
the specific threats to be warded off by limiting the free flow of information, nor does it 
set out those threats at a high level of generality. The act indirectly recognises that the 
purpose of the limitation of the right to receive and impart state-held information is to 
prevent a threat from compromising an interest, but what those threats are, is 
unclear.364 Consequently, for the courts to be able to resolve disputes between 
information and security and to prevent state abuse, PIA must identify the threats it 
aims to guard against.  
The final obstacle is PIA’s potential failure to protect appropriate security interests. 
Presently, PIA only refers to the ‘security of the Republic’. Like PAIA, the act seemingly 
fails to protect other important security interests, as referred to in paragraph 2.4.2.3 
above. On a superficial reading of sections 3 and 4 of the act, the judiciary and the 
state may not be able to rely on PIA to limit the right to receive and impart information 
if the defence of the Republic, or the interests identified in the Masetlha decision, the 
SP, JHBP or NSIA are at risk of being compromised. If PIA does not protect the 
appropriate security interests, the danger is that the judiciary could be restricted from 
protecting interests which must be preserved.  
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Additionally, all of the drawbacks for the state as adumbrated under paragraph 
2.4.2.3 of this chapter will also arise. However, it could be argued that the term 
‘security of the Republic’, as referred to in sections 3 and 4 of the act, can and should 
be interpreted to preserve the other security interests embedded within the other South 
African and international conceptions of National Security. Conversely, if the act 
cannot be interpreted in this fashion, it should be assessed if the security interests are 
of such importance that it warrants amending the act in order to protect them. As in 
the case of PAIA, it is therefore necessary to consider what security interests PIA 
should protect in light of the different local and international conceptions of National 
Security and the uncertainty over the meaning of the ‘security of the Republic’. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
South Africa’s courts can only resolve the tension between free flow of information 
and National Security in a manner that does not put the state at risk, if the meaning of 
National Security as contemplated by sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA, and 
sections 3 and 4 of PIA, is specific.  
The courts, in resolving disputes between information and security, should not have 
major difficulties in giving content to the information rights. The rights to access, 
receive and impart information and the values which inform them are set out with 
sufficient clarity. These rights grant actors the rights to access, receive and 
disseminate state-held information. They can, however, be limited in terms of sections 
41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA, and sections 3 and 4 of PIA, for purposes of 
National Security, provided that these limitations are justifiable in terms of section 36 
of the Constitution.  
Despite the importance of granting the state the power to limit the free flow of 
information for reasons of National Security in terms of PAIA and PIA, the said acts 
fail to identify the content of the protected security interests. They also potentially fail 
to include certain important security interests, and to identify the threats that they aim 
to guard against. This makes it unlikely that National Security will receive adequate 
protection in cases involving limitations of the free flow of information. In addition, 
vague conceptions of National Security can also open the door to state abuse. If 




Africa needs to avoid settling into the habit of unjustifiably limiting the free flow of 
information. There is therefore a need to determine what National Security means in 







DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The notion of National Security is said to be as old as the nation state itself.365 The 
first recorded use of the term was in a debate by Yale undergraduates in 1790 who 
aimed to answer the question: ‘does the National Security depend on fostering 
Domestic industries’.366 Yet, its use as an established term in the English language is 
a fairly recent phenomenon. The original term used to describe National Security, was 
national defence. The term was altered just prior to the start of the Cold War between 
the United States of America (USA), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and their 
respective allies.367 The National Security Act, passed by the USA in 1947, was the 
first piece of legislation that contained the term National Security.368 This concept 
came to be the vogue just prior to the end of the first half of the 20th century.369 Despite 
being the first country to use the term in its laws, the USA failed to set down a fixed 
definition for this concept.370 Since then, there have been many attempts to identify 
the meaning of National Security. However, a universally accepted definition of 
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National Security does not exist.371 What is universally accepted is that states are 
justified in limiting the free flow of information to preserve their National Security.372 
This state defence does create problems, the most prominent of which is the 
significant state abuse of the concept for the last six decades.373  
As indicated in the previous chapter, sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA 
authorise the limitation of the right to access state-held information in order to protect 
the ‘defence and security of the Republic’, while sections 3 and 4 of PIA enable the 
limitation of the rights to receive and impart state-held information in order to preserve 
the ‘security of the Republic’. It was submitted in chapter 2 that the terms ‘defence of 
the Republic’ and ‘security of the Republic’ bear the same meaning as National 
Security.374 It was further argued that both acts fail to define the meaning of these 
terms. As argued in the previous chapter, the acts are unclear as to (i) the appropriate 
security interests that they should protect, (ii) the content of the security interests, and 
(iii) the threats that they are to guard against.375 The lack of a clear and established 
definition leads to several problems. First, it could leave the Republic with inadequate 
protection and could put the state in harm’s way.376 Secondly, it could open the door 
for the South African government to conceal malfeasance, unjustifiably limit the free 
flow of information and undermine democracy. Thirdly, it makes it difficult for the 
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judiciary to resolve the tension between the free flow of information and National 
Security in a principled manner.377  
Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to determine what National Security 
should mean in terms of PAIA and PIA. Such a definition could help guide the state in 
protecting National Security when limiting the free flow of information in terms of these 
acts, and enable the South African judiciary to resolve disputes between the free flow 
of information and National Security in a manner that promotes Open Justice when 
proceedings have been instituted.  
To this end, this chapter will firstly analyse the security interests protected in terms 
of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and sections 3 and 4 of PIA, to 
determine if they are or can be defined with sufficient clarity. Secondly, the chapter will 
examine other relevant South African and international conceptions of National 
Security to determine what this concept means. Thereafter it will juxtapose the security 
interests protected in terms of PAIA and PIA against the security interests covered by 
those other conceptions of National Security to determine whether there are additional 
interests that PAIA and PIA should protect. Thirdly, PAIA and PIA will be re-examined 
to determine if the security interests of the acts lend themselves to an interpretation 
which could accommodate the other security interests which have been identified as 
appropriate to protect. Fourthly, this chapter will identify the types of National Security 
threats that warrant limiting the free flow of information in terms of PAIA and PIA. 
Fifthly, the chapter will seek to construct an appropriate statutory definition of National 
Security, which can be utilised to resolve disputes between information and security 
under PAIA and PIA. Lastly, this chapter will consider if such a statutory definition is 
necessary in light of the judiciary’s ability to determine what this concept means by 
rigorously engaging with the applicable security provisions of PAIA and PIA. 
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3.2 THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT 
3.2.1 THE MEANING OF DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC 
Despite the legislature’s and judiciary’s failure to give content to the meaning of the 
term ‘defence of the Republic’ as recorded under section 41(1)(a)(i) of PAIA, guidance 
can be sought from the Constitution to establish its meaning. Chapter 11 of the 
Constitution identifies South Africa’s security services and lays down the principles 
that govern National Security in the Republic. The Constitution places the protection 
of South Africa’s National Security in the hands of Parliament and the Executive.378 
Section 201(2)(b) of the Constitution provides that: 
“Only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorise the employment of the defence 
force […] in defence of the Republic.” 
The Constitution makes it clear that the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) must be employed in ‘defence of the Republic’. This is confirmed by section 
200(2) of the Constitution, which states that: 
“The primary object of the defence force is to defend […] the Republic […].” 
Ever since the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia states have engaged their 
military might against looming threats to defend their National Security.379 This 
conception of state defence persisted during the Cold War era where states feared 
that conquering forces would take away their independence.380 States engaged their 
military forces to neutralise or destroy any imminent or looming threat.381 They used 
their military might, in conjunction with their intelligence and foreign policy, to combat 
security threats.382 The objective of the military was to protect the state against any 
violent threats, irrespective of whether they originated from within its borders, or 
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extraterritorially.383 Different measures were employed to neutralise or destroy an 
enemy.384 As an example, if a threat emanated from within the state, the primary 
objective of the military in preserving National Security was to protect the state’s 
territory, its civil peace and, if the people mobilised against the government, to protect 
the state itself.385 If the threat was extraterritorial, the military force would either take 
an armed offensive or defensive stance against the threat.386 During the Cold War, 
states effectively employed their military in preparation for an attack and, if necessary, 
defended themselves via military action.387  
On the strength of this history, ‘defence’ can take on three meanings. Firstly, it could 
mean the state’s ability to defend itself. Secondly, it could refer to the activation of the 
state’s security services to actively defend against any hostilities. Thirdly, defence can 
also refer to the military’s resources available to protect the state. 
These interpretations of defence are consistent with section 41(2) of PAIA’s notion 
of defence. This section, read together with section 41(1)(a)(i) of the same act, 
authorises the state to deny access to records that contain information relating to the 
military’s ability to defend the Republic, military operations, or the resources of the 
military, if access to the information is reasonably expected to compromise South 
Africa’s National Security.388 Sections 41(2)(a), 41(2)(b)(i), 41(2)(b)(ii), 41(2)(c)(i), 
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41(2)(c)(ii), 41(2)(d)(i), 41(2)(d)(ii), 41(2)(e) and 41(2)(f) aim to protect information of 
a military nature. One of the purposes of section 41(2) is to empower state officials to 
deny access to information if its publicity will prejudice the military in its ability to defend 
South Africa in specific instances. The phrase ‘defence of the Republic’ as recorded 
in section 41(1)(a)(i) of PAIA therefore seems to refer to the SANDF’s ability to defend 
the Republic. 
However, the meaning of this section should not only be limited to the SANDF’s 
ability to defend the Republic. The meaning of ‘defence of the Republic’ should also 
include the ability of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and/or the SANDF to 
combat terrorism in specific instances. Even though SAPS is not entrusted with 
protecting the ‘defence of the Republic’ in terms of the Constitution,389 it is the duty of 
SAPS to combat terrorism.390 Sections 41(2)(b)(i), 41(2)(c)(ii) and 41(2)(d)(ii) of PAIA 
make it clear that the state may deny access to specific information concerning 
‘subversive or hostile activities’, if a reasonable expectation exists that its publication 
will compromise the ‘defence of the Republic’. ‘Subversive or hostile activities’ is 
defined in the act to include ‘terrorism […] whether inside or outside the Republic.’391 
Given that the obligation to combat terrorism falls in the domain of SAPS, sections 
41(1)(a)(i), 41(2)(a), 41(2)(b)(i), 41(2)(c)(ii) and 41(2)(d)(ii) of PAIA contemplate 
denying access to information to ensure that SAPS’ ability to combat terrorism is not 
                                      
the purpose of intelligence relating to - (i) the defence of the Republic; (ii) the detection, prevention, 
suppression or curtailment of subversive or hostile activities; or (iii) another state or an international 
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missions or consular posts of the Republic”. 
389 Constitution S205(3). 
390 S205(3); Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
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impaired in instances where there is a reasonable expectation that the ventilation of 
the information on such activities will compromise the ‘defence of the Republic’. 
However, SAPS may in certain instances be assisted by the SANDF in its fight against 
terrorism. Section 201(2)(a) of the Constitution provides in this regard that the 
President may: 
“authorise the employment of the defence force in co-operation with the police service.” 
Against this background, it would be possible to restrict access to state-held 
information in order to preserve the ability of SAPS, in co-operation with the SANDF, 
to combat terrorism. It is important to note that in these cases a reasonable expectation 
must exist that the publicity of information concerning their activities would 
compromise National Security.392 Therefore the ‘defence of the Republic’ in terms of 
section 41(1)(a)(i) of PAIA aims not only to protect the ability of the SANDF to protect 
the Republic of South Africa, but also the ability of SAPS, or, in certain circumstances, 
SAPS together with the SANDF, to combat terrorism. 
Military defence has always been a central interest of states in the context of 
National Security.393 Granting the South African government the power to supress 
information so that it may successfully defend the Republic is therefore critical. Failing 
to provide this authority to the state could potentially lead to the damage, invasion or 
occupation of the state.394 Additionally, impairing the ability of the state to take 
measures against terrorism in South Africa could also have grave consequences.395 
Parliament’s decision to protect these security interests in terms of PAIA seems 
uncontroversial. The defence of a country is historically seen as an interest worthy of 
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protection. That has been the case since the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia.396 
The importance of state defence has been emphasised inter alia during the Cold 
War,397 in the ‘Traditional’ and ‘Wide’ debate around National Security,398 and in 
international thinking around National Security.399 It is commonly accepted that 
terrorism represents a threat to a country’s National Security. The failure to protect 
against it will surely compromise South Africa’s National Security.  
In view of this, the state may deny a request for access to a record in terms of PAIA 
if preventing access to it would protect the SANDF’s ability to protect the Republic of 
South Africa, or in specific instances the ability of SAPS in cooperation with the SANDF 
to combat terrorism.400  
3.2.2 THE MEANING OF SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC  
Section 41(1)(a)(ii) of the act does not specify what the phrase ‘security of the 
Republic’ means. The rest of the act does not provide clarity on the meaning of the 
phrase either. Regrettably, the courts have not been called upon to determine what 
the phrase means. 
Despite the failure to define what ‘security of the Republic’ means, section 
41(2)(d)(ii), read together with section 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA, does provide some insight 
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into the meaning of the phrase. Read together, these sections enable the state to deny 
access to state-held records: 
“(d) held for the purpose of intelligence relating to- 
(ii) the detection, prevention, suppression or curtailment of subversive or hostile 
activities;”401 
if the reasonable expectation exists that the publicity of the intelligence record could 
compromise the ‘security of South Africa’.402 Section 41(2)(d)(ii) clearly contemplates 
protecting information which is of importance to the South African intelligence services. 
Given the intelligence services’ role in protecting the ‘security of the Republic’, their 
intelligence should not be leaked if the reasonable prospect exists that its ventilation 
will compromise the intelligence services’ ability to protect the state. Therefore, the 
‘security of the Republic’ seems to be concerned with preserving the intelligence 
services’ ability to protect South Africa’s security. 
The purpose of the intelligence services in South Africa seems to support the above 
interpretation. The Constitution provides that the security services consist of: 
“[…] a single defence force, a single police service and any intelligence services […].”403 
The South African Intelligence Service is made up of three bodies namely, the State 
Security Agency (Agency), the military intelligence division of the SANDF, and the 
Crime Intelligence Division of the South African Police Service (CID).404 The military 
intelligence division of the SANDF and the CID are autonomous organs of state, which 
fall under the control of the Department of Defence and the Police Service 
respectively,405 while the Agency is governed by the Intelligence Services Act.406 
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Collectively, all of the abovementioned entities are referred to as the National 
Intelligence Structures and are governed by NSIA.407 
Historically, states employed their intelligence services to identify and assess 
threats to their safety and security.408 The intelligence apparatuses are used covertly 
to measure the ability, limitations and purposes of foreign states409 and to assess their 
personal exposure to threats.410 In the same vein, Parliament tasked the Agency in 
terms of section 2(1)(b) of NSIA to execute its national counterintelligence 
responsibilities by identifying: 
“[…] any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic […]” 
and in terms of its additional functions under section 2(2)(a)(i) of NSIA: 
“to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse foreign intelligence excluding foreign military intelligence, 
in order to – (i) identify any threat or potential threat to the security of the Republic […].” 
NSIA thus clearly states that the Agency is responsible for providing the Republic 
of South Africa with ‘security’ and how this function is to be executed. The functions of 
the intelligence services as set out in NSIA reinforces the view that, for purposes of 
PAIA, the ‘security of the Republic’ is concerned with preserving the intelligence 
services’ ability to protect South Africa’s security. In order to effectively execute this 
function, PAIA provides the Agency with the authority to deny access to information 
which would impair its ability to execute its duty in terms of NSIA. It is submitted that 
the object of these acts is geared towards preserving the same interests, i.e. the 
security of the Republic. 
It is important to note that the Agency is not the only intelligence service which 
provides security to South Africa. Section 3(1)(b) of NSIA specifically contemplates 
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that SAPS can execute functions aimed at preserving the ‘security of the Republic’. 
This is also recognised by section 41(2)(d)(ii) of PAIA. This section, read together with 
section 41(1)(a)(ii), clearly empowers the state to deny access to intelligence related 
to ‘subversive or hostile activities’, if its publication is reasonably expected to 
compromise the state’s security. As illustrated in paragraph 3.2.1 of this chapter, the 
definition of ‘subversive or hostile activities’ includes acts of terror which SAPS must 
guard against. The state must therefore deny access to intelligence records if its 
publicity is reasonably expected to compromise SAPS’ ability to preserve the ‘security 
of the Republic’. 
The SANDF is also responsible for providing security to the Republic of South 
Africa. Sections 41(1)(a)(ii) and 41(2)(d)(ii) of PAIA, read together with the definition 
of ‘subversive or hostile activities’ as embedded in section 1 of the act, entitles the 
state to deny access to intelligence: 
“relating to - the detection, prevention, suppression or curtailment of subversive or hostile activities.” 
Included in the definition of ‘subversive or hostile activities’ are acts of aggression 
aimed at South Africa. Thus, the state is entitled in terms of the previous sections to 
deny access to an intelligence record which includes information concerning the 
‘detection, prevention, suppression or curtailment’ of acts of aggression against the 
Republic.411 Aggression is defined in terms of general resolution 29/3314 of the 
General Assembly as: 
“[…] armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out 
in this Definition.”412 
The defence against these types of attacks falls in the realm of expertise of the 
SANDF. Additionally, intelligence related to these types of threats must also fall within 
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the domain of the SANDF. Therefore, the South African military is also concerned with 
preserving the ‘security of the Republic’ from an intelligence perspective.413 
In the context of the above, preserving the ‘security of the Republic’ is essentially 
concerned with protecting the security capacity of the intelligence services (i.e. the 
Agency, SAPS and the SANDF) of South Africa.414 
While sections 41(1)(a)(ii) and 41(2)(d)(ii) of PAIA allow the state to deny access to 
information in matters which concern the intelligence services, the act also recognises 
that there may be intelligence which should be protected by other branches of 
government. This view seems to be aligned with NSIA. Section 3(1) of NSIA 
specifically provides that any other department of state may be required in terms of 
applicable law to perform any function or engage in activity to counteract any threat to 
the ‘security of Republic’. Section 3(1) states that: 
“[…] such law shall be deemed to empower such department to gather departmental intelligence, 
and to evaluate, correlate and interpret such intelligence for the purpose of discharging such function 
[…].” 
NSIA also makes it clear that the activities of these other departments of state in 
protecting South Africa’s security must not conflict with the SANDF’s and SAPS’ 
duties.415 If one reads section 3(1) of NSIA together with sections 41(1)(a)(ii) and 41(2) 
of PAIA, the provisions of the latter act permit the state to deny access to the 
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intelligence records of these other departments of state if a reasonable risk exists that 
their publication will compromise the ‘security of the Republic’. Ultimately, section 3(1) 
of NSIA and sections 41(1)(a)(ii) and 41(2) (d)(ii) of PAIA are geared towards 
preserving the ability of other departments of state to protect the ‘security of the 
Republic’. 
The ‘security of the Republic’ as recorded in terms of section 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA is 
therefore concerned with protecting the security capacity of the intelligence services 
of South Africa (i.e. the Agency, SAPS and the SANDF) and the capacity of other 
department of states – authorised in terms of applicable law – to provide ‘security to 
the Republic’. 
3.3 THE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ACT 
As indicated in the previous chapter, sections 3 and 4 of PIA enable the judiciary to 
limit the right to express state-held information in order to preserve the ‘security of the 
Republic’. The rub is that the meaning of ‘security of the Republic’ is unclear in terms 
of this act. 
Section 3 of PIA aims to criminalise the receipt of information from or relating to any 
prohibited place. Section 1 of the act provides that a prohibited place means: 
“(a) any work of defence belonging to or occupied or used by or on behalf of the Government, 
including - 
(i) any arsenal, military establishment or station, factory, dockyard, camp, ship, vessel or 
aircraft; 
(ii) any telegraph, telephone, radio or signal station or office; and 
(iii) any place used for building, repairing, making, keeping or obtaining armaments or any 
model or document relating thereto” 
Section 3 further aims to criminalise the receipt of any information originating from 
or concerning armaments, the defence of the Republic, any military matter, any 
security matter, any information concerning the prevention or combating of terrorism, 
and any other matter or article, as the disclosure of these types of information can 
compromise the ‘security of the Republic’. Since all of the information which needs to 




is submitted that the purpose of freezing the information is to ensure that the state’s 
ability to defend itself, the activation of the state’s security services to actively defend 
against any hostilities and the state’s resources available to protect itself are not 
compromised by the publication of information. It therefore seems that section 3 of 
PIA, which aims to preserve the ‘security of the Republic’, is concerned with protecting 
the SANDF’s ability to protect the Republic of South Africa.  
Section 3(b)(ii) of PIA is also concerned with preserving the intelligence capacity of 
the Agency. This section provides that: 
“Any person who, for purposes of the disclosure thereof to any foreign State or to any agent, or to 
any employee or inhabitant of, or any organization, party, institution, body or movement in, any 
foreign State, or to any hostile organization or to any office-bearer, officer, member or active 
supporter of any hostile organization –  
(b) prepares, compiles, makes, obtains or receives any document, model, article or information 
relating to – 
(ii) […] any security matter […],” 
which for reasons of state security should not be ventilated, shall be guilty of an 
offence. The term ‘security matter’ is defined in section 1 of PIA to include: 
“any matter which is dealt with by (a) the Agency as defined in section 1 of the Intelligence Services 
Act, 2002 (Act No. 65 of 2002) […] or which relates to the functions of the Agency […].” 
Sections 2(1) and 2(2) of NSIA set out the functions of the Agency. Its duties involve 
providing the state with security by fulfilling its intelligence functions as required by this 
act. Consequently, if information relating to the Agency’s functions are ventilated, the 
state can be placed in grave danger. It therefore seems reasonable that section 3(b)(ii) 
of PIA, in aiming to preserve the ability of the Agency to perform its security functions, 
does so in order to preserve the ‘security of the Republic’. Put differently, the ‘security 
of the Republic’ as referred to in section 3(b)(ii) of PIA is concerned with preserving 
the intelligence capacity of the Agency. 
PIA, like PAIA, also contemplates that the ‘security of the Republic’ can be 




prohibited from preventing and combating terrorism. Section 3 of PIA acknowledges 
that if state-held information recording the manner in which these organs of state 
execute their duties is publically ventilated, it could compromise their ability to keep 
the state secure against terrorism. Section 3 therefore aims to preserve these 
institutions’ ability to preserve the ‘security of the Republic’, by criminalising the receipt 
of information that concerns the prevention or combating of terrorism. While the exact 
wording of section 41(1)(a)(i) of PAIA and section 3 of PIA are different, both acts aim 
to protect the same security interests. Section 3 of PIA, like section 41(1)(a)(i) of PAIA, 
aims to protect the SANDF’s ability to protect the Republic of South Africa, as well as 
the ability of SAPS, acting alone or together with the SANDF, to combat terrorism.416 
It is important to note that, while sections 3(b)(ii) and 4(1)(b)(i) of PIA aim to protect 
the ‘security of the Republic’ by aiming to preserve the intelligence capabilities of the 
Agency, the act does not protect the intelligence capacity of SAPS, the SANDF or 
other department of states. Since the intelligence services provided by SAPS, the 
SANDF and other department of states are clearly necessary as pointed out in NSIA 
and PAIA, it would seem prudent that PIA’s security interest be aligned with PAIA’s. 
Section 4(1) of PIA aims to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information to specific 
actors. Section 4(1)(a)(i)(bb) provides that: 
“Any person who has in his possession or under his control or at his disposal -  
(a) any secret official code or password; 
(i) which he knows or reasonably should know is kept, used, made or obtained in a 
prohibited place or relates to a prohibited place, anything in a prohibited place, 
armaments, the defence of the republic, a military matter, a security matter or the 
prevention or combating of terrorism; 
(bb) publishes or uses such code, password, document, model, article or information 
in any manner or for any purpose which is prejudicial to the security or interests of the 
Republic;” 
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shall be guilty of committing an offence in South Africa.417 Additionally section 
4(1)(b)(i)(bb) holds that: 
“Any person who has in his possession or under his control or at his disposal -  
(b) any document, model, article or information; 
(ii) which he knows or reasonably should know is kept, used, made or obtained in a 
prohibited place or relates to a prohibited place, anything in a prohibited place, 
armaments, the defence of the republic, a military matter, a security matter or the 
prevention or combating of terrorism; 
(bb) publishes or uses such code, password, document, model, article or information 
in any manner or for any purpose which is prejudicial to the security or interests of the 
Republic;” 
shall also be guilty of committing an offence. Ultimately, both sections criminalise 
the possession and use or dissemination of sensitive information – any secret official 
code or password in the case of section 4(1)(a)(i)(bb), and any document, model, 
article or information in the case of section 4(1)(b)(i)(bb)) – in a manner which is 
prejudicial to the ‘security of the Republic’. In other words, sections 4(1)(a)(i)(bb) and 
4(1)(b)(i)(bb) of PIA aim to conceal information which, if expressed, could compromise 
South Africa’s National Security.  
While it is clear that sections 4(1)(a)(i)(bb) and 4(1)(b)(i)(bb) of PIA contemplate 
freezing the free flow of information for reasons of National Security, this does not 
draw us closer to determining what the concept means. The sensitive information 
which may not be possessed, used or disseminated relates to prohibited places, 
armaments, the defence of the Republic, military matters, security matters and the 
prevention or combating of terrorism. As demonstrated above in the context of section 
3, all of the preceding information concerns military matters – save for terrorism and 
the preservation of the Agency’s intelligence functions. It is submitted that the purpose 
of prohibiting the control and use, or the control and dissemination, of the information 
in terms of sections 4(1)(a)(i)(bb) and 4(1)(b)(i)(bb) of PIA is to protect the state’s ability 
to defend itself. Like section 3, sections 4(1)(a)(i)(bb) and 4(1)(b)(i)(bb) of PIA seem 
                                      




geared towards protecting the SANDF’s and the Agency’s ability to protect the 
Republic. Additionally, and as pointed out earlier, sections 4(1)(a)(i)(bb) and 
4(1)(b)(i)(bb) of PIA also criminalise the possession and use or dissemination of 
sensitive information which relates to the prevention and combating of terrorism. As 
argued earlier, the possession and use or dissemination of sensitive information 
relating to the prevention and combating of terrorism ultimately compromises the 
ability of SAPS, or SAPS in cooperation with the SANDF, to prevent and combat 
terrorism. 
While sections 4(1)(a)(i)(bb) and 4(1)(b)(i)(bb) of the act make it an offense to 
possess and use or disseminate sensitive information, section 4(2) of PIA acts as a 
catch all provision which prohibits the receipt of this genre of information. Although this 
provision does not explicitly state that the receipt of this type of sensitive information 
is a criminal activity due to National Security considerations, section 4(2), when read 
in conjunction with sections 4(1)(a)(i)(bb) and 4(1)(b)(i)(bb), is broad enough to 
criminalise the receipt of sensitive information which can compromise the ‘security of 
the Republic’. Naturally, National Security in terms of section 4(2) would carry the 
same meaning as set out in sections 4(1)(a)(i)(bb) and 4(1)(b)(i)(bb). It is important to 
note that section 4(2) suffers from a number of inherent problems, in that it is 
overbroad and possibly unconstitutional in certain respects. However, this analysis is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In summary, sections 3, 4(1)(a)(i)(bb), 4(1)(b)(i)(bb) and 4(2) of PIA are aimed at 
protecting security interests such as (i) the SANDF’s ability to protect the Republic of 
South Africa in relation to military matters, (ii) the Agency’s intelligence capacity and 
(iii) the ability of SAPS, or SAPS in co-operation with the SANDF, to guard against 
terrorism. 
3.4 TOWARDS PROTECTING APPROPRIATE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS 
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It could be asked whether PAIA and PIA afford adequate protection to National 
Security, or whether there are National Security interests that they fail to protect. As 




are, on the face of it, not incorporated into PAIA and PIA. For ease of reference they 
are repeated again. National Security in South Africa was viewed by Moseneke DCJ 
as ‘collective safety and security’,418 by Yacoob J as ‘protecting the people’,419 by Van 
der Westhuizen J as protecting the ‘democratic order’, ‘the people’, and ‘state 
sovereignty’420 and by NSIA as protecting ‘the people’, the ‘constitutional order’ and 
the ‘territorial integrity’ of the Republic of South Africa.421 The SP, the first of the 
relevant international instruments relating to National Security, aims to protect a 
‘state’s political independence’, its ‘territorial integrity’ and the ‘existence of the 
nation’,422 while the second, namely the JHBP, aims to protect a ‘country’s existence’, 
a ‘state’s capacity to defend itself’ and its ‘territorial integrity’.423  
As argued in the previous chapter, PAIA and PIA do not explicitly authorise 
limitations of the rights to access, receive and impart information, if its disclosure will 
compromise South Africa’s ‘collective safety and security’, its ‘people’, the ‘Republic’s 
democratic order’, ‘territorial integrity’, ‘state sovereignty’, the ‘state’s political 
independence’, the ‘existence of the nation’ and the ‘country’s existence’. The danger 
is that the acts may provide the Republic with inadequate protection if they fail to 
preserve the appropriate security interests. The question is therefore whether the acts’ 
conception of National Security is not under-inclusive. There is also a danger that the 
judiciary will not be in a proper position to resolve disputes between the free flow of 
information and National Security in terms of PAIA and PIA, if the acts do not preserve 
the appropriate security interests. 
It is therefore necessary to examine these other (South African and international) 
conceptions of National Security, and to determine whether they are capable of being 
clearly defined. It is also necessary to juxtapose these definitions against PAIA and 
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PIA’s conceptions of National Security. This must be done in order to establish 
whether PAIA and PIA’s conceptions of National Security are under-inclusive, and if 
so, to determine which other security interests should be incorporated into their 
conceptions of National Security.  
3.4.2 SOUTH AFRICAN CONCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
3.4.2.1 VAN DER WESTHUIZEN’S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY  
In his dissenting judgment in the Masetlha decision, Van der Westhuizen J opined 
that National Security must be construed to protect South Africa’s ‘people’, ‘the 
Republic’s democratic order’ and ‘state sovereignty’. Judge Van der Westhuizen’s 
understanding of National Security is firmly grounded in the Constitution’s rights and 
values.424 Although, he probably did not intend to provide a comprehensive definition 
for National Security, he did identify the security interests that National Security should 
protect. Unfortunately, that was the full extent of his comments on the meaning of 
National Security in South Africa. In order to determine if PAIA and PIA’s conceptions 
of National Security should include the security interests identified by Van der 
Westhuizen, an analysis of these security interests needs to be undertaken. The 
following paragraphs will analyse the terms sequentially. 
3.4.2.1.1 THE REPUBLIC’S DEMOCRATIC ORDER 
Although the meaning of democracy is a deeply contested issue,425 the ‘democratic 
order’ can be defined with a fair degree of specificity for National Security purposes. 
South Africa’s democratic order can be divided into two parts. The first can be 
classified as institutional democracy, and involves basic structures and institutions 
which operationalise democracy. The second breathes life into formal democratic 
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institutions and is referred to as non-institutional democracy.426 Collectively, these 
conceptions of democracy constitute South Africa’s democratic order. 
Malan posits that democracy exists if certain operational institutions, or what he 
calls essentialia, are in place. These essentialia are: the universality of the franchise, 
multiparty participation in regular elections that are free and fair, the control of political 
decision makers by the general public and majority rule.427 South Africa’s democratic 
structure includes all of these essentialia.428 The first three of these institutional 
structures are provided for in section 1(d) and are operationalised by section 19 of the 
supreme law.429 The institutional structure is fleshed out further in the Republic’s 
electoral legislation, which makes room for majority rule.430 
In addition to these essentialia, the Constitution also makes provision for other 
institutional structures. These mechanisms compel Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures to conduct their functions in accordance with representative democracy,431 
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to foster participatory democracy,432 to promote public and media access433 and to 
create a number of state institutions to support South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy.434  
Despite the valuable contribution that institutional democracy makes to South 
Africa’s democratic order, it is really non-institutional democracy that gives life to it. 
Institutional democracy is an empty shell without non-institutional democracy.435 At its 
most basic level, the common denominator in all conceptions of democracy is that 
democratic rule originates from the people, in the interests of the people.436 It is this 
activity of the people that breathes life into democracies’ institutional structures. 
Essentially, the institutional structures are created to convert the wishes of the people 
into tangible results. Brand opines that non-institutional democracy is the social activity 
                                      
432 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) [116]; 
Constitution S57(1) (b), S70(1)(b) & 116(1)(b); Roux “Democracy” in Constitutional law of South Africa 
10-43. The Constitutional Court in the Doctors for Life International case made it clear that participatory 
democracy is an indispensable part of South Africa’s democracy. The Constitution directs the NA, the 
NCOP and the provincial legislatures to conduct their business with due regard for participative 
democracy. Roux opines that these provisions seek to enhance the legitimacy and efficacy of political 
decision making. 
433 Constitution S59(2), S72(2) & S118(2); Roux “Democracy” in Constitutional law of South Africa 10-
44. The supreme law enjoins Parliament and the provincial legislatures to allow the public and/or the 
media to sit in on their committees. The Constitution - subject to limitations - prohibits these bodies from 
stifling public and media participation. These provisions permit the public access to information and the 
workings of government, as opposed to granting them the power to participate in legislative decision-
making. Opening up these committees to public scrutiny enhances the effectiveness of non-institutional 
democracy. Once aware of state information, the public and/or the media can make the people aware 
of important issues which concern them by disseminating the topical information. 
434 Constitution Chapter 9; Roux “Democracy” in Constitutional law of South Africa 10-47. Roux argues 
that the reason that these institutions exist is to support and protect a thick conception of democracy.  
435 Brand (2011) STLR 624. Brands contends that institutional democracy only provides the 
infrastructure in which substantive democracy can operate. The existence of democratic institutions 
does not mean that democracy exists, it only means that the state has fulfilled its essential duties to 
assist in the development of a democratic society. 
436 D Schultz “Democracy on trial: Terrorism, crime, and National Security policy in a post 9-11 world” 




occurring in communities, streets, papers, homes, churches and at work.437 This 
conception of democracy is firmly entrenched in and protected by the Bill of Rights.438 
Roux argues that the rights in the Bill of Rights constitute and provide shape to South 
Africa’s democracy.439 Since Van der Westhuizen’s democratic order is defined with 
sufficient clarity, the court will be well placed to resolve the dispute between the free 
flow of information and National Security in a manner which promotes Open Justice. 
3.4.2.1.2 THE PEOPLE  
Engaging the defence of National Security to protect ‘the people’, as Van der 
Westhuizen’s conception of National Security permits, is not a novel idea. The duty of 
states to protect persons residing within their borders is fundamental to the 
Westphalian conception of statehood.440 The underlying philosophy of the social 
contract is for states to protect citizens residing within their borders.441 Guarnizo 
pointed out that: 
“The 1648 Westphalian model of political organisation presupposes a unified, dominant and central 
political model that exercises supreme and autonomous governing power over a specific population 
within the borders of a clearly demarcated national territory.”442 
Currently, states are still responsible for protecting the physical safety and lives of 
the citizens who reside within their borders against violence.443 Violence aimed against 
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persons may be manifested in war, terrorism or similar attacks. Such violence can 
result in the death or injury of citizens within a state.444  
In the information context, the limitation of the free flow of information for purposes 
of National Security is geared towards protecting the physical security and lives of the 
people. However, neither NSIA nor the judgment in the Masetlha decision which both 
aim to protect the people, identify who the people in need of protection are.445 Do the 
people, in this context, refer only to citizens, or to everyone within South Africa’s 
borders?446 
According to Van der Westhuizen, National Security is aimed at protecting the 
fundamental rights of the people, not just citizens.447 The Constitution provides that 
everyone within the Republic’s borders has the right to life, irrespective of their 
citizenship.448 The importance of this right cannot be overlooked. If a person’s right to 
life is taken away, all other rights to which he/she is constitutionally entitled cease 
immediately.449 Section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution also requires the state to protect 
all persons from all forms of violence, irrespective of whether the violence is of a 
private or public nature.450 It is also important to note that section 7(1) of the 
Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights ‘enshrines the rights of all people’ in South 
Africa. Since Van der Westhuizen contemplates that the purpose of National Security 
is to counteract threats which will compromise the people’s rights to life and security 
of the person, and since the state is constitutionally obliged to take active steps to 
protect everyone’s right to life and physical security and the Bill of Rights enshrines 
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the rights of the people of South Africa,451 the people that Van der Westhuizen’s 
conception of National Security aims to protect, includes everyone within the territory 
of South Africa.452 On account that section 2 of the Constitution requires that all of the 
laws of the Republic must be read in a manner that is consistent with the supreme law, 
the people which NSIA and the judges aim to protect are the same people which the 
Constitution and Van der Westhuizen aim to protect. Thus, Van der Westhuizen’s 
conception of the people is adequately identified for purposes of National Security. 
3.4.2.1.3 STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
The idea that a state is sovereign and can engage in war to protect its territory 
originated at the beginning of the Westphalian period.453 The rationale informing this 
idea, is that in times of war all that a state can do is defend itself.454 Sovereignty is the 
supreme authority which a state exercises within its borders (or within its territory) and 
the recognition of this absolute power by foreign states.455 It can be divided into two 
components, namely internal and external sovereignty.456 That is not to suggest that 
two clinically divided aspects of sovereignty exist. On the contrary, these elements co-
exist and are complementary. Partitioning sovereignty into two facets simply makes it 
easier to discuss.457 
Internal sovereignty is the authority to control everything that falls within a state’s 
territory.458 On the other hand, external sovereignty – acknowledged by the 
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Constitution’s Preamble – is a legal barrier that prohibits foreign actors from interfering 
with the authority of the sovereign.459 
South Africa’s government has absolute authority in its territory.460 Its authority 
stretches over all of the people - citizens and non-citizens - found within the confines 
of its territory461 and over property falling within the scope of its jurisdiction.462 
Sovereignty over property in the Republic is exercised for the benefit of the people.463 
The Republic’s absolute authority expands over its land, its airspace, its territorial 
waters,464 its aircrafts flying over the high seas or foreign territory and its ships on the 
high seas.465 In some instances, outer space may also fall under a state’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.466 Any act which aims to impair an object over which the Republic has 
ultimate control will constitute a threat to South Africa’s sovereignty and ultimately its 
National Security.467 The state will thus be justified in limiting the free flow of 
information to protect any of the previous objects.468 
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State sovereignty will also be threatened if the Republic’s property in another state 
is targeted by hostile actors.469 South Africa has embassies and consulates in other 
states all over the world.470 Diplomatic institutions have a number of functions. They 
are responsible for representing the state, cultivating and fostering friendly relations, 
negotiating with foreign states, providing feedback on the conditions in the receiving 
state and protecting the interests of the sending state and its nationals.471 Even though 
the physical structures are owned by them, these diplomatic missions still fall under 
the jurisdiction of the receiving state.472 A sending state’s mission must not be 
prohibited from performing its functions. Although the inviolability of South Africa’s 
diplomatic institutions is not rooted in extraterritoriality, but in functional necessity, a 
threat to these missions will be interpreted as a threat to its sovereignty.473 
South Africa’s external authority on the other hand is the recognition by foreign 
states of its sovereignty.474 External sovereignty prohibits foreign states from 
exercising any kind of authority in South Africa’s jurisdiction.475 Foreign intervention 
may be interpreted as a threat to state sovereignty.  
At a conceptual level, state sovereignty does however create a number of problems 
in the National Security context. Is it a part of the state? If so, is it located at a specific 
place so that it can be impaired? Does it form part of the people, state institutions, 
administration or the bureaucracy? If so, does threatening any of the previous objects 
aim to compromise sovereignty? Is sovereignty part of the DNA of every object falling 
under the authority of a state and therefore by threatening it, can National Security be 
put at risk?476  
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The imprecision surrounding the meaning of state sovereignty is a cause for 
concern. Sovereignty cannot be defined with mathematical certainty and therefore 
states may use this as an opportunity to unlawfully limit the right to free flow of 
information in the interests of National Security,477 when state sovereignty is not at 
risk. Despite the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of sovereignty, the question 
whether a state’s sovereignty is at risk is factual in nature. What will constitute a threat 
to it is perhaps best explained with reference to examples, rather than by attempting 
to come up with a comprehensive definition.  
There were several Latin American states which in the 1970’s and 1980’s identified 
a number of social clubs, one of which was the Rotary Club, as a threat to their state 
sovereignty. In an attempt to stay in power and under the auspices of protecting their 
National Security, these military governments attacked peaceful groups, individuals 
and violent opponents to discourage political opposition.478 State sovereignty was 
clearly not at risk of being compromised in this instance.479  
An extreme example of the invasion of a state’s sovereignty occurred when Iraq 
was invaded by the USA in 2003. Following the invasion, the USA not only handpicked 
Iraq’s interim government, but crafted and put in place the legal framework under 
which sovereignty would be restored to Iraq. Neack records that: 
“[…] sovereignty as an ideal envisions no right of other states to determine the internal policy 
structure, leadership and laws of another sovereign state. Sovereignty as an ideal envisions no right 
of others to take away and give back one’s sovereignty.”480  
In the earlier example, it is clear that the USA violated Iraq’s sovereignty. 
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Another factual example of an invasion of state sovereignty occurred when the USA 
and Israel, in an attempt to impair and setback Iran’s nuclear capabilities, successfully 
released the STUXNET virus, which infiltrated the computer systems of the 
Iranians.481 Furthermore, the USA and Israel threatened to engage in further cyber-
attacks, which would continue to impair Iran’s nuclear program if it would not cease to 
develop its nuclear capabilities.482 This example reinforces the argument that a risk to 
a state’s sovereignty is a factual one. 
Due to the nature of Van der Westhuizen’s conception of sovereignty, the courts 
must determine if South Africa’s sovereignty is at risk of being compromised. 
3.4.2.2 THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ACT’S CONCEPTION OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
Parliament for the first time provided a partial definition of National Security in 2013 
when it amended NSIA.483 Section 1 of NSIA sets out that: 
““national security” includes the protection of the people of the Republic and the territorial integrity 
of the Republic […].” 
The word ‘includes’ indicates that Parliament did not aim to create a closed list of 
security interests, but envisages that other interests can also be safeguarded for 
reasons of National Security. Section 1’s definition of ‘national security’ further 
provides that NSIA aims to protect the Republic’s people and its territorial integrity 
from inter alia the following threats:  
“(i) Hostile acts of foreign intervention directed at undermining the constitutional order of the 
Republic; 
(ii) terrorism or terrorist-related activities; 
(iii) espionage; 
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(iv) exposure of a state security matter with the intention of undermining the constitutional order of 
the Republic; 
(v) exposure of economic, scientific or technological secrets vital to the Republic; 
(vi) sabotage; and 
(vii) serious violence directed at overthrowing the constitutional order of the Republic.” 
While the act recognises that the South African public and its territorial integrity 
must be protected from the preceding threats, these security interests are not directly 
at stake in the case of the threats referred to under paragraphs (i), (iv) and (vii) of the 
definition. In these instances, the objective of NSIA is to protect the ‘constitutional 
order’ of the Republic, not the people or its territorial integrity. It is strange that the 
legislature identified South Africa’s National Security interests in such an unclear 
manner. Notwithstanding the strange drafting, NSIA does permit the ‘constitutional 
order’ of the Republic to be recognised as a protectable interest.484 
NSIA’s non-exhaustive list is a doubled edged sword. Its open-ended conception of 
National Security allows for the protection of interests not specifically set out in the 
legislation. Naturally, this creates the opportunity for abuse, since courts and/or the 
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state are provided with the opportunity to protect interests which do not need to be 
protected, or to cover up malfeasance under the auspices of protecting a security 
interest. Consequently, NSIA permits the courts and the state to over-protect National 
Security. It thus opens the door to all of the dangers that may arise when courts and/or 
the state rely on a vague conception of National Security to limit the free flow of 
information, as set out in the former chapter.485 If the judiciary and the state are to 
provide adequate protection to National Security and to prevent the unjustifiable 
limitation of the free flow of information, it is important to identify the state’s security 
interests in unequivocal terms. Essentially, this is the purpose of defining National 
Security. 
Despite this inherent shortcoming in NSIA’s conception of National Security, the 
legislature does not seem intent on adjusting its thinking around this concept. The 
potential enactment of a particular security law provides evidence of this. Coined the 
‘Secrecy Bill’ by the media, PSI,486 originally gazetted as the Protection of Information 
Bill,487 was created to replace PIA as the legislation that would control the free flow of 
information in the interests of National Security in South Africa.488 However, since its 
formation it has been unable to shake off the scathing criticisms that have been 
levelled against it.489 Several versions of PSI have been released in an effort to allay 
the fears of the critics of the bill.490 The bill uses several methods that empower the 
state to protect National Security.491 Firstly, PSI allows authorised persons to classify 
information, and secondly, it allows the state to impose criminal sanctions on any 
person who unlawfully accesses, receives or disseminates it. It thus allows for the 
regulation of the free flow of information in the interests of National Security in two 
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ways: through classification and criminal liability in instances of contravention.492 
Classification can only be used by the state as an exceptional measure. A 
demonstrable need to protect information must exist before sensitive information can 
be classified.493 The right to conceal information falls in the sole domain of Cabinet, 
the Republic’s Security Services and their oversight committees.494 There is an 
exception to this rule: any head of any organ of state – or a person to whom a head 
has delegated their authority – can also classify information provided that this power 
is conferred on them by the Minister of State Security who has shown that good 
reasons exist to provide a head of an organ of state with classification authority. Yet, 
before the classification power will become operational, the Minister’s reasons for 
granting authority must first be approved by Parliament and the Minister must 
subsequently publish the reasons for granting this authority in the Government 
Gazette.495 Once classified, PSI makes it unlawful for any person to access, 
disseminate or receive such information.496  
Like NSIA, PSI makes it clear that one of its primary objectives is to protect South 
Africa’s National Security, and its conception of this term is identical to NSIA’s 
definition. In fact the entire definition is identical, not just the security interests.497 
Consequently, PSI entrenches the current legislative thinking around National 
Security. It is important to note that if this bill is enacted, the same danger will arise, 
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that is, its non-exhaustive protection of interests could lead to over-protection and 
abuse by the judiciary and the state in the name of National Security. 
Despite this drawback, an examination of the specific security interests identified in 
NSIA could bring us closer to determining what National Security should mean in the 
Republic of South Africa. 
3.4.2.2.1 THE MEANING OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN TERMS OF THE 
NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ACT  
Section 103 of the Constitution sets out the land territory of South Africa. Vrancken 
argues that if this section is read in conjunction with section 232 of the Constitution, it 
makes South Africa’s territorial sea also part of the Republic’s territory.498 Section 232 
states that: 
“Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or 
an Act of Parliament.” 
It is a principle of customary international law that the waters of a coastal state form 
part of the state.499 The Republic’s territory thus comprises both its land territory and 
territorial waters.500 The government therefore has a direct interest in protecting the 
Republic’s territorial integrity against damage, invasion, occupation, annexation and 
threats from internal or external forces.501 
Section 2 of the Constitution provides that: 
“This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, 
and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.” 
The effect of this provision is that the Constitution prevails over any other law in 
instances of conflict. In view of this, and in view of the fact that NSIA does not define 
the term, territorial integrity in terms of NSIA should be given the same meaning as 
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under the Constitution. This will add to the clarity of what needs to be preserved from 
a National Security perspective. 
3.4.2.2.2 THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF THE REPUBLIC 
IN TERMS OF THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ACT  
While NSIA is aimed at preserving the constitutional order of South Africa for 
purposes of National Security, the meaning of this concept has not been set out in the 
act or applicable case law.502 However, guidance could possibly be found in the 
German constitutional literature. This is because the German Basic Law includes 
provisions aimed at protecting the constitutional order or the free democratic order. 
For example, article 9(2) provides for the banning of associations that are directed 
against the constitutional order, while article 21(2) authorises the prohibition of political 
parties that seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order. These 
provisions are a direct response to Germany’s Nazi past, and are aimed at preventing 
anti-democratic movements and parties from exploiting constitutional freedoms in 
order to undermine or destroy the democratic constitutional order.503 The underlying 
idea that Germany’s constitutional order should be protected against anti-democratic 
threats has been coined militant democracy.504 The provisions in question have been 
interpreted by the German Federal Constitutional Court in a number of cases. 
Commenting on these judgments, Niesen points out that the Court took the position 
that the constitutional order is government: 
“[…] characterized by the absence of violent or arbitrary government.”505 
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In addition, the constitutional order is: 
“[…] a basic order that satisfies the following necessary conditions: "respect for human rights as 
laid down in the Basic Law - especially every person's right to life and free development -, respect 
for popular sovereignty, separation of powers, responsible government, an administration governed 
by the rule of law, independent courts, multiple and equal political parties, including the constitutional 
right to the establishment and operation of an opposition."506 
Niesen argues that the Basic Law and the jurisprudence of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court recognise that the constitutional order, which is based on rights, 
values, principles and institutions, is at risk of being compromised.507 Moreover, any 
threat aimed at compromising the constitutional order should be dealt with on the basis 
that it represents a threat to the state.508  
Like the German Basic Law, the Constitution is a direct reaction to the injustices of 
the past. The objective of transitioning to a constitutional democracy, was to move 
away from a ‘[…] deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold 
suffering and injustice […]’, and to ensure that South Africa is not forced to return 
across the bridge back to the Apartheid system or another oppressive system of 
governance which is not democratically authored or embraced by the majority of South 
Africans, as the late Professor Mureinik noted.509  
It is submitted that South Africa’s constitutional order is founded on the following six 
security interests. The first is democracy. For the first time in the history of the 
Republic, the franchise was granted to every adult South African irrespective of colour, 
creed, racial origin or religious beliefs, thus enabling them to support and vote for the 
political party of their choice.510 
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Secondly, the Constitution aims to safeguard a number of fundamental rights.511 
These rights promote the values of human dignity, equality and freedom.512 
Thirdly, a system of government was instituted to ensure democratic rule. 
Constitutional supremacy and the rule of law were introduced to act as constraints on 
the exercise of all public power.513 Additionally, the state must act in a manner which 
is open and accountable.514 Parliamentary sovereignty was done away with, and the 
exercise of public power must be authorised by applicable law.515 
Fourthly, the Constitution ensured that specific areas of competence were reserved 
for the executive, legislature and judiciary.516 
Fifthly, the supreme law reserved the duty to protect the Republic from threats to its 
constitutional order, for the security services. The Constitution tasks the security 
institutions with the responsibility of protecting and preserving the Republic’s 
constitutional democracy.517 
Lastly, it created specific chapter 9 institutions to ensure that democracy would be 
enforced and maintained in the Republic.518 
These features of South Africa’s constitutional order are at risk of being 
compromised in a number of ways. Hostile entities and actors could attempt to 
compromise this security interest by aiming threats against clearly defined groups in 
the state. They could capture and threaten the democratic institutions which are to 
uphold the Republic’s democracy. They could through force drive out persons residing 
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in an area in South Africa and partition this area off for right wing residents only. 
Furthermore, they could furnish this area with their political nomenclature.519 
Ultimately, this would result in an environment in which freedom, equality and human 
dignity cannot thrive or exist. If South Africa’s constitutional order is overhauled it will 
no longer represent a system of laws geared towards creating and preserving the 
central features of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. Any attempt to overthrow 
or change the constitutional order, or key aspects of it, through non-constitutional 
means, would endanger this interest.  
3.4.2.2.3 THE MEANING OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC IN TERMS OF THE 
NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ACT  
Who the people are has been examined under Van der Westhuizen’s conception of 
National Security. The same meaning should be given to the people for purposes of 
NSIA. 
3.4.3 INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
3.4.3.1 THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT, THE 
PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ACT AND INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
PAIA and PIA at first glance do not seem to expressly protect the established 
National Security interests as set out by specific international instruments, such as the 
SP and the JHBP.520 As mentioned before, the SP are concerned with protecting a 
state’s ‘political independence’, its ‘territorial integrity’ and the ‘existence of the 
nation’,521 while the JHBP are concerned with safeguarding a ‘country’s existence’, a 
‘state’s capacity to defend itself’ and ‘territorial integrity’.522 The interests that the SP 
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and the JHBP conceptions of National Security aim to safeguard appear to be different 
from those mentioned in PAIA and PIA, as well as from the interests protected in terms 
of NSIA and Van der Westhuizen’s notions of security.523  
However, there are overlaps between the interests which the SP and JHBP aim to 
protect and the other conceptions of National Security.524 Although caution should be 
exercised when relying on international conceptions of National Security, since this 
concept is a product of a state’s history,525 the SP and the JHBP conceptions of 
National Security could potentially assist us in determining what National Security 
should mean in terms of PAIA and PIA on the strength of the reasoning set out in the 
previous chapter. A failure to protect these interests may also result in under protection 
of South Africa’s National Security. It is thus necessary to analyse the content of the 
security interests protected in terms of these conceptions of National Security to 
determine what they mean, before determining if it is necessary for PAIA and PIA to 
preserve them from being compromised. 
3.4.3.2 THE SIRACUSA PRINCIPLES 
3.4.3.2.1 POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE 
Political independence does not have a fixed meaning.526 Bourne opines that it 
includes the powers to create, alter and maintain governments and constitutions, 
create and foster political alliances, conclude treaties and develop relationships with 
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other members of the international community.527 This concept is generally concerned 
with protecting a state’s ability to control matters that fall within its powers.528 
According to McDougal and Feliciano, political independence is impaired when the 
decision-making ability of a state to regulate and control its matters is totally 
surrendered to or considerably reduced by another state or states. The attack on a 
state’s political independence may manifest itself in the form of an attempt by 
unconstitutional means to alter the composition of government, to disempower it, to 
replace it or alter the manner in which decisions are reached within a state.529 
3.4.3.2.2 TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
Territorial integrity is not specifically defined in international law.530 Despite the lack 
of a fixed definition, El Ouali submits that it refers to a state’s sovereign right to exist 
within a defined territory.531 McDougal and Feliciano have a different perspective. 
Instead of focusing on the state’s right to existence, the two authors posit that territorial 
integrity is concerned with the control that the state has over a geographical area and 
the people who reside therein.532 Helpful as these viewpoints are, it seems that the 
concept is still contested and not many commentators have identified what it means.533 
Naturally the danger is that this term opens up the occasion for state abuse. 
3.4.3.2.3 THE EXISTENCE OF THE NATION 
It is also uncertain what the SP definition aims to protect where it refers to the 
‘existence of the nation’. There are two reasons for this uncertainty. The first reason 
is that the concept is defined so broadly that any number of things could potentially be 
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compromised when a threat or attack is aimed at the ‘existence of a nation’. On one 
view to threaten the ‘existence of the nation’ is the same as ‘threatening the life of the 
nation’.534 The SP defines the latter concept. It holds that to ‘threaten the life of the 
nation’ can mean one of several things. It could mean that the political independence 
or territorial integrity of the state is at risk. This is somewhat surprising as political 
independence and territorial integrity are the two other security interests safeguarded 
by the SP definition of National Security, as discussed above in paragraphs 3.4.3.2.1 
and 3.4.3.2.2, respectively. It seems strange that the drafters deemed it necessary to 
include the before mentioned security interests expressly, but then allowed for these 
interests to be protected again under the ‘existence of a nation’. Additionally, it can 
also mean that the whole of the population, the whole or part of the territory of the 
state, the physical integrity of the population or the existence or the basic functioning 
of institutions to ensure and protect the rights recognised in the covenant are 
threatened.535 In summary, the concept and the objects that it aims to protect causes 
considerable confusion. 
The second reason is that the word ‘nation’ is fraught with difficulties, and that 
employing National Security to protect it has often led to abuse.536 Buzan argues that 
the object that needs security is the nation. He defines nation as: 
“[…] a large group of people sharing the same culture and possibly the same racial heritage and 
normally living in one area.”537 
However, Cameron’s conception of the nation shows that Buzan’s solution is 
problematic. Evidence suggests that states in the past abused the term to justify 
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security activity aimed at protecting parochial interests.538 Cameron notes that the 
word ‘nation’ can be interpreted to refer to cultural, racial and ethnic groupings within 
a state. The socio-political cohesion between the groups may be weak or even non-
existent. The ideology of one group of people in a state might be totally different and 
stand in stark opposition to a state’s institutionalised ideology.539 Neack shows how 
cultural groups subscribing to different ideologies can result in tension, and be the 
cause of disloyalty towards a state. In the South African context, the majority of the 
population’s political ideology was different from and opposed to the Apartheid 
government’s creed.540 Thus, when the state employed National Security action to 
protect the nation in which there was weak socio-political cohesion, it was not 
protecting the entire population of the state, but rather partisan or elitist interests.541 
Buzan’s proposed conception of National Security would only seem to have purchase 
in very homogenous societies. If National Security is aimed at protecting the nation, 
who they are is more nuanced, as Cameron appreciates. It is therefore not certain 
what the word ‘nation’ means in the National Security context.542 
Although the attempt to define the interests that are in need of protection is to be 
welcomed, the majority of the SP interests are vaguely defined and open to different 
interpretations. The SP contribution in the context of the mediation of security and 
information seems to be very little, if any. 
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3.4.3.3 THE JOHANNESBURG PRINCIPLES 
Like the SP, the JHBP also defines National Security.543 The JHBP expressly 
protects the rights to access, receive and impart information. It also recognises that 
states may limit these rights in order to protect National Security,544 but takes care to 
specify what National Security entails. Inspired in part by the National Security 
definition of the SP, the JHBP hold that National Security must ‘protect a country’s 
existence’, its ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘the ability of the state to defend itself’.545 
Despite being partly inspired by the SP, the JHBP’s definition is different in several 
respects. Firstly, the JHBP does not specifically identify a state’s ‘political 
independence’ as a protectable interest. Secondly, the JHBP identifies a ‘country’s 
existence’ as one of its primary objects of protection, as opposed to a ‘nation’s 
existence’ as set out by the SP. This was motivated by the fact that states had in the 
past abused the term to justify state activity aimed at protecting parochial interests.546 
Thus, the authors of the JHBP wanted to make a break from this kind of arbitrary use 
of National Security. In terms of the JHBP, ‘a country’s existence’ refers to the entire 
country. Although the phrase implies the protection of a territory, it is aimed at 
safeguarding the population within a defined territory, not the territory itself, which is 
protected separately by the JHBP as an independent interest. Thus, only threats which 
pose a risk to the ‘entire country as a whole’, i.e. the entire population within a state, 
can impair National Security.547 Lastly, the JHBP recognises that a state’s National 
Security can be compromised if its capacity to defend itself is impaired. It thus 
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specifically recognises the need to protect the ability of a state to defend itself.548 The 
rationale for including this protectable interest in its definition is to permit states to deny 
access to or supress any information that would reveal details of its troop movements, 
weapons caches, or offensive and defensive abilities. 
The SP and the JHBP both identify territorial integrity as a protectable interest which 
needs to be protected for purposes of National Security. However, the inclusion of this 
interest was not inspired by the SP, but rather derived from the ECHR, which 
recognises that territorial integrity is a protectable interest that is inextricably linked to 
National Security.549 Conte shows that the European Court of Human Rights also 
treats territorial integrity as a concept closely linked to National Security.550 Coliver 
argues that this is also tacitly recognised by all of the seminal human rights treaties.551 
Unfortunately, a generally accepted universal definition, which crystallises the 
meaning of this concept, has not been established.552 Although the motivation for the 
inclusion of this concept is derived from the ECHR, commentators and jurisprudence 
do not identify what this concept means.553 The imprecision surrounding the meaning 
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of territorial integrity continues to exist under the JHBP. Additionally, the same risk of 
abuse under the SP continues under the JHBP too. The free flow of information runs 
the risk of being arbitrarily limited by states because both instruments allow for the 
protection of imprecise security interests.  
3.4.4 TOWARDS PROTECTING THE APPROPRIATE SECURITY INTERESTS IN 
TERMS OF THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT AND THE 
PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ACT 
From the above analysis it is clear that there are overlaps between some of the 
security interests that PAIA and PIA aim to protect, and the security interests which 
the other notions of National Security aim to preserve. The difficulty is determining 
which security interests should be protected by these two acts. It is therefore important 
to determine which conceptions of National Security will provide South Africa with the 
necessary protection, without risking serious violations of the rights to access, receive 
or impart information. To this end, this section will juxtapose PAIA and PIA’s notions 
of National Security against the security interests of the other conceptions of National 
Security that were discussed above. 
It has been argued above that section 41(1)(a)(i) of PAIA, in aiming to preserve the 
‘defence of the Republic’ from being compromised, is concerned with protecting the 
SANDF’s ability to safeguard the Republic of South Africa, and the ability of the SAPS, 
acting alone or together with the SANDF, to combat terrorism. Additionally, it has been 
argued that sections 3, 4(1)(a)(i)(bb), 4(1)(b)(i)(bb) and 4(2) of PIA, which aim to 
preserve the ‘security of the Republic’, are concerned with protecting the same 
interests as those set out in section 41(1)(a)(i) PAIA. The JHBP, like PAIA and PIA, 
recognises the need to protect the defence of the state. While there is an overlap 
between the security interests which PAIA and PIA aim to protect and which the JHBP 
aim to preserve, the acts aim to provide much broader protection than the JHBP. While 
the JHBP is concerned with preserving the defence of the country, the acts, in addition 
to protecting this interest, aim to guard against impairing the ability of SAPS, or SAPS 
together with the SANDF, to combat terrorism. In view of the importance of the 
preservation of the defence of the state and the state’s duty to guard against terrorism, 
it is submitted that it is more appropriate to protect PAIA and PIA’s conception of this 




As argued earlier, section 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA refers to the ‘security of the Republic’, 
which is ultimately concerned with preserving the security capacity of the intelligence 
services of South Africa (i.e. the Agency, SAPS and the SANDF) and the capacity of 
other department of states - authorised in terms of applicable law - to provide ‘security 
to the Republic’. The intelligence services and other departments of state which have 
specific authority to act in the intelligence cluster, are instrumental to South Africa’s 
safety. Since this security interest is defined with sufficient specificity and is of 
fundamental importance, PAIA should continue to protect it. Sections 3 and 4 of PIA 
also aims to preserve the intelligence capacity of the Agency. However this act does 
not seem concerned with preserving the intelligence capacity of SAPS, the SANDF 
and the capacity of other department of states - authorised in terms of applicable law. 
The danger is that PIA does not provide South Africa with sufficient protection. For this 
reason, PAIA’s conception of the ‘security of the Republic’ seems preferable.  
Whereas Van der Westhuizen, Yacoob, Moseneke and NSIA refer to ‘the people’, 
the SP refers to ‘the existence of the nation’, while the JHBP aims to protect ‘a 
country’s existence’.554 As pointed above, the SP’s formulation is problematic for two 
reasons. Firstly, the term ‘existence of the nation’ does not specifically have as its 
objective the protection of the people. The term is a misnomer, which refers to many 
objects, most of which do not directly concern the protection of the people, as 
demonstrated in paragraph 3.4.3.2.3.555 Incorporating SP’s ambiguous notion of the 
people into PAIA will cause confusion and create uncertainty as to what the purpose 
of the security action is. It will countenance arbitrary state action, and most importantly, 
it will fail to provide adequate protection to the most important protectable interest of 
National Security. Secondly, including the SP’s notion of the ‘nation’ into the act may 
permit the state to protect parochial interests as opposed to protecting all South 
Africans. Although the ‘nation’ as contemplated by the SP arguably refers to the nation 
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as a whole, there have been too many historical instances where states have invoked 
the protection of the nation to protect parochial interests. Since the ‘nation’ is 
sometimes identified with partisan interests, the use of the term could enable the state 
to limit the free flow of information in order to protect the interests of elites. 
Conversely, the JHBP clearly aims to protect all of the people within a state’s 
boundaries.556 The views of Van der Westhuizen, Yacoob, Moseneke and NSIA 
(collectively ‘the South African definitions’)557 similarly are geared towards protecting 
the lives and physical security of everyone in the state.558 The JHBP’s notion is drawn 
from various sources of international and comparative law,559 while the South African 
definitions’ conception is linked to South Africa’s Bill of Rights. Since the South African 
definitions and the JHBP are concerned with protecting the same interests and are 
clear on the content and meaning of ‘the people’, PAIA and PIA could include either 
of these notions of the people in its conception of National Security. However, since 
the meaning of the people as contemplated by South African laws is closely aligned 
to South Africa’s Bill of Rights, it is preferable if the acts refer to the people rather than 
to the country’s existence. The people are the single most important protectable 
interest to any country. All state power originates from the people, government is 
established for their wellbeing,560 the people create industries, provide the funds and 
labour to construct the state, and debate on and design the future of the state. Without 
people the need for democracy, sovereignty, territorial integrity and state defence are 
superfluous. In fact, the existence of the people is a precondition for the protection of 
National Security.561 For these reasons, PAIA and PIA should refer expressly to the 
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people as a security interest that must be safeguarded for purposes of National 
Security.  
Presently PAIA and PIA do not expressly refer to the remainder of the security 
interests which the other South African and international conceptions of National 
Security aim to preserve. They do not refer to a state’s democratic order, sovereignty 
(protected by Van der Westhuizen’s notion of security), constitutional order (protected 
by NSIA), territorial integrity (protected by NSIA, SP and JHBP) and political 
independence (protected by SP). PAIA and PIA’s failure to protect these interests may 
under-protect the Republic’s National Security where information rights and security 
interests come to a head. There are overlaps between Van der Westhuizen’s 
democratic order and NSIA’s constitutional order, and between Van der Westhuizen’s 
sovereignty, the SP’s political independence, and territorial integrity, as referred to by 
NSIA, SP and the JHBP. Thus, it is necessary to determine if these interests should 
be safeguarded by PAIA and PIA.  
On an initial reading, it is unclear whether and to what extent NSIA’s constitutional 
order is different from Van der Westhuizen’s democratic order. However, NSIA’s 
constitutional order seems broader. Van der Westhuizen’s democratic order includes 
institutional democracy, which is grounded in sections 1(d) and 19 of South Africa’s 
Constitution and electoral legislation, and other institutional structures designed to 
protect South Africa’s democracy. It also includes non-institutional democracy, which 
refers to those activities which give life to the institutional structures. NSIA’s notion of 
constitutional democracy is broad enough to include institutional and non-institutional 
democracy. But it also includes other important aspects of South Africa’s constitutional 
architecture. These interests are the recognition of the different spheres of 
government,562 the formation of independent and impartial entities aimed at promoting 
constitutional democracy,563 the recognition and empowerment of the security 
institutions tasked with protecting and preserving the Republic,564 the recognition and 
preservation of traditional leaders565 and a democratically authored government which 
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is embraced by the majority of South Africans.566 Due to the increased protection that 
the constitutional order would provide, PAIA and PIA should preserve this security 
interest. 
Territorial integrity is the only protectable interest that is safeguarded by different 
conceptions of National Security under an identical name, specifically under NSIA, the 
SP and JHBP. Although the meaning of territorial integrity under the JHBP and the SP 
is inexact, it is ultimately the physical base of a state that is protected, although its 
size, terrain, configuration, level and shape are also considered for protection 
purposes, depending on the state being analysed.567 The problem is that a state’s 
territory is not always precisely defined. A state’s territory may not be recognised by 
other states, its boundaries could be disputed or poorly defined, or the area which it 
controls may change over the course of time.568 Irrespective of the fact that territorial 
integrity has an imprecise meaning under the JHBP and SP, the protectable interest 
is specific enough in South Africa. Due to the specificity of the Republic’s notion of 
territorial integrity, PAIA and PIA’s conception of National Security should preserve 
South Africa’s conception of territorial integrity as a security interest.  
The SP identifies sovereignty as ‘political independence’, while Van der Westhuizen 
calls it ‘state sovereignty’. The people of all states have a direct interest in ensuring 
that their government uses its sovereignty for the nation’s wellbeing. A state wielding 
its sovereign authority creates the conditions for liberty, security, wealth and solidarity. 
It also uses its powers to put in place a rules based framework and consolidates it 
through enforcement to create order in society.569 Even though neither the SP nor Van 
der Westhuizen’s conception of sovereignty can be defined with scientific precision,570 
both definitions of National Security are concerned with protecting a state’s internal 
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and external sovereignty.571 To relinquish its state sovereignty to another actor would 
mean that the national and international destiny of South Africa will be designed and 
controlled by another state which does not have the Republic’s interests at heart. 
Ultimately, it will be undemocratic. Thus, PAIA and PIA’s notion of National Security 
must have as its objective the protection of the Republic’s sovereignty. Since the SP 
and Van der Westhuizen’s conception of sovereignty both ultimately aim to protect a 
state’s internal and external sovereignty, PAIA and PIA’s notion of National Security 
can protect either of the definitions’ conceptions of sovereignty. 
In light of the foregoing examination and in summary, PAIA and PIA, insofar as they 
seek to safeguard National Security, should aim to protect the defence, intelligence 
capacity, the people, the constitutional order, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Republic of South Africa from being compromised. These interests are specific 
and are sufficiently clear as to what will fall within the realm of their protection. They 
will thus assist the courts in their resolution of disputes between information and 
security. 
Requiring PAIA and PIA to protect these security interests would have two 
advantages. Firstly, and most importantly, it would make it more difficult for the state 
to abuse National Security in order to suppress sensitive information. In the case of a 
dispute, the courts will have clarity as to the National Security interests that could be 
invoked to limit the rights to access, receive and impart information. The imprecise 
meaning of National Security will no longer be a barrier to the principled resolution of 
such disputes. Secondly, the precision added to the meaning of National Security 
should ensure that the state is adequately protected against threats to its security. 
Articulating what needs to be protected allows the judiciary and the state to protect 
South Africa’s National Security, should the free flow of information and National 
Security come to a head. 
There are significant overlaps between the different security interests discussed 
above. For example, both the ‘constitutional order’ and the ‘people’ are concerned with 
preserving the life and safety of all people in South Africa. Similarly, the ‘constitutional 
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order’ aims to ensure that the security services preserve the Republic of South Africa, 
while also protecting the ‘defence of the country’. Moreover, state ‘sovereignty’ is a 
precondition for preserving the landscape, airspace and sea from being compromised, 
and thus overlaps with ‘territorial integrity’. Due to the overlap in security interests, the 
argument can be made that if the ‘constitutional order’ already aims to protect the lives 
of the people and to ensure the defence of the country, and state ‘sovereignty’ already 
preserves the ‘territorial integrity’ of the state, there is no need for PAIA and PIA to 
separately safeguard ‘the people’, the ‘defence’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of the Republic 
of South Africa.  
However, on closer scrutiny this argument does not hold much weight. Despite 
similarities between the security interests, a threat aimed at compromising ‘the people’ 
or the ‘defence of the Republic’ will not automatically compromise the ‘constitutional 
order’ of the Republic. This statement is best explained by way of two examples. 
Firstly, violent acts of terror targeting a particular part of society aim to compromise 
the life and safety of those people. While these violent attacks target the people, they 
may not necessarily be aimed at compromising the ‘constitutional order’ of the 
Republic. The security interest in need of protection in this example are the ‘people’, 
not the ‘constitutional order’ of the state. However, should the violent acts of terror 
aimed at harming ‘the people’ be executed with the purpose of overthrowing the state, 
the threat is aimed at the ‘constitutional order’ of the state, as opposed to the ‘people’. 
Secondly, if South Africa has constructed specialised weaponry to defend itself in 
times of war and the USA threatens war if South Africa does not dismantle the 
weaponry, such a threat is aimed at the defensive capability of the SANDF. If the South 
African media publishes the location of the specialised defence systems 
notwithstanding the threat and the USA carries out strategic attacks to neutralise this 
defence system, they have essentially impaired the defence capabilities of the state. 
The aim of the attack by the USA was not to overthrow the ‘constitutional order’ of 
South Africa. Its goal was to neutralise South Africa’s defence capabilities. Therefore, 
although the ‘constitutional order’ aims to preserve the security services, the attack 
perpetrated by the USA is not aimed at overhauling South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy. However, if the USA invaded South Africa for its mineral resources under 
the auspices of bringing true democracy to South Africa, this threat would be aimed at 




It is also important to note that compromising the ‘territorial integrity’ of the Republic 
will not automatically compromise the ‘sovereignty’ of the Republic. For example, if a 
group of radicals occupy and retain large tracts of state land through violence, these 
threats are aimed at compromising South Africa’s ‘territorial integrity’. However, if 
Zimbabwe annexes Tshwane, this action could be seen as an attack on the 
sovereignty of the state. On the other hand, certain activities may compromise both 
‘territorial integrity’ and its sovereignty. 
3.4.5 TOWARDS A MORE NUANCED INTERPRETATION: THE OTHER SECURITY 
INTERESTS AND THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT AND 
THE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ACT 
3.4.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As indicated above, sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and sections 3 and 
4 of PIA do not expressly refer to the constitutional order, territorial integrity, state 
sovereignty and the people of the Republic. It may nevertheless be asked whether 
these sections could be interpreted to include these interests under terms like the 
security and/or defence of the Republic. 
3.4.5.2 PROTECTING THE OTHER SECURITY INTERESTS: THE PROMOTION OF 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT 
Sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA enable the state to deny access to 
information if the reasonable expectation is that its publicity will compromise the 
‘security and/or the defence’ of the Republic. More specifically, these sections, read in 
conjunction with sections 41(2)(a), 41(2)(b)(i), 41(2)(c)(ii) and 41(2)(d)(ii), enable the 
state to deny access to state records containing information on ‘subversive or hostile 
activities’. 
The phrase ‘subversive or hostile activities’, as defined in section 1 of PAIA, is 
concerned with state records which contain information on acts of ‘aggression against 
the Republic’, acts of terror ‘aimed at the people of the Republic’, and the use of force 
or violence against the ‘constitutional order’ of the Republic. It is interesting to note 




of the other security interests, namely, sovereignty, territorial integrity, the people and 
the ‘constitutional order’ of the Republic. However, section 1’s definition of ‘subversive 
or hostile activities’ does not expressly refer to state sovereignty and the territorial 
integrity of the Republic, but refers to ‘aggression against the Republic’. The phrase 
‘aggression against the Republic’ means acts of violence aimed at the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of a state.572  
These sections do not obligate the state to deny access to information concerning 
acts of ‘aggression against the Republic’, acts of terror ‘aimed at the people of the 
Republic’, or the use of force or violence aimed at the ‘constitutional order’ of the 
Republic.573 The state may only restrict access to this type of information if its 
ventilation is reasonably expected to compromise South Africa’s defence or 
security.574 This seems to imply that, although records which contain information on 
‘subversive or hostile activities’ are concerned with matters which clearly threaten 
important security interests, the executive or the courts may still elect to ventilate it on 
the grounds that there is no reasonable expectation that the security and/or defence 
of the Republic will be compromised. This interpretation raises the concern that the 
state could be placed in serious danger if information relating to the detection, 
prevention, suppression or curtailment of subversive or hostile activities is released. 
It is however submitted that sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA can and 
should be interpreted to include the interests identified above within the meaning of 
the defence and security of the Republic. This is because it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario in which the ventilation of information would threaten the constitutional order, 
territorial integrity, state sovereignty or the people without also compromising the 
security and defence of the Republic. For this reason, it is not necessary to amend 
sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA. However, for PAIA’s conception of 
National Security to be truly effective, the content of its security interests should be 
aligned to the meanings ascribed to them in 3.4.4 above. 
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3.4.5.3 PROTECTING THE OTHER SECURITY INTERESTS: THE PROTECTION 
OF INFORMATION ACT 
Sections 3 and 4 of PIA also seem to be capable of an interpretation which could 
preserve the other security interests. As submitted earlier the act empowers state 
entities to conceal information which, if publicised, could compromise the ‘security of 
the Republic’. In addition, section 3 of PIA also contemplates freezing information 
which, if ventilated, would compromise the ‘Republic’s interests’. PIA does not define 
what the ‘interests of the Republic’ means, neither does any case law. However, as a 
consequence of the legislature’s view of National Security, as articulated in NSIA and 
PSI, it would be really surprising if the courts held the view that the ‘constitutional 
order’, territorial integrity, the sovereignty and the people of the Republic would not 
qualify as interests of the Republic worthy of protection. Therefore, section 3 of PIA 
does enable the state to conceal information which, if publicised, would compromise 
the other security interests. 
However, it must be kept in mind that the meaning of the ‘Republic’s interest’ is a 
deeply contested issue.575 The criticism of National Security has always been that it is 
an indistinct concept, and that its vagueness has enabled states to engage in and 
conceal their malfeasance. Despite the earlier interpretation of the ‘Republic’s 
interest’, it is submitted that it would be more appropriate if PIA clearly sets out the 
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security interests which it aims to preserve in order to avoid abuse or misuse.576 It is 
submitted that the act should be amended to preserve the relevant security interests. 
The risk in failing to do so is that the imprecision surrounding the meaning of this 
concept could allow the state to unjustifiably limit the free flow of information. However, 
even if the legislature fails to amend PIA, section 3 can be interpreted in a manner 
which would preserve the other security interests. 
Section 4(1) of PIA, like section 3 of the act, is also capable of being interpreted in 
a manner which permits the state to contain the free flow of information to protect the 
other security interests. The broadness of the provisions enables the courts and the 
state to limit the publicity of information which could compromise the ‘constitutional 
order’, ‘territorial integrity’, ‘state sovereignty’ and the ‘people’ of the Republic of South 
Africa. The same applies to section 4(2) of PIA.577 
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As argued earlier, it would be more appropriate if PIA clearly sets out the security 
interests which it aims to preserve.578 This can be achieved by amending the act to 
specify in section 1 that ‘interests of the Republic’ means the preservation of South 
Africa’s constitutional order, territorial integrity, state sovereignty and people. These 
terms should be given the meanings ascribed to them in paragraph 3.4.4 of this thesis.  
3.5 THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
3.5.1 BACKGROUND 
The purpose of defining the content of PAIA and PIA’s security interests is to reduce 
the extent to which the state could misuse National Security in disputes between 
information and security. However, the opportunity for abuse can be reduced even 
further if section 41(1)(a) of PAIA and sections 3 and 4 of PIA identified the nature of 
the threats which they aim to guard against by containing information.  
As pointed out in chapter 2, section 41(1)(a) of PAIA enables the state to deny 
access to state-held information, if it is reasonable to expect that the publicity of the 
information will compromise South Africa’s National Security – except in very specific 
instances which will be addressed in this paragraph below. Sections 3 and 4 of PIA 
also contemplate that the state can limit a person’s rights to receive and impart 
information in terms of the act, if it can show that there is a reasonable apprehension 
that the publicity of the information will cause irreparable harm to the Republic’s 
National Security.579 The failure to identify the National Security threats with sufficient 
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specificity, could lead to judicial and/or state error or abuse in terms of PAIA, as 
already demonstrated in paragraph 2.4.2.2 of this thesis. The same risk of error or 
abuse could occur in terms of PIA, since this act fails to identify the types of threats it 
aims to guard against, as pointed out above in paragraph 2.4.3. 
If the judiciary is to resolve the tension effectively, PAIA and PIA should expressly 
identify the threats it aims to neutralise when limiting the free flow of information. The 
solution could possibly be found in the two threat conceptions that are commonly found 
in the National Security context, namely force and imminence. Unlike PIA, NSIA and 
PSI expressly identify the National Security threats that can compromise their 
conceptions of National Security. Both the act and the bill aim to protect security 
interests from the use of force or the threat thereof, and from specific threats, namely 
hostile acts of foreign intervention, terrorism or terrorist related activities, espionage, 
exposure of economic, scientific or technological secrets vital to the Republic, 
sabotage and serious violence.580  
While section 41(1)(a) of PAIA does not identify the threats it aims to guard against 
through the embargo of information, the act does seem to have a preference at a 
specific level for the threats it aims to guard against. Section 41(2), read in conjunction 
with section 41(1)(a) of PAIA, aims to enable the state to deny access to a record if it 
firstly includes information which contains evidence of material relating to ‘subversive 
or hostile activities’;581 and secondly if the ventilation of the information could 
reasonably be expected to compromise National Security. 
Section 1 of PAIA defines the phrase ‘subversive or hostile’ activities as meaning 
inter alia: 
“(a) aggression against the Republic; 
(b) sabotage or terrorism aimed at the people of the Republic or a strategic asset of the Republic, 
whether inside or outside the Republic; 
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(c) an activity aimed at changing the constitutional order of the Republic by the use of force or 
violence;” 
While section 41(1)(a) of PAIA may not generally aim to counteract forceful threats, 
the state is empowered to deny a request for access to information if it is reasonably 
expected that the ventilation of information relating to the detection, prevention, 
suppression or curtailment of ‘subversive or hostile’ activities will compromise National 
Security. The reason for this is that, although the use of force and aggression are 
aimed at different targets, the ventilation of the information could reasonably be 
expected to compromise the ‘security or defence of the Republic’ if it were to enter into 
the public domain.  
Keeping the above in mind, it seems as if the legislature has already indicated its 
preference in NSIA, PSI and PAIA – in limited instances – for the use of force or the 
threat thereof. However, no clarity exists as to which of the two threat conceptions 
(imminence or force) best protects PAIA and PIA’s conception of National Security.582  
There are stark differences between the two threat conceptions, which could 
ultimately affect the outcome of an information embargo for purposes of National 
Security.583 Therefore, this chapter will examine which of these threat conceptions 
should be incorporated into PAIA and PIA. But first it is necessary to examine the 
content of the different threat conceptions and the manner in which they apply. 
3.5.2 IMMINENT THREATS 
Imminence in the National Security context finds its origins in customary 
international law. States possess an inherent right to defend themselves in the 
National Security context against imminent threats,584 but they have to do this under 
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an existing exception to all treaties, one of which is the right to self-defence.585 
Currently, a state’s right to self-defence against an imminent threat is captured in 
article 51 of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter)586 which is a codification of 
customary international law’s right to self-defence.587 The text of the UN Charter does 
not expressly use the words ‘imminent threat’ in relation to a state’s right to self-
defence. However, post-UN Charter scholarship is of the view that states have the 
right to defend themselves against imminent threats in terms of the aforementioned 
provision.588 Naturally, a state can use force to protect its National Security from 
imminent threats in terms of article 51 of the UN Charter.589 Imminence does not 
narrow down with sufficient specificity which threats a state can protect itself against 
by placing an embargo on information. 
Svarc posits that a threat will only be imminent if it amounts to an armed attack.590 
What an ‘armed attack’ is, is a deeply contested issue and not even the UN Charter 
provides clarity on the meaning of this concept.591 What is certain is that an armed 
attack includes attacks from hostile states, state sponsored actors and non-state 
actors.592 There is no reason why international law’s conception of imminence cannot 
be adapted to suit South Africa’s information and security needs. In international law, 
states are permitted to employ a security action – i.e. an act of force – to prevent an 
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imminent threat from compromising their National Security.593 In other words, the 
employment of a security action is necessary to prevent an imminent threat from 
compromising a state’s National Security. An adaptation of international law’s notion 
of imminence can apply with a slight difference in the South African National Security 
and information context. Instead of a physical act of force being utilised, the state could 
limit the free flow of information if it is reasonably expected that the publicity of the 
relevant information would pose an imminent threat to National Security in terms of 
PAIA and PIA.594 Imminence provides the judiciary and the state with guidelines as to 
when it is reasonable to contain information in terms of the acts. 
While this is useful in the resolution of a dispute between information and security, 
it is important to note that there are two conceptions of imminence which the Republic 
could use to protect its security interests by placing an embargo on information. Firstly, 
the South African government could rely on a temporal conception of imminence and 
only limit the free flow of information if the threat is currently on the verge of 
occurring.595 This traditional conception of imminence has its roots in the Caroline 
incident.596 It carries a meaning synonymous with immediate.597 Only activities which 
are ripe and on the verge of being executed are classified as imminent threats in terms 
of this notion of imminence. In the information context, the judiciary and the state would 
only be permitted to limit the free flow of information if it is reasonably expected that it 
would prevent an imminent threat from compromising South Africa’s National Security. 
Although using this conception of imminence as an indicator to identify when it would 
be reasonable to conceal information is of assistance at a conceptual level, practically 
states will only be permitted to embargo information once attacks have been launched 
with the intent to harm or where they have been executed, but have not reached their 
targets yet.598 The primary weakness of the classic notion of imminence is that modern 
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warfare can render an embargo of sensitive information superfluous.599 The Caroline 
conception of imminence, crafted in 1837, was applicable in an age of horseback 
riders, muskets, line infantry and militias.600 In the modern era, Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, biological weapons and ballistic missiles can cripple a country in seconds. 
To expect a state to protect information only when a threat is underway seems 
ludicrous.601 If states must wait until a threat is imminent, it may already be too late to 
take countermeasures, let alone prevent it by putting an embargo on information.602 
Using this conception of imminence is likely to lead to unreasonable risk to the 
Republic’s National Security in terms of PAIA and PIA’s conceptions of National 
Security. 
Secondly, the Republic could rely on the non-temporal conception of imminence in 
its endeavour to protect National Security. This notion of imminence and self-defence 
developed in the context of President Bush’s response to the 9/11 attacks.603 This 
approach represents a definitive step away from the temporal understanding of 
imminence and embraces a far more aggressive style of self-defence.604 It is premised 
on the idea that, since technology and instruments of war have advanced to such a 
level that it may take mere seconds for a threat to transform itself from non-existent to 
existential, it would be national suicide to wait until the threat is manifest before a state 
engages National Security actions. States should defend themselves despite not 
knowing the time or place of an attack.605 The danger of relying on the non-temporal 
understanding of imminence to determine if information should be supressed, is that 
it may empower the state to engage in arbitrary security action. Ultimately, the state 
can limit the free flow of information even though it is uncertain about the true nature 
of the threat.606 Granting the Republic such unbridled power in matters of security is 
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unwise in light of the state’s history of engaging in arbitrary security actions,607 and it 
would be unreasonable to allow the state to limit the free flow of information under 
such circumstances. 
3.5.3 FORCE OR THE THREAT OF FORCE 
The idea that a state’s security interests must be defended against ‘force or the 
threat of force’ has its roots in the SP and JHBP. Principle 29 of the SP provides that: 
“National security may be invoked to justify measures limiting certain rights only when they are taken 
to protect the existence of the nation, its territorial integrity or political independence against force 
or threat of force,”608 
while Principle 2(a) of the JHBP states that: 
“A restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not legitimate unless its 
genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect a country's existence or its territorial integrity 
against the use or threat of force, or its capacity to respond to the use or threat of force, whether 
from an external source, such as a military threat, or an internal source, such as incitement to violent 
overthrow of the government.”609 
If ‘force or the threat thereof’ is used in PAIA and PIA, the state will only be able to 
justifiably embargo information if it is reasonably expected that the containment of the 
information will prevent an act of ‘force or a threat of force’ from compromising South 
Africa’s National Security.610 As mentioned earlier, South Africa’s legislature’s view of 
threats seems to be consistent with that of the authors of the JHBP and SP. NSIA and 
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PSI have been crafted to prevent South Africa’s security interests from being 
compromised by acts of force or the threat thereof. The relevant provisions read:  
“‘‘national security’’ includes the protection of the people of the Republic and the territorial integrity 
of the Republic against — 
(a) the threat of use of force or the use of force;”611 
While SP, JHBP, NSIA, PSI and PAIA - in very specific instances - are clear as to 
the threats they aim to counteract, none of these instruments identifies which activities 
amount to ‘force or the threat thereof’.612 Nevertheless, this phrase does have a 
specific meaning in terms of the UN Charter. In 1987 the General Assembly of the UN 
approved the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of 
Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, which defines 
what aggression means.613 The meaning of ‘force’ falls within the meaning of the act 
of aggression.614 The purpose of this declaration was to crystallise the meaning of 
aggression615 and dispute, an earlier definition of ‘force’ constructed by the General 
Assembly in 1970.616 The meaning of the UN’s notion of ‘force’, although not 
authoritative, does provide an indication of which activities will amount to ‘force’ in 
terms of the Charter.617 
Force under the UN Charter refers to ‘armed force’. More specifically, it is the 
intentional determination by one state to take military action against another state. An 
act of ‘force’ can present itself in one of two ways. Firstly, it may be a direct attack 
where one state engages its regular armed forces against another state. Secondly, a 
state’s activities will still qualify as forceful activity should state sponsored, but irregular 
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forces mount an armed attack against another state. To put the above into perspective, 
non-military action that is not directly engaged in by the state and is not state 
sponsored will not count as an act of ‘force’.618 Even the travaux préparatoires reveals 
that the concept of ‘force’ was not meant to cover other conceptions of coercion such 
as economic or political pressure.619 
It is far more complicated to determine what constitutes a ‘threat of force’.620 
Brownlie opines that an express or implied declaration by any state to engage in 
forceful activity amounts to a ‘threat of force’,621 while Green and Grimal argue that 
military posturing or demonstrations constitute a ‘threat of force’.622 Sadurska puts it 
most forcefully by stating that: 
“In the international arena, a threat of force is a message, explicit or implicit, formulated by a decision 
maker and directed to the target audience, indicating that force will be used if a rule or demand is 
not complied with.”623 
If the UN Charter’s conception of a ‘threat of force or force’ is relied upon in the 
proposed definition of National Security, the state will only be permitted to place an 
embargo on information in terms of PAIA and/or PIA if the reasonable expectation 
exists that the containment of information will prevent a threat of or an armed attack 
by a state or by state sponsored actors from compromising South Africa’s National 
Security. Helpful as this threat construction may be, the UN’s conception of ‘force or 
the threat thereof’ will not sufficiently protect National Security in South Africa for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it does not recognise that the National Security of a state 
can be impaired by non-affiliated hostile actors. Asymmetrical warfare can 
compromise National Security, even if it is not state sponsored and does not originate 
from a specific state.624 The Charter’s conception of ‘force or the threat thereof’ stands 
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in stark contrast to imminence, which recognises that hostile states,625 state 
sponsored actors626 and non-state actors627 can compromise a state’s National 
Security.  
Secondly, cyber-operations will not qualify as an act of ‘force’, despite the fact that 
they can compromise National Security in the same manner as a military attack. 
Cyber-operations threaten states’ National Security in a manner that the drafters of 
the instrument could not have foreseen.628 One of the oldest examples of the manner 
in which cyber-operations can qualify as an armed attack is where the Central 
Intelligence Agency in 1982 allegedly inserted a logic bomb into a Russian controlled 
computer system which resulted in an explosion of a Siberian gas line.629 The point 
here is not that a single explosion of a gas line compromises National Security, but 
that the use of modern technology can compromise a state’s National Security in the 
same way that an armed military or paramilitary attack can. 
3.5.4 IMMINENCE VS. FORCE 
Despite suffering from its own ailments, ‘force or the threat of force’ is a better threat 
conception than ‘imminence’ to determine if the disclosure of state-held information is 
reasonably expected to compromise PAIA and PIA’s conceptions of National Security, 
provided that the threat conception is adjusted to include force or threats of force from 
non-state actors and cyber-operations. Unlike imminence’s armed attack, the adjusted 
conception of ‘force or the threat thereof’ will leave the state under no illusions as to 
when there are threats to South Africa’s National Security in terms of PAIA and PIA. 
More importantly, using ‘force or the threat of force’ as an indicator will limit the risk 
the Republic may be exposed to if it relies on the temporal conception of imminence 
to determine if the limitation of the free flow of information could be reasonably 
expected to compromise National Security. Employing ‘force or the threat of force’, 
instead of imminence, will also counteract any arbitrary state action that would be 
permissible if the non-temporal notion of imminence was relied upon. 
In terms of section 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and sections 3 and 4 of PIA, 
the state should only be entitled to deny access to state-held information or limit the 





publication thereof on the condition that it is reasonably expected that the containment 
of the information would prevent National Security from being compromised by an act 
of ‘force or the threat of force’. To put it differently, if government is aware that a hostile 
actor poses a ‘forceful threat’ to its National Security, it will be reasonable to embargo 
any information that can be used by the hostile actor to compromise the Republic’s 
targets. The state will not be compelled to wait until a hostile actor has attacked its 
National Security – like the temporal conception of imminence requires – before it 
decides to blackout information. Additionally, it also guarantees that the state will not 
restrict any information until it possesses a clear understanding of a hostile actor’s 
intentions, a practice which stands in opposition to the demands of the non-temporal 
notion of imminence. Thus ‘force or the threat thereof’ seems to lie between the polar 
extremes of the temporal and non-temporal conceptions of imminence. 
In order to provide greater protection to South Africa’s National Security and the 
free flow of information, PAIA and PIA could also include more specific threats that are 
the same as, or similar to those listed under NSIA and PSI’s definition of state security, 
since the act and the bill give us insights into how the legislature aims to restrict the 
executive’s power, as mentioned under paragraph 3.5.1.630 
In light of the above, the provisions of PAIA and PIA should be amended to permit 
the state to limit the free flow of information only if it is reasonable to expect that the 
information blackout will prevent an act of ‘force or the threat of force’ from 
compromising National Security. This will also ensure that the courts can resolve the 
tension between the free flow of information and National Security effectively. 
3.6 CONSTRUCTING A DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY FOR THE 
PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT AND THE PROTECTION OF 
INFORMATION ACT 
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If the courts are to limit the free flow of information in a manner which does not lead 
to the abuse of National Security, and will not put the state unnecessarily at risk, PAIA 
and PIA should take the following stance towards National Security in South Africa. 
Firstly, both acts should continue to preserve the security interests that PAIA and PIA 
aim to protect, provided that the content of each of the security interests align with the 
meanings ascribed to them in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.4.5.3 of this chapter. Secondly, 
PAIA should be interpreted in a manner which permits the judiciary to protect the 
‘constitutional order’, ‘state sovereignty’, the ‘people’ and the ‘territorial integrity’ of the 
state. Enabling these security interests to be protected in terms of PAIA will ensure 
that the state is not exposed to grave danger. Furthermore, the meaning assigned to 
each concept must be consistent with the meaning ascribed to it as set out above in 
this chapter. Thirdly, although PIA can be interpreted in a manner which protects the 
other security interests, the risk is that the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the act are 
so broad that they open up the opportunity for state abuse. It is submitted that to avoid 
possible state abuse, a definition of the security of the Republic must be inserted which 
includes the other security interests. Lastly, PAIA and PIA should only enable the 
judiciary to contain the exposure of a record, if it is reasonably expected that its 
publicity will cause ‘force or the threat thereof’ to compromise the acts’ conception of 
National Security. A corollary effect of the aforementioned changes is that the state’s 
opportunity to misuse National Security will also be reduced. Additionally, the changes 
will ensure that it could limit the free flow of information to protect the appropriate 
security interests. 
National Security in the context of PAIA and PIA should therefore mean the 
protection of the defence, security, constitutional order, sovereignty, the people and 
territorial integrity of the Republic of South Africa against acts of force, or the threat 
thereof. Therefore state-held information should only be prevented from entering the 
public domain, if it is reasonably expected that the publicity of the information would 





If National Security is interpreted in PAIA and PIA in the manner set out above, the 
judiciary would be able to resolve disputes between the free flow of information and 
National Security in a manner which promotes the values underlying an open and 
democratic society. This is because sufficient clarity will be provided which would 
enable the courts to establish what needs to be preserved. 
3.7 DETERMINING THE NECESSITY OF A STATUTORY DEFINITION OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
While it is submitted that the proposed definition does provide much needed clarity, 
the proposition that PAIA and PIA should be amended to provide clarity on the 
meaning of National Security is based on the assumption that the judiciary requires a 
statutory definition to resolve disputes between the free flow of information and 
National Security. This assumption can be challenged, based on the idea that the 
judiciary is appropriately placed to determine the meaning of National Security. In fact, 
Klaaren argues that the judiciary has already started to define this concept.631  
To date, the South African judiciary has had two opportunities to determine the 
meaning of National Security in the context of PAIA and PIA and on both occasions 
the judiciary failed to provide much needed clarity to an indistinct concept. The first 
instance in which a court could determine the meaning of National Security was in 
Right2Know Campaign v Minister of Police.632 In this matter, the court was called upon 
to determine if South Africans should know which places qualify as national key points 
in terms of the National Key Points Act 102 of 1980.633 Section 11, read together with 
section 18(1) of PAIA, was relied upon by the second applicant in an attempt to compel 
the state to disclose the location of its national key points.  
However this request for information was refused by the state. At the initial stage, 
the state relied on sections 38(a) and 38(b)(i)(aa) of PAIA to justify its decision to deny 
the request for information. The first of these provisions states that: 
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“The information officer of a public body- 
(a) must refuse a request for access to a record of the body if its disclosure could reasonably 
be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of an individual; […]” 
The second provision provides that an: 
“[…] information officer of a public body- 
(b) may refuse a request for access to a record of the body if its disclosure would be likely to 
prejudice or impair- 
(i) the security of- 
(aa) a building, structure or system, including, but not limited to, a computer or 
communication system; […]” 
The state’s reasons for denying access to the requested information were that: 
“To provide access to the requested records will impact negatively on and jeopardize the operational 
strategy and tactics used to ensure security at the relevant property or safety of an individual (eg if 
a person plans, intends or tries to harm the relevant individual or to prejudice or impair the security 
of the building, access to this information may prejudice the effectiveness of those methods, 
techniques or procedures used to ensure the safety of such individuals and/or the building - a person 
who intends to harm the relevant individual may with ease harm the individual if he or she has access 
to such information, or he or she may with ease determine the strategies and tactics used for such 
protection and then use the information to do such harm.”634 
The requester then launched an internal appeal against the state’s decision. The 
internal appeal was unsuccessful. The outcome was based on the same legal 
provisions and reasoning set out by the information officer at the initial request, save 
for one difference. The state also argued that, since the majority of key points are 
privately owned, the name of the place constituted private information. Section 34 of 
PAIA compelled the state to protect the information of a natural person, and thus it 
was prohibited from disclosing the information.635 






The requester next launched an application in the High Court. The court found that 
the state had failed to demonstrate that the records which it aimed to preserve actually 
fell within the ambit of the provisions relied upon in terms of PAIA. Therefore no 
grounds existed which legally allowed the state to deny access to the requested 
information.636 The court further held that the safety of the country was not a concern 
when the state decided to deny the request for information.637 The reason for this is 
that the state did not actually raise National Security as a consideration which would 
enable it to preserve the ventilation of information. The court thus resolved the dispute 
on the basis of sections 38(a) and 38(b)(i)(aa) of PAIA and the sufficiency of evidence, 
not on National Security grounds. 
Despite the above, the court did consider if National Security should be taken into 
consideration in this matter. The reason for this was that the state’s answering affidavit 
referred repeatedly to National Security, although the applicable provision which deals 
with this aspect - i.e. section 41 of PAIA - was not relied upon by the state.638 The 
court took the view that it is unnecessary to make a determination on this aspect since 
the state did not provide evidence to support its allegations that state security was 
threatened.639 The court could have relied on its powers as set out in PAIA to 
determine what this concept means, yet it failed to do so. Neither did it add any content 
to the meaning of the concept.640 The closest the court came to grappling with this 
concept is that it referred to it as obscure.641 
The second opportunity that the judiciary had to add content to the meaning of 
National Security was in Mandag Centre For Investigative Journalism v Minister of 
Public Works. This time the opportunity presented itself in the context of both PAIA 
and PIA. On 6 July 2012 a media house made a request in terms of PAIA to procure 
access to information providing evidence on the upgrades made at Nkandla Estate – 
the dwelling of the erstwhile President of South Africa Mr Jacob Gedleyihlekisa 










Zuma.642 To avoid having to provide access to the requested information, the Acting 
Director-General, Ms Mandisa Fatyela-Linde in a letter dated 13 August 2012, refused 
the request: 
“on grounds that information on the Nkandla Estate was protected under the ‘National Key Point 
Act 102 of 1980 (‘the NKP Act’), the Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982 (‘the PI Act’) , the 
Minimum Information Security Standards, (‘the MISS’) and other relevant security prescripts of 
the State Security Agency’.”643 
The applicants believed that the exceptions raised by the state are not permissible 
in terms of PAIA,644 and launched an internal appeal to procure the requested 
information. The state failed to respond in the appropriate time-frames permitted by 
PAIA. The Minister was therefore considered to have dismissed the appeal which led 
to the institution of proceedings.645 Prior to the matter being resolved the parties 
continued to engage with each other through correspondence, which resulted in the 
state releasing information which it considered to be innocuous from a security 
perspective.646 While this matter had National Security considerations, the judiciary 
steered away from determining what this concept means in terms of PAIA, PIA or the 
other applicable legislation. The reason for this is that the state abandoned its reliance 
on the defence of National Security during the course of the dispute.647 Consequently, 
there was no real reason for the court to interrogate the meaning of this concept.  
Despite the preceding failures Klaaren submits that the judiciary in several cases, 
has started to determine what the concept should mean. In support of this view, he 
relies on two cases namely Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd v Minister for 
Intelligence Services; Freedom of Expression Institute In re: Masetlha v President of 
                                      









the Republic of South Africa648 and M&G Limited v President of the Republic of South 
Africa.649 
The first matter concerns a dispute between the previous Director-General of the 
National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the then President of the Republic of South 
Africa.650 In order to impugn his suspension in a labour dispute the erstwhile Director-
General filed two applications which were supported by two affidavits. He 
distinguished between the two in the following manner: 
“The one he styled an “open court founding affidavit” and the other carried the heading “in camera 
founding affidavit”.”651 
Due to the nature of the in camera affidavit the court informally directed that it be 
kept out of the public domain as an interim precaution.652 Prior to the commencement 
of proceedings, a journalist aimed to procure access to the record. On account of his 
failure to do so, he brought an application in an attempt to obtain access.653 Naturally 
the Minister of Intelligence opposed the application on National Security grounds.654 
The matter triggered many legal issues, one of which was: 
“Does the Minister’s objection premised on national security constitute adequate justification.”655 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, several judges (namely Moseneke DCJ 
– writing for the majority - Van der Westhuizen J and Yacoob J) considered the 
meaning of National Security. However, they could not agree on (i) the security 
interests which should be protected by National Security, or (ii) the types of threats 
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that could compromise these security interests.656 This casts doubt on Klaaren’s 
assertion that the court in this case has started to develop the concept of National 
Security. In fact, it could be argued that the judgments have not contributed to the 
development of the concept, but have rather added to the confusion.657 
The second matter in which Klaaren argues that the judiciary added content to the 
meaning of National Security dates back to 2010, namely M&G Limited v President of 
the Republic of South Africa. Subsequent to the High Court hearing, this matter was 
heard in the SCA,658 then the Constitutional Court,659 and then it was referred back to 
the court of first instance660 before it was heard by the SCA for the second time.661 
The material facts of this case are as follows. President Mbeki aiming to procure a 
report on the nature of the general elections in Zimbabwe dispatched two sitting judges 
to the country.662 On completion, the judges provided the President with the report. 
The Mail and Guardian newspaper aimed to procure access to the report through 
PAIA. After their request was turned down, the newspaper approached the court. It 
was accordingly called upon to determine if the Mail & Guardian should be granted 
access to the record in terms of PAIA. The state in all of these matters refused to grant 
access to the information requested and relied on sections 41(1)(b)(i) and 44(1)(a) of 
PAIA, to deny access to same.663 Only section 41(1)(b)(i) is important from a security 
perspective and provides that: 
“(1) The information officer of a public body may refuse a request for access to a record of the body 
if its disclosure - (b) would reveal information- (i) supplied in confidence by or on behalf of another 
state or an international organisation;” 
Although section 41(1)(b)(i) is related to National Security, it is important to note 
that in none of the cases listed above did the court consider (i) what National Security 
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means, (ii) which interests the concept aims to preserve from being compromised, (iii) 
what the content of those interests should be, or (iv) which threats the concept is to 
guard against. The manner in which the courts resolved this dispute was to (i) 
determine if the state provided sufficient evidence in order to justify its decision to deny 
access to information, and (ii) to the extent that it could not, if the ‘Judicial Peek’ could 
be invoked and (iii) if the actual evidence analysed by the court following the ‘Judicial 
Peek’ actually fell within the ambit of the applicable provision.664 
Despite this, Klaaren submits that in these cases: 
“the law on the national security ground, […], had been made, tested, and confirmed.”665 
Contrary to what he states,666 the courts neither identified what National Security 
means nor fleshed out the security interests to be protected.667 
While it is true that the judiciary could develop the meaning of National Security in 
the absence of a statutory definition, it has up to now failed to give content to National 
Security in the context of PAIA and PIA. The two cases referred to above provided the 
courts with the opportunity to do so, but they failed to remove the mystery surrounding 
this concept. Since the judiciary’s ability to pronounce on specific considerations is 
limited to proceedings that have been launched, it is uncertain when the courts will be 
called upon again to address this issue. In the interim, National Security may continue 
to be a vague concept in Republic of South Africa. To avoid having to wait for judicial 
proceedings to bring about the much needed changes, adopting the definition of 
National Security proposed in this chapter could guard against the negative effects 
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which can flow from relying on a vague conception of security. The advantage for the 
judiciary of having this definition of National Security in place is that it provides a 
starting point to determine (i) what needs to be preserved, (ii) the content of the 
applicable security interests, (iii) and the threats which can compromise these 
interests. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
For the judiciary to be able to resolve the tension between the free flow of 
information and National Security in a manner which promotes the values underlying 
an open and democratic society in terms of PAIA and PIA, National Security should 
be understood to mean the protection of the defence, security, constitutional order, 
sovereignty, the people and territorial integrity of the Republic of South Africa from 
acts of force, or the threat thereof in terms of these acts.  
PAIA and PIA can be interpreted in a manner which should protect the preceding 
security interests. That is because the ‘security and defence of the Republic’ are 
already afforded protection in terms of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and 
sections 3 and 4 of PIA, and since these provisions also lend themselves to an 
interpretation which would allow these acts to protect the other security interests which 
are appropriate to protect from being compromised. 
However, with respect to the nature of threats which should be guarded against by 
the acts, PAIA and PIA should be amended to permit the state to limit the free flow of 
information only if it is reasonable to expect that the information blackout will prevent 
an act of ‘force or the threat of force’ from compromising National Security. This will 
also ensure that the courts can resolve the tension between the free flow of information 
and National Security effectively. 
Provided that the security interests identified above carry the same meaning as set 
out in this chapter and the acts guard against the specific threat conception set out in 
the previous paragraph, the state’s opportunity to misuse PAIA and PIA’s conception 
of National Security will be reduced, and the possibility of judicial errors will be limited. 











OPEN JUSTICE, AND SECRET JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTERESTS 
OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
If National Security is interpreted in the manner as proposed in chapter 3 of this 
thesis, the courts’ ability to resolve the tension between information and security in 
terms of PAIA and PIA in a principled manner will be enhanced significantly. Courts 
are required by the Constitution to resolve judicial disputes in a manner which 
promotes Open Justice.668 This principle ensures that justice is meted out in a manner 
which promotes transparency and fairness.669  
However, in certain cases the judiciary’s duty to resolve disputes in an open fashion 
could put the state in danger. That would be the case where open proceedings would 
result in the disclosure of information which could compromise South Africa’s National 
Security. That could endanger the very open and democratic Republic which Open 
Justice aims to foster and preserve.670 In such instances, it would be more appropriate 
to resolve disputes in secret. For that reason, Parliament has enabled the judiciary to 
employ secret proceedings when mediating disputes between the free flow of 
information and National Security in terms of sections 80(1), 80(3)(b) and 80(3)(c) of 
PAIA and section 13 of PIA. 
However, using secret proceedings to resolve a dispute between the free flow of 
information and National Security can be problematic. The danger is that the courts 
could deliver judgments which are unfair and inimical to the objectives of South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy. It also provides the state with an opportunity to conceal its 
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malfeasance under the pretext that justice has been done. The employment of secret 
proceedings by the judiciary in terms of PAIA and PIA opens the judiciary up to the 
criticism that, instead of upholding transparency, it becomes complicit in state secrecy 
and injustice. The difference between PAIA and PIA’s secret proceedings (which will 
be examined hereunder) also raises the concern that Open Justice may be 
unjustifiably limited or that National Security may be under protected. 
Against this background,671 this chapter aims to identify the most appropriate 
procedural mechanism which South African courts should employ to promote Open 
Justice and protect National Security in disputes between information and security. To 
this end, this chapter will firstly analyse Open Justice to identify its content and impact 
on judicial proceedings. Secondly, it will examine the extent to which PAIA gives effect 
to and subtracts from Open Justice during the resolution of disputes. Thirdly it will 
assess if the courts' discovery procedures nullify PAIA’s procedure in resolving the 
tension between information and security, rendering it permanently ineffective. 
Fourthly, this chapter will examine the extent to which PIA gives effect to and subtracts 
from Open Justice. Fifthly, the chapter will determine which of PAIA or PIA’s procedure 
is better suited to resolve the tension between the free flow of information and National 
Security in a manner which best promotes Open Justice. Finally, it will determine the 
constitutionality of the limitation of Open Justice in terms of PAIA and PIA in order to 
protect South Africa’s National Security.  
4.2 OPEN JUSTICE: ITS CONTENT, EFFECTS AND IMPACT ON JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
The South African judiciary is obligated to conduct its activities and resolve disputes 
between litigating parties in an open fashion, irrespective of whether the proceedings 
are civil, criminal or constitutional in nature.672 More specifically in the information and 
security context, South African courts are obligated to resolve the tension between the 
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rights to access, receive and impart information and National Security in a manner 
which promotes Open Justice.673 
The term Open Justice does not appear in the text of South Africa’s supreme law. 
Despite this, the Constitutional Court has held that courts are constitutionally obliged 
to resolve judicial disputes in a manner which promotes Open Justice. The concept 
was developed by the Constitutional Court in several cases roughly over the last two 
decades674 – namely South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions,675 Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd v Minister for 
Intelligence Services; Freedom of Expression Institute In re: Masetlha v President of 
the Republic of South Africa676 and Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v 
Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development.677 The term cannot be narrowed 
down to a single provision in the Bill of Rights, but is founded on three fundamental 
rights which, taken together, form the contours and set the boundaries for the meaning 
of Open Justice.678 The first is section 34 of the Constitution which provides that: 
“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided 
in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial 
tribunal or forum.” 
The second right is found in section 35(3)(c) which proclaims that: 
“Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right –  
(c) to a public trial before an ordinary court.” 
These provisions refer to a public hearing and a public trial, respectively, thus 
indicating that access must be provided to the public and the media when courts are 
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resolving disputes.679 Thus, irrespective of whether a trial before a South African court 
is civil or criminal in nature, it must as a general rule be open to both the public and 
the media.680 Thirdly, sections 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(b), which guarantee freedom of the 
press and other media, and freedom to receive or impart information or ideas, are also 
seen as central to the idea of Open Justice. 
This approach to court proceedings is a welcome change, considering that prior to the 
advent of democracy, courts frequently meted out justice under the cover of secrecy 
and in an unfair manner, as documented and commented on by authors like Dugard, 
Forsyth, Matthews and Marcus.681 During this era, the judicial process in the area of 
security was characterised by proceedings launched on the strength of forced 
confessions,682 the conviction of accused persons of broadly defined security 
offences,683 the failure to provide an accused with the right to a fair trial,684 the failure 
by the judiciary to interrogate the state’s security averments,685 the shifting of the onus 
of proof onto the accused in security matters686 and conducting proceedings in secret 
                                      
679 South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions [50]. 
680 [31]. 
681 J Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (2015) 303 – 360; C Forsyth “The 
Judiciary under Apartheid” in Hoexter C & Olivier M (eds) The Judiciary in South Africa (2014) 26: 54; 
AS Mathews “The South African judiciary and security system” (1985) 1 SAJHR 199: 200; Marcus 1 
(1985) SAJHR 69: 71; RJ Danay & J Foster “The sins of the media: the SABC decision and the erosion 
of free press rights” (2006) 22 SAJHR 563: 572. 
682 Mathews (1985) SAJHR 200; see also Forsyth “The Judiciary under Apartheid” in Hoexter & Olivier 
(eds) The Judiciary in South Africa 26: 54. 
683 Mathews (1985) SAJHR 200. 
684 Rossouw v Sachs 1964 2 SA 551 (A); Schermbrucker v Klindt NO 1965 4 SA 606 (A); Goldberg v 
Minister of Prisons 1979 1 SA 14 (A); South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967 1 
SA 263 (A); S v Meer 1981 4 SA 604 (A); Gumede v Minister of Justice 1985 2 SA 529 (N). 
685 C Forsyth “The Judiciary under Apartheid” in C Hoexter & M Olivier (eds) The Judiciary in South 





in some cases.687 In addition, the Apartheid government also relied on ouster clauses 
to prevent the judiciary from scrutinising the executive’s abuses.688  
A famous example in which secrecy and unfair judicial process occurred was in the 
Rivonia trials. In this matter 10 high ranking ANC officials were charged with sabotage 
among others. 8 of the 10 charged were later found guilty of this crime. The accused 
were denied access to their legal counsel on account of the 90 day detention rule. 
Additionally, they had limited time to see the evidence against them and only had a 
month in which to prepare a defence in a case in which they were at risk of being put 
to death.689 While the trial was very well publicised, the state relied on the evidence of 
173 witnesses who gave their evidence in camera on account of the ‘risk to their 
safety’.690 Such secret proceedings are a far cry from what Open Justice requires. 
Today, the Constitution guarantees every person’s right to publically challenge 
oppressive laws or state conduct before an independent adjudicatory body.691 The 
value and role of sections 34 and 35(3)(c) of our supreme law to South Africa’s 
democracy is captured best in the words of the erstwhile Pius Langa CJ in South 
African Broadcasting Corporation v National Director of Public Prosecutions: 
“It is not surprising then that section 35(3)(c) of the Constitution includes as one of the aspects of 
the right to a fair trial, the right to “a public trial before an ordinary court”. Similarly, section 34 of the 
Constitution entrenches the right to have disputes resolved “in a fair public hearing before a court”. 
Far from being intrinsically inimical to a fair trial, Open Justice is an important part of that right and 
serves as a great bulwark against abuse.”692 
Open Justice ensures that the court’s doors are open throughout proceedings to 
any person,693 including in instances where the free flow of information and the state’s 
duty to protect National Security are in tension with each other. 
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While sections 34 and 35(3)(c) provide the public, including the media, with access 
to civil or criminal proceedings, sections 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(b) allow these actors to 
receive any information which has been presented in open court. The public are the 
primary beneficiaries of the right to receive information. Moreover, the media has a 
vital role to play in promoting South Africa’s open democracy.694 Once these actors 
have received information during court proceedings, the constitutional right also 
permits them to disseminate it in any way they may choose.695 The right to attend and 
report on proceedings allows information on the dispute to be made available during 
the matter in order for the rights to receive and disseminate information to be 
functional. In commenting on the connection between access to court proceedings, 
the availability of information in the judicial arena, and the right of the public and/or the 
media to receive and disseminate information, Danay and Foster correctly assert that: 
“In our view, this aspect of the majority judgment [in South African Broadcasting Corp Ltd v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 1 SA 523 (CC)] misconstrues the Open Justice principle as 
merely providing a 'right of access' rather than a 'right to information.' As mentioned above, the 
majority had earlier defined the Open Justice principle as the right of the public to 'know and 
understand' the judiciary. Thus, what is most relevant in assessing fidelity to the Open Justice 
principle is the actual ability of the public to receive information about the trial, rather than a 
hypothetical ability to attend the trial in person.”696 
The principle of Open Justice serves a number of functions when the judiciary is 
called upon to resolve disputes between the free flow of information and National 
Security. Firstly, it ensures that the public and the media can be physically present at 
any trial irrespective of its nature. This can help to ensure that the fairness of a trial is 
not compromised.697 Secondly, the public are afforded the opportunity to observe, 
familiarise themselves with and understand the modus operandi of the judicial 
system.698 Thirdly, Open Justice ensures that judicial excellence is fostered.699 Since 
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Open Justice requires all courts to deliberate in public,700 the public is afforded the 
opportunity to examine the fairness of judicial proceedings and the court’s 
decisions.701 Open courtrooms counteract high-handed and arbitrary judicial action, 
which is associated with judicial secrecy rather than Open Justice.702 Moreover, by 
permitting judicial activity to be discussed, endorsed or opposed, judicial excellence is 
bred and fostered.703 
Lastly, Open Justice guarantees the free expression of any information received or 
disseminated in the judicial arena, consequently contributing to the efficacy of the 
Republic’s democracy.704 Open Justice plays an instrumental role in encouraging 
debate, discussion, rejection or acceptance of the courts’ decisions and processes,705 
amongst the litigants, the media and the walk-in-public. It enables the media to form 
views on judicial proceedings,706 and permits it to communicate these views to the 
public.707 This is not to deny that litigants at a trial or the general public in attendance 
could also play a role in disseminating information and stimulating debate about 
judicial proceedings.708 However, the media seems to be better situated to keeping 
the general public up to date on how judicial proceedings are unfolding.709 Additionally, 
the mass dissemination of information can also enhance judicial legitimacy if the 
broader public sees that justice is done.710 In all fairness, it is also possible that mass 
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dissemination may actually have the converse effect and bring the judiciary into 
disrepute. 
To put the above succinctly, Open Justice requires the judiciary to ensure that court 
rooms are open spaces which allow for the maximum amount of information to flow 
freely through them, irrespective of the nature of the disputes involved.711 It must also 
be mentioned that while Open Justice is a recognised constitutional principle in South 
African law, there are instances where it can be ‘limited’. However it is important to 
note that what is being limited is not the principle itself, but the rights (i.e. sections 
16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 34 and/or 35(3)(c) of the Constitution) which underscore it. This 
aspect will be discussed more comprehensively under paragraph 4.7.1 below. 
4.3 PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT AND OPEN JUSTICE: THE 
RIGHT TO ACCESS INFORMATION, OPEN JUSTICE AND ITS LIMITATION 
The extent to which South African courts must promote Open Justice in disputes in 
which the right to access information and National Security are in tension, is directly 
affected by the provisions of PAIA. The legislature has recognised that to allow a 
security matter to be resolved in open court could result in National Security being 
compromised.712 It is important to note that the extent to which PAIA’s provisions 
authorise the courts to limit Open Justice is directly dependent on the procedure which 
the courts decide to employ to resolve the dispute. The manner in which the judiciary 
can resolve the dispute between information and National Security can be divided into 
two parts. Initially the judiciary will always attempt to resolve the dispute in a manner 
which promotes Open Justice by hearing the entire dispute in the open. However, if 
this is not possible, section 80 of PAIA, read together with sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 
41(1)(a)(ii) of the act, permits courts to employ clandestine procedures to resolve the 
dispute in order to preserve South Africa’s National Security.713 
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At the outset of any dispute between the right to access state-held information and 
the state’s refusal to grant access to the record for reasons of National Security in 
terms of the act, the courts must resolve the dispute in a manner which promotes Open 
Justice. Provided that all of PAIA’s internal appeal procedures have been satisfied as 
contemplated by section 78(1) of the act,714 a requester may apply to a court for 
appropriate relief in instances where the state invokes its powers conferred on it by 
sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA, to deny a request for information for 
reasons of National Security.715 Section 78(2)(a) of PAIA permits an aggrieved 
requester to apply to a court of law for relief should the requester be unsuccessful at 
the administrative stage of the proceedings.716 The judiciary, in resolving such a 
dispute between a requester’s right and the state’s duty, is not restricted to just 
reviewing the state’s administrative decision. Rather, its responsibility is to decide the 
matter de novo.717 In resolving the dispute, the courts possess the authority, inter alia, 
to grant or deny access to the contested record.718 
At this stage of the proceedings the applicant will have to show that he or she has 
a right to access state information. If the applicant can also prove that a request for a 
state record has been denied by a public body, the burden of proof will shift onto the 
state to justify its decision to deny access to information for purposes of National 
Security.719  
In order for the state to justify its decision to deny access to information on the 
grounds of National Security, it must specifically reference sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 
41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA as the authorising law enabling the state to deny a request for 
information.720 Additionally, the state must also justify its decision to deny a requester’s 
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right to access information for reasons of National Security. The Constitutional Court 
has held that, due to the nature of information cases, the state must place sufficient 
evidence before the court to justify its decision to deny access to information.721 It is 
important to point out that, while the state must set before the court sufficient evidence 
to justify its use of the security exemption, sections 25(3)(b) and 77(5)(b) of PAIA 
prohibit the state from referring to the content of the contested record when persuading 
the court that it is justified in denying access to information for reasons of National 
Security. In other words, the requested information will never be ventilated in open 
court during the resolution of the dispute. The purpose of these sections is to prevent 
National Security from being compromised during judicial proceedings.722 The state 
must discharge its onus on a balance of probabilities.723 
Therefore, if the state places sufficient evidence before a court of law so that it may 
conclude on a preponderance of probabilities that the requested information falls 
under the purview of the security exemption, as contemplated by sections 41(1)(a)(i) 
and/or 41(1)(a)(ii), then it has discharged its onus.724 The reason for placing the 
burden of proof on the state is perfectly logical. Since the state is the only party to the 
proceedings which has access to the contested record, it is responsible for its 
protection, and has had sight of it, it is easy for it to determine if the record should or 
should not be protected by PAIA’s National Security provisions. To place the burden 
of proving that the record cannot be protected by PAIA’s security provisions on the 
applicant, will not only be contrary to the right to access information, but will also be 
patently unfair. This is because the applicant has never had access to the contested 
record and thus has no way of determining if it has been legitimately protected or 
not.725  
It is important to note that, while the onus of proving that the contested record should 
be prevented from being accessed for reasons of National Security falls squarely on 
the state’s shoulders, sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA could limit the 
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extent to which the state can protect National Security. Put differently, although 
compromising the Republic’s constitutional order, state sovereignty, the people or 
territorial integrity clearly trigger National Security concerns, a literalist reading of 
PAIA’s wording may prevent the state from denying access to state-held information 
if its publicity will impair the above security interests. Additionally the act in its current 
form also allows the state to deny access to information on a whim, since PAIA does 
not determine which threats South Africa’s National Security should guard against. 
Adherence to the interpretation of PAIA’s conception of National Security that was 
argued for in chapter 3 will neutralise both of these problems.726 
It seems as if the state will always be the strongest litigant in the foregoing 
proceedings, since it is the only party to the dispute which has access to the contested 
record.727 If the applicant produces no evidence which can cast doubt on the state’s 
case, the only available option for an applicant is to resort to a bare denial of the facts 
put forward by the public body.728 Regrettably, these assertions are insufficient to raise 
a real dispute of fact.729 As it happens, genuine disputes of fact will hardly ever arise 
because the state will be the only party to the proceedings who will have actual 
knowledge of the content of the contested record.730 Since a bare denial by an 
applicant of the facts advanced by the state is insufficient to raise a genuine dispute 
of fact, the Plascon-Evans rule requires that the courts decide the application on the 
state’s factual allegations.731 Therefore, if an applicant is unable to challenge the 
state’s case after it has discharged its onus, the courts will decide in favour of the 
state.732 At this stage of the proceedings the courts will make such a decision without 
actually examining the protected record.733  
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On one view, the entire proceedings as described above is purportedly done in a 
manner which promotes Open Justice. This constitutional principle is adhered to if the 
courts resolve the conflict between information and security without even examining 
the contested record, as the entire proceedings take place in the open. Since actors 
present in the matter are able to observe the processes of the court and are able to 
disseminate all information made available in court, judicial legitimacy, fairness and 
excellence are entrenched. Democracy is also enhanced.  
However on a different interpretation, the state’s failure to refer to the content of the 
protected information in presenting and defending its case is a breach of Open Justice. 
This interpretation is unconvincing. Open Justice does not place an obligation on the 
state to place secret information before a court of law. Any litigant to a matter can 
decide on the evidence it will advance to discharge its onus. Additionally, as a matter 
of course, PAIA contains a statutory prohibition restricting the type of evidence which 
can be used by the state to discharge its onus. There is a very good reason why this 
statutory duty exists. The objective is to protect National Security.734 This state interest 
would be given inadequate protection and be unnecessarily placed in harm’s way, if 
any requester aggrieved by the state’s decision at an administrative level could gain 
access to the information by just taking the matter to trial.735 While it is unusual that 
the court can decide such an important dispute without having sight of the record, the 
failure by the state to produce the record, will not in and of itself contravene Open 
Justice. To deny a requester access to state-held information for reasons of National 
Security, where the requester has not produced any evidence of state impropriety 
following the state’s discharge of its onus, will hardly be unfair.736 In the words of 
Moseneke DCJ: 
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“The party must display more than inquisitiveness or a desire to embark upon a fishing expedition. 
It must point to a lack or abuse of authority or other unlawfulness or impropriety on the part of the 
official who asserts confidentiality over the sealed documents or other information.”737 
PAIA essentially bars requesters from going on fishing expeditions which could 
compromise the Republic’s National Security. The resolution of disputes in this fashion 
actually ensures the fairness of the trial without the risk of compromising South Africa’s 
National Security.738 
Conflicts between the right to access information and National Security will as a 
general rule be resolved by the judiciary in terms of PAIA in the manner outlined above. 
However, if the judiciary is unable to resolve the tension in this manner, section 80 of 
PAIA can be used to resolve the dispute in a manner which limits Open Justice.739 
Section 80(1) of PAIA holds that: 
“Despite this Act and any other law, any court hearing an application, or an appeal against a decision 
on that application, may examine any record of a public or private body to which this Act applies, 
and no such record may be withheld from the court on any grounds.”740 
The courts have referred to this as the power to take a Judicial Peek.741 This 
provision entitles the court to compel the state to place the denied information before 
it in order to resolve the dispute. Once the document has been placed before it, the 
court will adjourn to examine the record.742 In the event that a court decides to invoke 
the Judicial Peek to assist it in the adjudication of a dispute between the right to access 
information and the state’s duty to preserve National Security, it does so in the public 
interest. The Constitutional Court held that the public has a direct interest in containing 
information which should be protected in terms of PAIA from permeating through the 
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public sphere. Thus the public has an interest in ensuring that sensitive information is 
not publicised while the court takes a Judicial Peek in order to protect the Republic’s 
National Security.743 The Judicial Peek is conducted in secret and all parties to the 
proceedings are excluded.744 Naturally this prohibition will not apply to the state. 
Consequently, only the judiciary and the state will have access to the information 
denied for reasons of National Security.745 The Judicial Peek is useful to invoke where 
the courts lack the necessary information to decide if a record is legitimately protected 
by PAIA’s security exemption.746 Essentially, the Judicial Peek permits the South 
African judiciary to test the legitimacy of the state’s decision to deny a request for 
access to state information for purposes of National Security. The courts will use the 
record to test the legality and the merits of the state’s refusal.747  
It is important to note that the Judicial Peek is a discretionary power granted to the 
courts and has been included in PAIA to guard against injustice.748 It is not clear from 
the text of the act when the courts should engage this statutory power. This problem 
was considered by the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa 
v M&G Media Ltd. Former Chief Justice Ngcobo, writing for the majority, concluded 
that the interests of justice is the deciding factor which determines if the Judicial Peek 
should be invoked.749 The judge did not deem it necessary to identify every event 
which would require the court to resort to using the Judicial Peek in the interests of 
justice.750 He nevertheless set out several circumstances in which the court may deem 
it necessary to exercise its discretionary power. 
The first instance in which the court can rely on this power is where doubt exists as 
to whether the exemption is rightly claimed by the state. As mentioned earlier, PAIA 
places the state under a unique limitation when discharging its onus. The state may 
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have difficulty in presenting evidence because it cannot refer to the content of the 
contested record.751 Consequently, doubt can arise whether an exemption is rightly 
relied on if the state, as a result of PAIA’s limitation, cannot place sufficient evidence 
before the court for it to determine that the claim for the exemption is valid. Doubt can 
also exist, where the legitimacy of the exemption can only be examined by having 
access to the record.752 However, if the state decides to deny access to information to 
preserve the Republic’s constitutional order, state sovereignty, the people or territorial 
integrity, much will hinge on the court’s interpretation of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 
41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA, as discussed in chapter 3 above.753  
Secondly, the court may take a Judicial Peek at the contested record where it is 
doubtful of the state’s representations. This will allow the court to examine the 
accuracy of the state’s exemptions while also restoring, to some extent, the adversarial 
nature of the matter before it.754 
Thirdly, it may also be necessary to invoke the Judicial Peek if the probabilities are 
evenly balanced. Generally, the rules of civil procedure dictate that, where the 
probabilities are evenly balanced, the judiciary must decide in favour of the applicant, 
since the state bears the burden of proof. However, if the balance in probabilities is a 
direct consequence of the limitations placed on litigants to present and refute 
evidence, a court should invoke the Judicial Peek and use the record to decide a 
matter’s merits.755  
                                      
751 [43]; PAIA S25(3)(b) & S77(5)(b). 
752 [46]. 
753 General Intelligence Laws Amendment National Strategic Intelligence S1 “national security”; 
Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd v Minister for Intelligence Services; Freedom of Expression Institute 
In re: Masetlha v President of the Republic of South Africa [62], [85] & [174]; PAIA S41(1)(a)(i) & 
S41(1)(a)(ii); PIA S3 & S4; Mendel “National Security vs. Openness: An Overview and Status Report 
on the Johannesburg Principles” in National Security and Open Government: Striking the right balance 
11; Siracusa Principles (1984) Principle 29. 





Fourthly, it may be necessary to utilise this instrument to resolve a material dispute 
of fact which is connected to whether or not the contested record falls under the 
protection of an exemption. 
Lastly, the Judicial Peek can also be used to determine if the contested record 
contains information which does not fall under the protection of an exemption and thus 
must be segregated from the record.756 
Therefore, if it is in the interests of justice, the court can take a Judicial Peek at the 
record in an attempt to resolve the dispute. The court’s discretionary power to invoke 
the Judicial Peek does not absolve the state of its duty to make out a case justifying 
its refusal on security grounds.757 The courts will only resort to a Judicial Peek once 
government has made out a plausible case, but the interests of justice dictate that the 
court should test the state’s argument.758 The court’s function is not to sift through the 
state’s records to determine what information can be protected by PAIA for National 
Security reasons.759 Thus when a court calls for a restricted record to be placed before 
it, the criticism cannot be made that the court is making the state’s case for it.760 
The engagement by the courts of PAIA’s Judicial Peek to resolve the dispute limits 
Open Justice. If the court reaches a conclusion on the nature of the record in a 
clandestine fashion it is worrying for several reasons.761 Firstly, altering the public 
nature of trials before an ordinary court762 allows the state to circumvent its duty to be 
open and accountable.763 Secondly, secrecy permits malfeasance to possibly creep 
in.764 Thirdly, judicial excellence is put at risk since PAIA permits the judiciary to 
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deliberate in secret.765 The counterweight of public scrutiny which usually warrants 
against the judiciary behaving in an arbitrary fashion is neutralised by secrecy.766 
Lastly, the democratic vitality of debate is weakened767 since the information 
necessary for public debate never enters the public arena.768 
Following a Judicial Peek by the courts and provided that the court has not resolved 
the dispute at this point of the proceedings,769 section 80(3) of PAIA permits courts to 
use the following processes to resolve a dispute in which the right to access 
information is in conflict with National Security: 
“(a) receive representations ex parte; 
(b) conduct hearings in camera; and 
(c) prohibit the publication of such information in relation to the proceedings as the court 
determines, including information in relation to the parties to the proceedings and the contents 
of orders made by the court in the proceedings.” 
Thus, if a court has not decided on the outcome of a dispute following its 
examination of the record in question, it is vested with the discretion to decide if the 
state has legitimately protected the information770 by receiving ex parte 
representations771 or resolving the dispute in camera.772 The court must exercise this 
discretion judiciously,773 taking cognisance of the nature of the exemption and the 
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category of the record sought.774 Save for section 80(3)(a), if the court relies on any 
of the balance of the procedures, the net effect will also be a limitation of Open Justice.  
Following its Judicial Peek the court can elect to limit Open Justice more extensively 
by choosing to resolve the dispute in camera. South Africa’s law relating to in camera 
proceedings is rooted in English law. Originally English common law criminal trials 
were conducted in public. Simpson states that these trials – dating as far back as the 
13th century775 – were not only public in nature, but also theatrical.776 However, during 
this epoch the English system also allowed for secret proceedings. Closed 
proceedings were prevalent during the Star Chamber trials. These proceedings were 
used to deal with political enemies outside of the general court proceedings.777 
Nevertheless, Herman opines that the Star Chamber proceedings did not change the 
public nature of English common law trials.778 The Star Chamber would eventually be 
abolished in 1641.779 The general format of criminal trials was open thereafter. 
However, it was during the 20th century that the openness of criminal trials began to 
wane again. Secret proceedings had a very negative connotation attached to them. 
They were connected with institutions like the Star Chamber. Nevertheless, Simpson 
points out that specific laws authorised the state to conduct in camera proceedings as 
far back as the beginning of the 20th century.780 
The case of Scott v Scott, which was decided in 1913, is the premier judgment that 
pointed out that judicial proceedings must be conducted in the open, but also 
specifically identified instances where in camera proceedings are permissible. Lords 
Haldane and Loreburn extended the ability of courts to conduct secret trials, by 
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providing that if in camera proceedings are necessary to achieve justice, then trials 
may be held behind closed doors.781 The first state security matter in England where 
in camera proceedings were applied occurred in 1914. The accused in the matter, Carl 
Hans Lody, or Charles Inglis as his alias was known, was charged with espionage.782 
Ackermann J in S v Leepile shows that the Republic of South Africa’s common law 
concerning the conduct of criminal trials stems from English law.783 He identifies the 
Scott case as the seminal judgement concerning criminal proceedings from which the 
public can be excluded.784 He also points out that several other South African cases 
have cited the English decision with approval.785 As mentioned earlier, the test used 
in English law to decide if in camera proceedings are necessary, is to determine if the 
matter will result in justice in a contest between litigants.786 Ackermann J, influenced 
by the decision in the Scott case, took the view that the test is no different in South 
African law. In South African law, proceedings should only be closed if openness will 
render the administration of justice impractical either because the matter is incapable 
of being effectively tried in the open, or the litigants in the matter will be loath to seek 
justice in open proceedings.787 
In the context of PAIA, the courts do not have to rely on their common law powers 
to engage in closed proceedings where the right to access information is in tension 
with National Security. Section 80(3)(b) of PAIA specifically grants the courts the 
statutory authority to use in camera proceedings.788 The rationale under PAIA is 
identical to that in terms of the common law. The purpose is to guarantee the proper 
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administration of justice. In camera proceedings enable the courts to determine if the 
government is justified in using PAIA’s National Security exemption to deny a request 
to access state information.789 
The presence of applicants and their legal counsel could be beneficial during in 
camera proceedings. Granting access to the applicants will allow them to effectively 
challenge the legality and the merits of the state’s submissions,790 consequently 
enriching the quality of the adversarial process.791 However, allowing these parties 
access to the proceedings may do more harm than good – as will be shown shortly.792 
It is submitted that when the courts conduct in camera proceedings in terms of the act, 
only the judicial officer and the state should be present at such proceedings. There 
are two reasons for this interpretation.  
The first is that this interpretation is in line with the text of PAIA. The act provides in 
no uncertain terms that a court choosing to utilise in camera proceedings is prohibited 
from disclosing the content of the requested record to any person during 
proceedings.793 By excluding any person from in camera proceedings the judiciary will 
ensure that it can satisfy this obligation. The High Court in M&G Media Ltd v President 
of the Republic of South Africa interpreted the meaning of the word ‘person’ to include 
applicants and their attorneys.794 Naturally excluding these parties will permit the court 
to meet PAIA’s requirement for non-disclosure. It would place National Security at 
grave risk should the court allow persons to access protected information without the 
necessary security clearance.795 
Secondly, denying the applicant and his or her counsel the right to be present at 
these proceedings is helpful in that it anticipates that the court can, at the conclusion 
of the trial, deny access to the contested record, on the ground that the publicity of the 
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information will compromise the Republic’s National Security.796 To grant an applicant 
and his/her counsel access to the record at this stage of proceedings will render the 
application for access to information superfluous.797 
The operation of in camera proceedings in terms of PAIA detracts from the principle 
of Open Justice.798 The greater public will be unable to determine if Open Justice was 
reasonably and justifiably limited. They will also not be able to assess the 
appropriateness of the court’s processes or its decisions in such circumstances.799 It 
also raises concerns about the fairness of proceedings since the applicant and his or 
her attorney will be excluded from the courts proceedings.800 However, Brickhill and 
Friedman opine that secret judicial hearings may be the only alternative when trying 
to protect South Africa’s National Security.801 
It should be clear from the text of section 80(3)(c), as set out earlier, that the courts 
are empowered to limit Open Justice again by limiting the free flow of information 
relating to court proceedings following a Judicial Peek.802 The court to date has not 
considered the meaning of section 80(3)(c) of PAIA. Nevertheless, it seems that the 
legislature granted this power to the courts to protect National Security specifically – 
and other interests generally – by authorising the judiciary to limit the right to access 
information which may come to light during trial proceedings, or sensitive information 
which has come to light after it has examined the contested record, and which will lead 
to the impairment of the security of the state. PAIA’s provision seems to be a legal 
contingency, created for the benefit of a protectable interest, which in this instance is 
National Security.803 In other words, if a court, subsequent to taking a Judicial Peek of 
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a contested record and irrespective of the procedure the court aims to use,804 
determines that it is necessary to protect any information, other than the contested 
record, the act grants the court the power to protect such information through secrecy, 
provided that it is in the interests of National Security (or some other interest that is 
protected under the act) to do so. In the event that the court elects to exercise this 
power, it will be a direct limitation of Open Justice. 
In summary, PAIA requires the judiciary to resolve the tension between a 
requester’s right to access state-held information and the state’s duty to preserve 
National Security in a manner which promotes Open Justice, but allows for the 
limitation of this principle if the interests of justice require the dispute to be resolved in 
secrecy. The question is whether these limitations of Open Justice are constitutional. 
4.4 PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT VS. DISCOVERY 
PROCEDURES 
Prior to assessing which procedural mechanism will best promote Open Justice and 
promote National Security, it is important to note that PAIA’s entire proceedings as 
contemplated in sections 25(3)(b), 77(5)(b), 80(1) and 80(3) could be neutralised if an 
information requester intends to resolve the dispute by relying on the courts’ discovery 
proceedings before the dispute is heard during court proceedings. Additionally, if an 
information requester successfully relies on the discovery procedures, the importance 
of identifying the most appropriate mechanism to resolve a dispute between 
information and security in terms of PAIA and PIA will be superfluous. Therefore, 
before identifying the appropriate procedural mechanism to resolve the dispute and 
the constitutionality thereof, it must first be established if PAIA’s procedure eclipses or 
operates concurrently with the discovery procedures in such cases. 
Before the substance of disputes between access to information and National 
Security can be heard in terms of PAIA, the discovery procedures of the various courts 
permit applicants to request access to the record protected by the state in terms of 
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sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA.805 An applicant aiming to procure 
access to the protected record in the possession of the state in terms of the court’s 
discovery procedures, will have to do so in terms of the Uniform Rules of Court or the 
Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Magistrates’ Courts of South 
Africa,806 depending on the forum in which the dispute will be resolved.807  
Prior to the actual trial in terms of PAIA, the courts’ discovery procedures permit 
applicants to procure documents which may be relevant to their matter from the 
opposing party. The party desiring access to the protected document must serve 
notice on the state requesting that they make the protected record in their possession 
or control available.808 Ordinarily, access to a requested record would allow parties to 
a dispute to prepare fully for trial proceedings. Moreover, it prevents the party from 
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being surprised during the hearing of a matter.809 Notwithstanding a party’s request in 
terms of the courts’ discovery procedures, National Security may require that an 
embargo be placed on the record due to the grave dangers that may manifest if the 
record is made public. As in PAIA, the courts’ discovery procedures recognise that 
certain information should not be provided to a party requesting access to it, and duly 
authorises the respondent to raise privilege to deny access to the information. A list of 
exhaustive grounds which permit a litigant to turn down a request for information does 
not exist. Nevertheless, National Security can be invoked to turn down a request for 
information, but the respondent must state reasons for turning down a request. Should 
the requester be dissatisfied with the denial, the requester can approach the court for 
relief.810 The court will then be compelled to determine if access should be granted or 
privilege upheld,811 and herein lies the rub.  
The problem is that the judiciary, when called upon to resolve a dispute between a 
request to provide access to the record in terms of the courts’ discovery procedures 
and the state’s defence of privilege on the grounds of National Security, can prevent 
the dispute from being heard in terms of PAIA’s proceedings. This will occur if the court 
decides the dispute in favour of the requester. The effect of this power is that 
requesters aiming to access the record by relying on the courts’ discovery procedures 
could render PAIA’s entire procedure moot. 
Dikgang Moseneke DCJ, writing for the majority of the Constitutional Court, pointed 
out that considerable judicial debate has revolved around whether PAIA’s procedure 
eclipses or operates concurrently with the discovery procedures regulated by rules of 
different courts. Unfortunately this debate has not yielded any definite answers.812 
Uncertainty still exists as to whether PAIA’s proceedings can be circumvented by using 
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the courts’ discovery procedures in instances where the court is called upon to 
adjudicate conflicts between the right to access state information and National 
Security. Since no clarity exists on this matter, it is seemingly possible for a requester 
to attempt to gain access to the state’s security information before a court hears the 
actual dispute in terms of the act. It is a curious fact that neither PAIA, nor the 
Promotion of Access to Information Rules explicitly prevent requesters from using the 
discovery procedures of a relevant court to acquire access to protected information 
after the state has denied the request at the administrative level, but before the 
substance of the tension is set down to be adjudicated in terms of PAIA’s procedure.813 
If this were the case, the manner in which the judiciary is obligated to promote Open 
Justice and use secrecy to resolve a dispute would be nullified. 
The Uniform Rules of Court and the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the 
Proceedings of the Magistrates’ Courts of South Africa do not direct the judiciary as to 
what procedure it should use in instances where a dispute can be resolved by way of 
the rules or PAIA. It is submitted that the judiciary should apply PAIA’s procedure to 
the exclusion of the different courts’ discovery procedures for the following reasons if 
the request aims to procure the contested record. 
Firstly, PAIA trumps the courts’ discovery procedures in instances where a 
requester originally relied on PAIA to access information.814 Section 32(2) of the 
Constitution places the authority squarely on the shoulders of Parliament to create 
national legislation to give effect to the constitutional right to access information. In 
executing its constitutional mandate, Parliament passed PAIA. The Uniform Rules of 
Courts were created by the judiciary in terms of the Supreme Court Act815 and the 
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Rules Board for Courts of Law Act,816 while the rules regulating proceedings in the 
magistrates’ courts were created by the Rules Board for Courts of Law.817 The 
Supreme Court Act has been repealed by the Superior Courts Act.818 Currently, all the 
rules for courts are governed by the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act.819 PAIA is 
original legislation expressly mandated by the Constitution, whereas these rules 
qualify as subordinate legislation.820 If the discovery procedures of the various courts 
always were to be applied first, before the procedure in terms of PAIA, the latter would 
be rendered redundant. That would be highly problematic, given that Parliament 
enacted PAIA in pursuance of its express constitutional mandate to adopt legislation 
to give effect to a constitutional right, and given Parliament’s choice to craft a specific 
procedure in the act itself to regulate the tension between access to information and 
National Security. It would disregard Parliament’s constitutional duty and the manner 
in which it determined was best to resolve the tension between competing interests.821 
In terms of the hierarchy of legislation in South Africa, the Constitution sits alone at the 
top. Therefore it is of a higher status than the courts’ discovery procedures. The effect 
of this is that, when a matter has originally been instituted in terms of PAIA, the latter 
act must take precedence. The reason for this is succinctly set out by Du Plessis who 
points out that: 
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“Superordinate legislation always takes precedence over subordinate legislation in pari materia.”822 
In other words, where PAIA and the discovery procedures share a common 
purpose, the purpose must be met in terms of the superordinate law. This seems to 
be the case here. As Theophilopoulos points out, the objective of both PAIA and the 
courts’ discovery procedures is to find a balance between National Security and the 
free flow of information.823 Additionally, in light of the unwelcome effects caused by 
the co-existence of these different procedures, it is not unreasonable to presume that 
the legislature would categorically prohibit the various discovery procedures of the 
courts from operating in conjunction with PAIA if it were to apply its mind to this matter. 
Secondly, using PAIA as the principal vehicle to resolve the tension ensures that 
the objective of the various courts’ discovery procedures is not altered and used for 
the primary purpose of settling a substantive dispute. The purpose of the discovery 
procedures in the different courts is to place documents, which contain information 
which can directly or indirectly enhance a requester’s case or alternatively damage his 
opponent’s case, in the petitioner’s hands.824 It assists litigants by permitting them to 
procure pertinent information which will be used to resolve a substantive dispute. If a 
requester utilises a relevant court’s discovery procedure subsequent to making an 
application to the court in terms of PAIA, the tension will have to be resolved at the 
discovery stage of proceedings. The decision of the court under these circumstances 
will not be concerned with making available or denying access to incidental 
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information, but its primary purpose would be to ultimately settle the substantive 
dispute between parties. A decision to grant access to requested documents to one of 
the parties will nullify the purpose for which a requester institutes an application in 
terms of PAIA,825 while also altering the purpose of the discovery procedures of 
different courts. Ensuring that the procedures do not co-exist prevents the previous 
state of affairs. 
Finally, employing PAIA’s procedure, instead of the discovery procedures, will 
ensure that the nature of an interlocutory application will not change. If the state raises 
the National Security exemption to deny a requester access to information at the 
administrative stage of PAIA, one can assume with reasonable certainty that the state 
will also raise state privilege to counteract a notice instituted by a requester to discover 
protected information after the party has applied to the courts for relief in terms of 
PAIA.826 It is important for the state to identify the grounds on which it raises 
privilege.827 Kelbrick submits that the state can raise the defence of privilege to avoid 
having to produce documents which provide information on the communications 
between client and legal counsel, witness statements recorded for purposes of 
proceedings, affidavits, notices in an action and pleadings. This list is by no means 
exhaustive. Provided that the state gives reasons, it can avoid having to discover 
documents over which it has raised privilege.828 The state can, and in this instance 
will, utilise the defence of privilege to avoid having to produce information protected in 
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the interests of National Security.829 Should this stance be adopted by the state in 
response to a notice, a requester can call on the courts to compel the state to make 
the protected record available.830 The court will commence with its duty of mediating 
this tension once a requester’s interlocutory application has been enrolled.831 
Interlocutory applications are different from normal applications which are not 
incidental to other proceedings, but stand on their own as the main legal vehicle for 
obtaining relief in a particular matter.832 If a requester utilises an interlocutory 
application in an attempt to procure access to information after they have instituted an 
application to the courts in terms of PAIA, the applicant will change the incidental 
nature of this application into the main vehicle for obtaining relief. Since the court will 
resolve the main thrust of the dispute at the discovery stage of proceedings, the further 
engagement of PAIA’s procedures is unnecessary. It could not have been the intention 
of the legislature to change the entire nature of an interlocutory application by allowing 
the two procedures to co-exist. 
Since the courts’ discovery procedures should not be able to render the applicability 
of PAIA redundant, it will also not influence PAIA’s effects on Open Justice. 
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4.5 PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ACT AND OPEN JUSTICE 
Disputes in which the right to receive and impart state-held information clashes with 
the state’s duty to protect the Republic’s National Security in terms of PIA must also 
be decided by the judiciary in a manner which upholds and promotes Open Justice. 
Section 13 of PIA lays down the procedure which must be followed by the courts in 
disputes where an individual’s rights to receive and impart state-held information, is in 
tension with the state’s duty to protect South Africa’s National Security by preventing 
the publication of sensitive state information. The provision reads: 
“Any court may, if it appears to that court to be necessary for considerations of the security or the 
other interests of the Republic, direct that any trial or preparatory examination in respect of an 
offence under this Act, shall take place behind closed doors or that the general public or any section 
thereof shall not be present thereat, and if the court issues any such direction, the court shall have 
the same powers as those conferred upon a court by section 154 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977), and the provisions of subsections (1), (4) and (5) of the said section 154 
shall apply mutatis mutandis.”  
It is submitted that this provision implicitly requires the judiciary in the ordinary 
course of events to resolve the tension between the rights to receive and impart state-
held information and National Security in a manner which promotes Open Justice.833 
However, it expressly authorises the judiciary to direct that any preparatory 
examination or the trial itself be held in camera when it is in the interests of the 
Republic’s National Security.834 This power is discretionary, since the provision 
specifically holds that the court ‘may’ hold in camera proceedings.835 Should a court 
deem it necessary to exercise its discretion, it may direct that proceedings be held 
behind closed doors.836 Alternatively, the court may order that the general public or a 
section of them be excluded from the proceedings.837 
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It is important to note that a court can only direct that such measures be taken if it 
‘appears to the court to be necessary’ for purposes of National Security. In order for 
the court to reach such a conclusion the state must make out its case before the court 
to show the drawbacks that may ensue if the court does not exercise its discretion. In 
instances where the accused has had sight of the sensitive information, it would seem 
appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion by resolving the dispute behind 
closed doors. The risk in these instances is that the accused may ventilate what he 
knows in open court.838 Put differently, to resolve the matter in open court could 
compromise National Security. In these instances, should the state deem that 
compelling reasons exist to conduct the trial or part thereof in camera, it must make 
an interlocutory application supported by evidence to the court to conduct the trial 
behind closed doors.839 The state bears the onus of providing the necessary evidence 
in support of its application to have the proceedings heard in camera.840 As the act 
currently stands, the state will only be permitted to make an interlocutory application 
for in camera proceedings if the ventilation of the record would place the state’s 
defence or intelligence capacity at risk of being compromised. PIA, unlike PAIA, does 
not permit the state to deny access to information if South Africa’s constitutional order, 
state sovereignty, the people or the territorial integrity of the Republic is at risk of being 
compromised.841  
Interlocutory applications are distinct from and subordinate to main applications.842 
Generally the former type of applications are to be heard in open court, but should the 
state only be able to make the application by relying on protected information, the 
application itself can be heard behind closed doors.843 If the court grants the state’s 
application, the court’s order is in and of itself interlocutory in nature.844 These types 
of applications may be corrected, set aside or altered by the court prior to its final 
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ruling.845 Thus should the court conclude that oral arguments, information or evidence 
placed before it is not of a protected character, it may reverse its interlocutory order 
and make such information public.846 Conducting the proceedings in this fashion is 
valuable for several reasons. Firstly, in line with the notion of severability, the court will 
ensure that innocuous information will be released and sensitive information protected 
when necessary.847 Secondly, litigants will be given the most effective way to resolve 
the tension, while at the same time giving effect to Open Justice. The alternative is to 
employ full in camera proceedings which will totally decimate Open Justice.848 
Open Justice will be adhered to at the mediation of the dispute. However, should 
the state deem it necessary that the interlocutory application be heard in secrecy, only 
the state and the judiciary will have access to the information. The accused and the 
public will be totally excluded from having access to the information which results in 
the institution of in camera or partially closed off proceedings.849 
In the event that the court, following an interlocutory application made by the state, 
deems it necessary to resolve the dispute in camera, the state will be permitted to lead 
evidence or present testimony of a sensitive nature in order to discharge its burden of 
proving the unlawful receipt or dissemination of protected information in contravention 
of section 3 and/or section 4 of PIA, without having to fear that the Republic’s National 
Security will be compromised.850 Although the structure of section 13 gives the 
impression that the entire trial could be held in camera if it is in the interests of National 
Security,851 it is highly unlikely that a court will conduct a trial in this fashion in our 
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constitutional democracy.852 The correct approach is to conduct proceedings in the 
open until it is necessary to engage in secret proceedings.853  
S v Geiges illustrates this point. In this matter the state applied to the court to have 
seven of the ten charges brought against an accused for nuclear proliferation to be 
heard in camera. The state relied on sections 152(1), 152(2) and 154(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA), section 52(1) of the Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999 
and section 21(2)(b) of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 
of 1993.854 In support of its application it made out a very strong case on the papers.855 
The relief that the state applied for aimed to make significant incursions into Open 
Justice.856 The state requested that the court exclude all of the public and media from 
attending the trial. It sought to limit the amount of people that could attend the 
proceedings. It also requested the court to prohibit the disclosure of the trial’s 
evidentiary record and the publicity of the identity of or information concerning its 
technical expert witnesses.857 It further required the court to limit access to the 
transcript of the secret proceedings and the evidence led during the trial. It also sought 
to prevent the publicity of information of the names, identities and other identifying 
materials, such as photographic or other images, of all witnesses whose names and 
addresses have been withheld.858 Despite the risk that the publication of the 
information could have for the proliferation of nuclear weapons which could result in a 
threat to South Africa’s National Security as well as international security, the court 
was still loath to totally close proceedings.859 It did however acknowledge that the court 
will have to be cleared in certain instances.860 The rationale for the court’s decision is 
that Open Justice and not secrecy is the general rule.861 In accordance with the 
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dictates of the Constitution’s requirement for openness and transparency, the court 
ruled that trial proceedings would be conducted in open court unless a situation arose 
that necessitated that a matter be heard in camera.862 If the court ordered that 
proceedings be conducted completely in camera, the general public or part thereof 
would be totally excluded from proceedings and Open Justice would be extensively 
impaired. Thus, even where the publicity of sensitive information during a trial could 
lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the court still did not choose to totally 
close down proceedings. 
Section 13 of PIA, read together with section 154(1) of the CPA and applicable case 
law, does not indicate who the general public or part thereof is. However, it would 
appear that the general public refers to the public at large. Moreover, the phrase ‘or 
any section thereof’ seems to indicate that the court may exclude any person or group 
of persons from judicial proceedings for purposes of protecting the Republic’s National 
Security. On this interpretation, the court has the power to exclude the accused and 
his legal counsel from in camera proceedings, notwithstanding the accused’s 
constitutional rights to a fair trial and to be assisted by legal counsel. 
The wording of the act seems to contemplate two instances in which the court can 
exercise this power. In the first instance, the judiciary is permitted to preclude an 
accused together with his/her legal counsel from participating in in camera 
proceedings. The court is most likely to make such a ruling if it is reasonably convinced 
that the accused has not seen the content of the record provided to him/her or 
disseminated by him/her.863 The extent to which Open Justice will be limited by the 
court in this instance is identical to the manner in which PAIA limits it under the same 
circumstances. The reason for this is to prevent the accused from procuring access to 
and ventilating information which is protected in terms of South African law.  
In the second instance, if the court is of the view that the accused has viewed the 
protected information, albeit cursorily, it would be logical for the court to permit the 
accused to participate in the proceedings, so that this party may effectively challenge 
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the state’s submissions.864 This interpretation of section 13 of PIA is also supported 
when read together with section 154(1) of the CPA. Under these circumstances, the 
extent to which Open Justice can be limited does not seem to be as extensive as in 
the first instance. The rationale behind this interpretation is that, although the 
proceedings are secret, the accused can still procure a fair outcome since he or she 
is present to make out a case.  
Yet, to exclude an accused and his or her legal representative from proceedings 
would have serious consequences for the right to a fair trial. The Constitution is clear 
that an accused has the right to be present when being tried and to legal counsel 
during criminal proceedings.865 Permitting an accused’s legal counsel to attend the 
closed proceedings would ensure that the alleged transgressor will be able to 
effectively challenge the state’s case. As pointed out earlier under the paragraph 
dealing with PAIA, having both litigants and their counsel present during in camera 
proceedings will help to ensure the fairness of the adversarial system of justice.866 It 
will also promote Open Justice. 
Nevertheless, it would be reckless to fail to notice that, making protected information 
available during secret proceedings to an accused’s legal counsel who does not have 
the necessary security clearance, could place the Republic’s National Security at 
risk.867 The tension between an accused’s right to a fair trial and the state’s duty to 
protect National Security presents a court with difficult choices. The court may decide 
in favour of the accused that his or her legal counsel must be present during in camera 
proceedings, thus effectively trumping National Security’s need for maximum secrecy 
in instances where the accused has not had access to information.868 Alternatively, 
the court may take the position that National Security will be exposed to grave danger 
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should the accused’s counsel be present during proceedings, and consequently limit 
the alleged transgressor’s constitutional right to a fair trial. 
There seems to be two possible solutions to this problem, which will both protect 
South Africa’s National Security during in camera proceedings while ensuring the 
accused’s right to a fair trial. The first possibility is to provide the accused with a 
government security cleared counsel to act on his or her behalf during in camera 
proceedings.869 This is not currently provided for in South African law. Alternatively, 
the accused’s counsel could continue to act for him or her during in camera 
proceedings on the condition that the representative will not reveal anything 
concerning the content of proceedings. This is made possible by sections 154(1) and 
154(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
PIA also gives the courts additional powers to limit Open Justice. In addition to 
authorising the court to engage in in camera proceedings, section 13 of PIA prevents 
the content of the secret proceedings from being publicised. Section 13 of PIA 
provides that a court which engages in in camera proceedings, will have the same 
powers as set out in sections 154(1), 154(4) and 154(5) of the CPA.870 Only sections 
154(1) and 154(5) are relevant for present purposes. Section 154(1) prohibits the 
publication of any information in any form concerning closed proceedings where the 
court has directed that the public may not be present or has excluded them from part 
of the proceedings. Should any actor attempt to engage in activity contrary to the 
court’s directions under section 154(1) of the CPA, section 154(5) grants the court the 
authority to fine or imprison such a person or subject him or her to both these penalties. 
The court’s ability to engage in in camera proceedings, potentially prohibiting the 
accused and their legal counsel from participating in proceedings, and prohibiting the 
general public from attending and/or the media from having access to such 
proceedings, is a direct limitation of the rights underpinning Open Justice. Ultimately 
section 13 ensures that the information necessary to prove the transgression of 
section 3 and/or section 4 of PIA will be wrapped up in secrecy. 
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4.6 THE BEST PROCEDURE TO PROMOTE OPEN JUSTICE WHILE PROTECTING 
THE REPUBLIC’S NATIONAL SECURITY 
As stated earlier, the regulatory regime which affects Open Justice in disputes in 
which the judiciary aims to resolve the tension between the free flow of information 
and National Security is as follows. On the one hand, PAIA permits courts to resolve 
disputes between the right to access information and National Security in a manner 
which promotes Open Justice, but also permits them to limit the rights that underpin 
this principle by taking a Judicial Peek at a state-protected record.871 Following its 
perusal and consideration of the record, the court can decide to limit Open Justice 
even further by engaging in in camera proceedings, and/or prohibiting the publication 
of information relating to court proceedings.872 
On the other hand, PIA authorises the judiciary to limit Open Justice from the outset 
by employing in camera proceedings if the Republic’s National Security is at risk of 
being compromised in disputes which concern the right to receive and impart 
information. The judiciary may also resolve to exclude the general public or part 
thereof from proceedings, which will also limit Open Justice. Additionally, it may also 
direct that the publication of any information in any form concerning closed 
proceedings is prohibited, which would again impair Open Justice.873 
Ultimately, the primary difference between the two pieces of legislation in the 
mediation of security disputes, is that PIA does not authorise the judiciary to employ a 
Judicial Peek.874 Nor does the act permit the court to receive ex parte representations 
following the court’s consideration of the record in secret. PIA also does not permit the 
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judiciary to freeze the free flow of information once it has realised that the publication 
of information actually compromises, or threatens to compromise National Security 
following a Judicial Peek.875 The commonality between the two pieces of legislation is 
that they both grant the judiciary the discretion to employ in camera proceedings, and 
permit the courts to prohibit the publication of information concerning the content of 
proceedings.876 
As it stands, PIA permits the courts to make greater inroads into Open Justice than 
PAIA does in disputes between information and security. A possible argument in 
support of PIA’s severe limitation of Open Justice is that, because an accused in 
disputes of this nature would presumably have knowledge of the content of the record, 
there is greater risk that protected information can be intentionally or inadvertently 
ventilated in proceedings which would result in compromising South Africa’s National 
Security. Another possible reason for this serious incursion into Open Justice is that 
the act is a throwback to the Apartheid era.877 
However, Open Justice would be promoted better in terms of PIA, without placing 
National Security at any greater risk, if the courts were first allowed to take a Judicial 
Peek at the record, and thereafter to resolve the dispute by receiving ex parte 
representations, if necessary. Additionally, since the accused is presumed to have 
knowledge of the information, more meaningful submissions could be made in defence 
of the accused’s right to receive and impart information. 
In view of the above, PIA’s procedural mechanisms to resolve a dispute between 
information and National Security should be brought in line with PAIA’s procedure. In 
this way the courts could promote Open Justice without increasing the exposure of 
South Africa’s National Security. 
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4.7 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROCEDURES ULTILISED TO RESOLVE 
THE TENSION BETWEEN THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
4.7.1 THE LIMITATION CLAUSE 
Even if Parliament were to amend PIA’s procedure to bring it in line with the position 
under PAIA, as argued for in the previous section, there may still be questions about 
the constitutionality of the relevant provisions. The danger is that secret proceedings 
would allow the courts to unjustifiably limit Open Justice under the pretext of protecting 
the Republic’s National Security. While section 36 can be employed to evaluate the 
constitutionality of the limitation, it is not the principle of Open Justice that is limited, 
but the rights which underscore it. In other words, the question is whether the limitation 
of sections 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 34 and/or 35(3)(c) of the Constitution is constitutional. 
Before examining whether sections 80(1) and 80(3) of PAIA and section 13 of PIA 
constitute justifiable limitations of these rights, it is first necessary to analyse section 
36 of the Constitution. 
Section 36 reads: 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including – 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
In view of this, the courts can only limit sections 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 34 and 35(3)(c) 
of the Constitution if a law of general application countenances secret proceedings. If 
no law of general application exists which allows for the limitation of the rights which 
make up Open Justice, then the limitation will be unconstitutional. 
The first step is to identify if a law is in existence which allows for this type of action. 




superfluous to move on to the next step which focuses on determining if the law 
qualifies as a law of general application.878 Ultimately state action unauthorised by law 
is unconstitutional.879 In the event that the legislature has enacted a law authorising 
specific activities, the court must then determine if such law qualifies as a law of 
general application.880 Only laws which possess four formal attributes will qualify as a 
law of general application.881 These are parity of treatment, non-arbitrariness, 
accessibility or public availability and precision or clarity.882 
Parity as a hallmark of the rule of law883 necessitates that the law which permits 
activities do two things.884 Firstly, it must have the effect of treating persons in similar 
situations identically.885 Additionally, it also means that the governors and the 
governed are subject to the same treatment under the law.886 
Non-arbitrariness necessitates that state action be implemented in accordance with 
a fixed standard.887 The Constitutional Court has held that where a vague legal 
provision gives the state the discretion to limit a right in the Bill of Rights and no 
guidelines exist to limit the government’s discretion, the provision must be declared 
unconstitutional.888 The objective is to ensure that the courts do not rely on poorly 
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constructed security laws, which will lead to arbitrary consequences and state 
abuse.889 
Precision on the other hand necessitates that the law must be so clear that persons 
are capable of fashioning their behaviour according to the dictates of the law.890 
The final attribute that a law must possess in order to qualify as a law of general 
application is that it must be accessible.891 Put differently, the law must be available in 
the public sphere.892 Botha and Woolman opine that a law is generally accessible if 
the reach of a law is widely known by persons and they can fashion their behaviour 
according to its dictates. Additionally, a law is also accessible if individuals can 
determine the consequences of an action.893 Laws which comply with all four criteria 
will qualify as a law of general application in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
Even if PAIA’s procedure and PIA’s proposed amendment were to qualify as a law 
of general application, their limitation of sections 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 34 and/or 35(3)(c) 
of the Constitution, must still qualify as reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society founded on dignity, equality and freedom before the courts will be 
able to justifiably limit the applicable rights. Section 36(1) sets out five factors which 
the courts must use to determine if a limitation will be constitutional. 
The first factor is to examine the nature of the right (in this case the rights 
underpinning the principle of Open Justice).894 This analysis forms part of the court’s 
broader proportionality examination.895 The analysis of this factor must not simply be 
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a duplication of the examination conducted during the first stage of the enquiry, in 
terms of section 39 of the Constitution.896  
Secondly, the courts will have to examine the purpose of PAIA and PIA’s secret 
proceedings and appraise its importance.897 The purpose of a limitation is not always 
self-evident. A court may have to analyse an act’s objective, the history of its 
provisions, and the mischief it aims to correct, in order to identify its purpose.898 The 
objective of a limitation must not run contrary to the values underpinning the 
Constitution. If the purpose is to protect South Africa’s security interests, it will be 
considered to be of sufficient importance to satisfy this second factor.899  
The third factor requires the judiciary to examine the manner in which PAIA and 
PIA’s secret proceedings will limit sections 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 34 and/or 35(3)(c) of the 
Constitution.900 The courts must determine the extent of the limitation on a 
fundamental right. Is the limitation fairly minor or does it severely impair the right?901 
This factor invites the court to engage in balancing and a proportionality analysis. 
Rationality review - the penultimate factor - enables the court to establish if a 
substantive connection exists between means and ends.902 Here, the question would 
be whether the employment of secret proceedings would result in the protection of 
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National Security. The judiciary must conduct an objective enquiry to determine if the 
limitation is rationally linked to its purpose.903 If not, the limitation is arbitrary.904 
The final criterion is whether a less restrictive mechanism exists to achieve the 
purpose of PAIA and PIA’s security provisions.905 The limitation must be tailored 
narrowly so that it does not limit a fundamental right more than necessary. If the 
limitation is more restrictive than necessary to achieve the provision’s purpose, the 
provision will be overbroad.906 
After considering the previous factors the courts have to engage in a proportionality 
test to ensure that PIA and PAIA’s limitation of sections 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 34 and/or 
35(3)(c) of the Constitution are both reasonable and justifiable in South Africa’s 
constitutional democracy. Ultimately PAIA and PIA’s secrecy provisions must not limit 
Open Justice more than necessary to achieve its purpose.907 To guarantee 
proportionality between an infringed right and the act or conduct, the courts must 
weigh up all of the factors.908 The court will assign weightings to each of the 
considerations to determine how the scales will fall.909 The greater the inroads that are 
made into the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, the greater the need to ensure that 
the limitation is indeed necessary to achieve its purpose.910 
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4.7.2 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECRET PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE 
PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT 
As mentioned above, sections 80(1), 80(3)(b) and 80(3)(c) of PAIA authorise the 
judiciary to employ secret proceedings in disputes between a requester’s right to 
access state-held information and the state’s denial of the request on the grounds of 
National Security. The judiciary is authorised by the act to take a Judicial Peek, engage 
in in camera proceedings and restrict the dissemination of information.911 To 
determine whether these powers constitute justifiable limitations of sections 16(1)(a), 
16(1)(b), and 34 of the Constitution (i.e. Open Justice in a civil matter), they must be 
measured against section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
In terms of section 36(1) fundamental rights can only be limited in terms of laws of 
general application. Sections 80(1), 80(3)(b) and 80(3)(c) of PAIA qualify as laws.912 
Additionally these provisions also satisfy all four formal requirements which a law must 
meet in order to qualify as a law of general application.913 Firstly, sections 80(1), 
80(3)(b) and 80(3)(c) of PAIA satisfy the requirement of parity. That is because a court 
will limit a requester’s and the public’s rights to access proceedings (i.e. section 34 of 
the Constitution) and their ability to report thereon (i.e. sections 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(b) 
of the Constitution) in all instances in which a dispute between the right to access state 
information and the state’s duty to protect National Security can only be settled through 
recourse to secret proceedings in terms of the act.914  
Secondly, PAIA’s secret provisions meet the requirement of non-arbitrariness. The 
courts are not allowed to employ the Judicial Peek or secret proceedings haphazardly. 
The Constitutional Court made it clear that courts will be able to engage the Judicial 
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Peek only if the interests of justice require it.915 Subsequent to the court’s examination 
of the protected record, it has the discretion to decide if the state has legitimately 
protected information916 by (i) receiving ex parte representations (i.e. section 80(3)(a) 
of PAIA) or (ii) hearing proceedings in camera (i.e. section 80(3)(b) of PAIA), provided 
that it has not already made its determination following the Judicial Peek. A court must 
exercise this discretion judiciously,917 taking cognisance of the nature of the exemption 
and the category of the record sought.918 Additionally, the judiciary may also elect to 
exercise the powers conferred on it in terms of section 80(3)(c) of PAIA. However, it 
is unclear what the content of this power really is - as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter.919 This provision is capable of two interpretations. One interpretation of this 
provision is that the applicable law allows the South African judiciary to prevent the 
dissemination of information concerning the content of the record following its 
consideration of it in terms of the Judicial Peek. It is submitted that this interpretation 
is not correct. As a matter of logic, the only reason the judiciary relies on its statutory 
powers to analyse a contested record in secret in order to resolve the dispute without 
placing the security interests of the state at risk is because the information is not 
available in the public domain.920 The more plausible interpretation is that following 
the court’s Judicial Peek it has recognised that information ventilated during 
proceedings prior to the Judicial Peek can compromise the Republic’s National 
Security. Consequently, it may deem it in the interests of National Security to freeze 
this information. Against the background of the courts powers in terms of PAIA, it is 
important to point out that the court may only resort to such decisions in very specific 
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instances. The legislation does not contemplate the arbitrary application of the law. 
Specific standards must be adhered to before taking such a decisions.921 
Thirdly, PAIA’s provisions relating to secret court proceedings are precise. During 
the Judicial Peek, requesters will never be permitted to gain access to state-held 
information,922 neither will they ever be able to gain access to it during the ex parte923 
or in camera proceedings. On the strength of the above interpretation of section 80(3), 
the exception to this rule concerns instances where the public during general trial 
proceedings have already gained access to sensitive information prior to the court 
taking a Judicial Peek. Subsequent to the judiciary’s examination of the record, the 
court may find that information publicised in the court room before the Judicial Peek 
was invoked should actually be protected for reasons of National Security. The act 
seems to grant the courts the authority to cloak this information in secrecy after 
establishing its true nature.924 In the context of what has been submitted earlier, PAIA’s 
provisions relating to secret proceedings are sufficiently clear to enable litigants to 
know how to comply with the act’s requirements.925 
Finally, PAIA’s provisions governing secret procedures also meet the criterion of 
accessibility. PAIA is freely available in the public sphere.926 Additionally, PAIA’s 
secrecy provisions, together with the standards laid down by the Constitutional Court, 
clearly set out when and the manner in which sections 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), and 34 of 
the Constitution can be limited.927 In fact it is clear enough so that a requester can 
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easily comply with a court’s decision to engage in secret proceedings and foresee the 
effects of a court’s decision.928 
Next, it must be determined whether the limitations of sections 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 
and 34 of the Constitution by sections 80(1), 80(3)(b) and 80(3)(c) of PAIA are 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. The first factor to be considered here is the nature of the rights 
underpinning Open Justice. The nature of Open Justice has been set out extensively 
at the beginning of this chapter in paragraph 4.2. Given the fundamental importance 
of this principle and the rights underpinning it, both for South Africa’s democracy and 
the judiciary, the rights to access court proceedings (i.e. section 34 of the Constitution) 
and to comment on material ventilated in the judicial arena (i.e. sections 16(1)(a) and 
16(1)(b) of the Constitution) must apply as the golden standard in resolving conflicts 
between the free flow of information and National Security.929 Any justification set 
forward for its limitation needs to be extremely convincing.930 
While the value of Open Justice is of fundamental importance, its limitation in terms 
of sections 80(1), 80(3)(b) and 80(3)(c) of PAIA, read in conjunction with sections 
41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii), serves an important purpose. The Constitution recognises 
both the importance of National Security to our constitutional democracy and the 
authority of Parliament in relation to National Security.931 In fulfilling its duty to protect 
National Security, Parliament has provided the courts with the authority in terms of 
PAIA to engage in secret proceedings.932 These proceedings were designed by the 
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legislature to protect fundamental state interests.933 Thus the importance of this 
limitation cannot be disputed. 
The extent to which sections 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), and 34 can be limited by PAIA’s 
secret proceedings varies, depending on the proceedings which the court chooses to 
engage after the Judicial Peek.934 If the court should choose to engage ex parte 
proceedings, part of the matter will be heard in open court.935 Consequently, the extent 
to which section 34 of the supreme law will be impaired will be limited. However, if it 
chooses to engage in in camera proceedings there will be a total information blackout 
which is a more severe impairment of section 34 of the Constitution.936 Additionally, 
should the court choose to further limit sections 16(1)(a) and16(1)(b) of the 
Constitution in terms of section 80(3)(c) of PAIA, the extent to which information will 
be limited would likewise be far greater under the in camera proceedings than under 
the ex parte proceedings. In other words Open Justice will be impaired, but the extent 
of the limitation will vary. However, there are commonalities which will appear in all of 
the different types of secret proceedings in which Open Justice is limited in the 
interests of National Security. Firstly, the limitation will affect the core values 
underlying Open Justice.937 Participants to a trial will not be able to access or freely 
receive and disseminate protected information at a trial.938 Neither will courts be open, 
transparent or accountable when they engage in secret proceedings.939 Secondly, any 
opportunity a requester will have to effectively challenge the legality and the merits of 
the state’s submissions is lost during secret proceedings.940 Nevertheless, PAIA’s 
limitation is not permanent, nor does it totally destroy Open Justice. Rather secrecy 
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limits sections 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), and 34 of the Constitution as far as it is necessary to 
protect National Security.941 If the courts find that certain information does not threaten 
National Security, it will publicise the information.942 
It seems obvious that sections 80(1) and 80(3)(b), read together with sections 
41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA, enable the courts to engage in secret proceedings 
in order to prevent compromising National Security in judicial disputes between the 
right to access information and National Security. In other words there is a direct 
relationship between means and ends.943 To put it differently, the employment of 
PAIA’s secret proceedings must result in the preservation of South Africa’s National 
Security.944 This raises the question: if the outcome of the proceedings is a finding that 
the record was unjustifiably protected by the state, would that mean that the court’s 
employment of sections 80(1) and 80(3)(b) of PAIA was irrational? The answer is no. 
The court will only employ PAIA’s secret proceedings if the state shows that it is in the 
interests of justice to do so. It would be irresponsible in these circumstances to hear 
the dispute in open court and run the risk of compromising South Africa’s National 
Security. Also if the court at any time finds that the information is incorrectly 
embargoed, it must release it. In these instances there is a clear relationship between 
means and ends.  
However, there does not seem to be a rational relationship between means and 
ends if a court relies on section 80(3)(c) of PAIA following its Judicial Peek of the 
contested record. While section 80(3)(c) of PAIA arms the court with the power to 
prevent the publication of information already in the public domain, it is highly unlikely 
that its limitation of the dissemination of information will practically prevent a threat 
from compromising the Republic’s National Security. The reason for this is simple. In 
the era of technology it is almost impossible to suppress information which has been 
disclosed in the judicial arena prior to the court conducting its Judicial Peek. If the 
disclosed information compromises National Security, court censorship will not be able 
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to effectively counteract any threats. The state will have to employ alternative methods 
to counteract a threat. Secrecy will no longer be an effective tool for the protection of 
National Security.945 Conversely, if the publicity of information does not compromise 
National Security, this is the litmus test. The publicity of the information will positively 
determine if the information really poses a threat to National Security, or not. 
WikiLeaks provides the best example of this. It released thousands of classified 
secrets which states claimed would compromise their National Security,946 and yet this 
did not actually compromise these states’ National Security.947 Ultimately the judiciary, 
by invoking its authority to deny the dissemination of information following a Judicial 
Peek of the record, is just trying to close the stable door after the horse has bolted. 
This provision does not have much value and there is no relationship between freezing 
information which has already been publicised and protecting National Security as 
contemplated by section 36(1)(d) of the Constitution.948 To put it differently, if the 
courts employ this power it will unjustifiably limit Open Justice. Consequently, the 
legislature should repeal this provision since it is unconstitutional.949 
It is hard to contemplate of a less restrictive manner in which to resolve a dispute 
between the right to access information and National Security than PAIA’s procedure. 
PAIA’s secret provisions do seem to be narrowly tailored. If sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 
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41(1)(a)(ii) are read in conjunction with sections 80(1) and 80(3)(b) of PAIA, it is clear 
that the court’s decision to conduct secret proceedings is designed and has the effect 
of protecting National Security. It must also be borne in mind that the Constitutional 
Court has added a specific procedural safeguard to ensure that the courts will only 
conduct secret proceedings if it is in the interests of justice to do so.950 To determine 
the nature of the record in open court will compromise National Security. The courts 
are only entitled to limit Open Justice to the extent necessary to avoid putting the 
state’s National Security at risk. There does not seem to be another viable option 
available to the courts, but to use secrecy to resolve the tension in a way that does 
not put South Africa’s society in grave danger.951  
While Open Justice preserves transparency, free flow of information and fairness in 
the judicial arena,952 the above analysis shows that sections 80(1) and 80(3)(b) of 
PAIA, which meet the requirements of a law of general application,953 only aim to 
empower the judiciary to detract from the transparency of the proceedings insofar as 
it is necessary to preserve the National Security of the Republic. The failure to resolve 
the dispute in this manner could result in the publication of security information, which 
could trigger a threat that could compromise National Security, and place the open 
and democratic society envisaged by the Constitution at risk. Sections 80(1) and 
80(3)(b) of PAIA therefore aim to allow the courts to resolve the tension between 
information and security in a manner which preserves the fairness and transparency 
of the trial without compromising National Security. Therefore the limitation of Open 
Justice in terms of sections 80(1) and 80(3)(b) is reasonable and justifiable.954 
In view of the above, it is submitted that the judiciary’s limitation of sections 16(1)(a), 
16(1)(b), and 34 of the Constitution to preserve National Security in terms of PAIA is 
constitutional. However, section 41(1)(a) in its current form, read in conjunction with 
sections 80(1) and 80(3)(b) of PAIA, does not expressly authorise the limitation of 
Open Justice in instances where the publication of the information could compromise 
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the constitutional order, state sovereignty, the people, or territorial integrity of the 
Republic. If these interests are not preserved from being compromised in terms of the 
applicable statutory framework, the state could be put at serious risk. For this reason, 
it is submitted that the courts should interpret PAIA’s conception of National Security 
in the same manner as proposed in the previous chapter. Should the judiciary rely on 
the definition proposed in chapter 3, the courts will not only be able to constitutionally 
limit Open Justice, but will also be able to preserve the appropriate security interests 
from being compromised by defined threats. 
4.7.3 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE 
PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ACT 
As argued previously, PIA will promote Open Justice more effectively without any 
further risk to South Africa’s National Security, if it is amended to bring it into line with 
sections 80(1) and 80(3)(a) of PAIA. To put it plainly, PIA should include a Judicial 
Peek and the court should be granted the discretion to call for ex parte representations. 
If these proposed amendments are to be incorporated into PIA the courts’ authority to 
resort to secret judicial proceedings would be constitutional for the same reasons as 
argued above (save for the provision that permits the courts to freeze publicised 
information once it has established after it has taken a Judicial Peek that it threatens 
National Security). It must be mentioned that, since disputes arising under PIA will 
often involve criminal aspects, section 35(3)(c) of the Constitution will also come into 
play.955 However, this should not have a substantial impact on the limitation analysis 
to be performed under section 36. 
The proposed amendment to PIA would also have a number of additional benefits 
in matters where one party’s right to receive and impart information stands in 
opposition to the state’s duty to protect National Security. Firstly, the accused would 
be able to assert his or her rights more aggressively. As pointed out earlier in this 
thesis, the accused in PIA’s proceedings may have already had sight of the protected 
record. This would give an accused in a dispute between the rights to receive and 
impart information and National Security, a significant advantage over his information 
counterpart under PAIA’s proceedings. This advantage would also permit the accused 
                                      




to make out a stronger case on why the information held by the state should not be 
protected. 
Secondly, it would improve the efficacy of the courts’ decisions to engage in secret 
proceedings. Prior to the implementation of the Judicial Peek, a requester could 
demonstrate that the state is overstating the necessity to engage in secret 
proceedings. In any ex parte representations following the Judicial Peek, the accused 
could make more meaningful submissions. 
While PAIA’s procedure does not provide unlimited protection to Open Justice, it 
allows the judiciary to resolve disputes in a manner which is fair, without running the 
risk of compromising South Africa’s National Security. The same applies to PIA, 
provided that it is amended as proposed in this chapter to incorporate some of the 
procedures provided for under PAIA, and provided that National Security is interpreted 
as proposed in chapter 3. The failure to do so could expose the state to danger and 
open the door for state abuse. 
4.8 CONCLUSION  
The powers granted to courts in sections 80(1) and 80(3)(b) of PAIA in cases in 
which the state has denied an application for access to information for reasons of 
National Security, constitute a justifiable limitation of the rights underpinning Open 
Justice, guaranteed in sections 16(1)(a), 16(1)(b), 34 and/or 35(3)(c) of the 
Constitution.956 Where the interests of justice demand, the courts must invoke the 
Judicial Peek to resolve the dispute between security and information.957 Following its 
examination of the record and provided that it has not decided on the outcome of the 
dispute after its Judicial Peek,958 a court must exercise its discretion judiciously,959 
taking cognisance of the nature of the security exemption and the category of the 
record sought960 when deciding if the litigants to the proceedings should make ex parte 
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representations, or if the dispute should be resolved in camera.961 Reliance on the 
Judicial Peek, and the decision to receive representations ex parte, or to resolve the 
dispute in camera are reasonable and justifiable limitations of the fundamental rights 
underpinning Open Justice. In addition to the above actions, section 80(3)(c) of PAIA 
also allows the judiciary to prevent the publication of information already in the public 
domain, which should have been protected for purposes of National Security. The 
employment of this power by the courts would be an unjustified limitation of Open 
Justice and the legislature should strike this provision from PAIA since it is 
unconstitutional.962 
The courts’ discovery procedures could possibly be employed to gain access to 
sensitive information in cases where the right to access information comes into conflict 
with National Security. The danger is that this may neutralise the employment of 
PAIA’s procedure for the resolution of disputes between information and security. 
PAIA should be employed to the exclusion of the courts’ discovery procedures to 
resolve the dispute for the reasons adumbrated earlier.  
To ensure that PIA can better promote Open Justice without placing the Republic’s 
National Security in any further danger, it should be amended to bring it in line with 
PAIA’s procedural mechanisms, save for section 80(3)(c). PIA should thus provide for 
a Judicial Peek, and grant the court the discretion to call for ex parte representations. 
Parliament should also consider redrafting the provision to permit the accused to be 
assisted by a security cleared legal representative, or his own counsel subject to 
certain legal sanctions being in place, to add to the fairness of the trial during in camera 
proceedings. If these changes are made, section 13 of PIA’s limitation of Open Justice 
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THE JUDICIARY’S CAPACITY TO RESOLVE THE TENSION BETWEEN THE 
FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Conflicts between the free flow of information and National Security in the judicial 
arena turn to a significant extent on the question whether the ventilation of a contested 
record will compromise National Security. The South African judiciary is the 
designated forum to resolve such conflicts in terms of applicable law.963 In terms of 
section 82(a) of PAIA the judiciary is entitled to confirm, amend or set aside any 
decisions made by the state in terms of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 41(1)(a)(ii) of the 
act. Additionally, the judiciary is also responsible for determining if sections 3 and 4 of 
PIA have been contravened.964  
However, the capability of the South African judiciary to resolve disputes of this 
nature and the proposed process (as set out in chapter 4) which it should rely on to 
resolve these types of disputes are not uncontroversial for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the executive often opposes judicial intervention in these types of disputes.965 
In their view, only the executive and not the judiciary possesses the institutional 
expertise and resources to determine if information should be protected for purposes 
of National Security.966 This line of argument is not without merit, as courts generally 
lack the operational capacity to decide what measures the executive should employ 
to protect National Security.967 Accordingly it may be appropriate for the judiciary to 
defer to the state in matters of National Security. 
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Secondly, even if the judiciary is found to possess the requisite security capacity to 
resolve disputes of this nature, the procedures which are to be applied in terms of the 
applicable legislation may hamper the judiciary’s ability to determine if a record should 
be contained for purposes of National Security. Chapter 4 has proposed an 
amendment of PIA to align it with PAIA’s procedure in order to promote Open Justice 
without putting National Security at any greater risk. However, it will be argued in this 
chapter that the two-step approach followed under PAIA is itself problematic, and may 
require some revision. 
Against this background, this chapter aims to determine (i) if the judiciary has the 
institutional capacity to resolve disputes between the free flow of information and 
National Security in terms of the acts, (ii) if it is appropriate for the judiciary to defer to 
the state in these matters, and (iii) if the procedures provided for under PAIA enable 
the judiciary to resolve this dispute effectively. 
To achieve these outcomes, this chapter will commence by firstly considering the 
roles of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as envisaged by the doctrine of 
the separation of powers in the context of National Security. In this regard, 
consideration will be given to securocrats’ criticisms of judicial intervention and their 
call for judicial deference.968 Secondly, it will analyse the role of the South African 
judiciary and the methodology it employs to resolve disputes between the free flow of 
information and National Security in terms of PAIA and PIA. The purpose of this 
analysis is to determine if the South African judiciary can resolve disputes between 
information and security in a principled manner. Thirdly, this chapter aims to analyse 
judicial and academic conceptions of deference to determine if the judiciary should 
defer to the state where security and information are in conflict in terms of PAIA. Lastly, 
the chapter aims to identify the legal mechanism which would enable the judiciary to 
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effectively resolve the dispute between the free flow of information and National 
Security. 
5.2 THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE TENSION BETWEEN THE FREE 
FLOW OF INFORMATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
The doctrine of the separation of powers calls for state power to be divided between 
different state institutions. This doctrine originated in seventeenth-century Europe, 
during the age of Enlightenment. During this epoch, political actors questioned the 
absolute authority of monarchs and the arbitrary manner in which their powers were 
applied.969 Montesquieu, a French lawyer and political theoretician,970 proposed that 
state power be divided between three distinct institutions.971 In its most elementary 
form, the doctrine is based on three principles. The first is that state power must be 
divided between the executive, legislature and the judiciary, and that no control or 
influence should be exerted by one institution over the other. Secondly, the functions 
of these institutions must be distinct and lastly, the institutions’ personnel must be 
separate.972  
It is worth noting that no universally accepted conception of the doctrine of 
separation of powers exists.973 The Republic of South Africa has its own specific model 
of the doctrine of the separation of powers.974 South Africa’s conception of separation 
of powers acknowledges that state power is divided between three branches of 
government which perform distinct functions.975 
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The first institution in which state power is vested, is the South African legislature. 
The Constitution grants the legislature this power. The supreme law permits the two 
institutions which make up the national legislature – namely the National Assembly 
(NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) – to amend the Constitution, and 
pass laws with regard to their respective spheres of competence. The NCOP is also 
vested with the authority to consider particular legislation passed by the NA. The NA 
is permitted to delegate its legislative authority, save for the authority to amend the 
Constitution.976 The Constitution expressly places the authority to draft laws to protect 
South Africa’s National Security in the hands of Parliament, and makes National 
Security subject to its authority.977 
The second institution in which state authority is vested, is the executive. The 
Constitution places executive authority in the hands of the President of the Republic 
of South Africa.978 Executive authority is exercised by the President together with the 
members of his/her Cabinet.979 The function of the executive is to create and 
implement national policy and legislation. It must also exercise control over executive 
departments and the administration which must implement the laws and policy.980 For 
purposes of this chapter, the term executive includes the executive, its departments, 
the state in criminal disputes or the administration as the context may indicate. The 
Constitution also specifically authorises the executive to protect the Republic’s 
National Security.981 As mentioned earlier, but in a different context, Parliament, by 
enacting PAIA, has granted the executive the authority to deny any request for access 
to state-held information if its publicity will compromise the Republic’s National 
Security in terms of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 41(1)(a)(ii) of the act. PIA also allows 
the executive to take steps to prohibit the dissemination of state-held information in 
the interests of National Security.982 These enactments provide the executive with the 
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necessary tools to limit the free flow of information in order to preserve the Republic’s 
National Security. 
The final institution in which state authority is vested, is the judiciary.983 A crucial 
aspect of the separation of powers is that the judiciary must be independent from the 
other branches of government who are also bearers of state authority, and that it 
should apply the law impartially.984 Effectively, South African courts bear the obligation 
of resolving disputes where the free flow of information and National Security are in 
tension in terms of PAIA and PIA.985 
5.2.1 THE FUNCTION OF THE EXECUTIVE IN MATTERS OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
Legislation typically confers a broad range of powers on the executive to enable it 
to ward off threats against National Security.986 According to Lumina, these powers 
may include the power to detain suspects, restrict their access to legal representation, 
declare a state of emergency, procure property and limit the free flow of information.987 
Historically, the executive bore the responsibility of determining which state-held 
information should be publicised or concealed.988 This judgement call by the executive 
had to be respected by the courts. Arden argues that: 
“If the democratically elected legislature confers specific powers on the executive to deal with 
terrorism, and those powers normally infringe an individual’s human rights, the courts must pay 
respect to the view of the legislature that such powers were needed.”989 
Whether and to what extent judges should defer to the decisions of the executive 
in cases involving conflicts between human rights and National Security is, of course, 
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a contentious issue. However, South African courts cannot ignore the fact that the duty 
to protect the Republic’s National Security through the containment of information 
legally falls within the scope of the executive’s authority.990 Sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 
41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA991 and sections 3 and 4 of PIA firmly establish this.992  
To preserve their realm of competence in disputes concerning National Security, 
securocrats support the idea of limited judicial participation in matters of National 
Security. In their view, the courts are ill suited to resolve the tension between the free 
flow of information and National Security. In support of their view they have levelled a 
number of criticisms against judicial intervention. Their purpose is to highlight the 
deficiencies in the resolution of information and security. Their underlying intention 
seems to be to exclude the judiciary from pronouncing on the executive’s security 
actions and activities. 
The first and most prominent criticism in this context is that the judiciary lacks the 
necessary understanding concerning matters of National Security. This argument is 
founded on the idea that the judiciary lacks the necessary training and expertise in 
matters of National Security. On this view, the judiciary’s lack of ability disqualifies it 
from making pronouncements on security matters. This argument in the information 
and security context strongly suggests that the executive, which is the expert in the 
security field, should have the final say as to what information should be publicised or 
concealed.993 
Secondly, securocrats argue that the courts’ lack of operational capacity impairs 
their ability to resolve matters of National Security. One commentator has argued that 
the judiciary not only lacks the aptitude, but also the facilities to evaluate the efficacy 
of the executive’s security actions.994 
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The final criticism is related to the previous two. The securocrats are of the view 
that the judiciary’s inherent limitations in matters of National Security hamper the 
executive from taking clinical security action. Kirby points out that: 
“Officials commonly believe that external scrutiny by ‘non-experts' is slow, technical and needlessly 
suspicious, involving an unwarranted intrusion into the resolute action necessary to respond to 
urgent modern perils.”995 
In fact commentators have gone as far as to aver that the judiciary restricts the 
security apparatus from being able to ‘confront and defeat its enemies’.996 More 
scathingly, others have argued that the judiciary is responsible for allowing future 
threats to occur.997 In light of this, the executive has taken measures to avoid judicial 
scrutiny of their security actions in some instances. Kirby points out that: 
“[…] the high importance of intelligence gathering and sharing and the urgency of action in some 
circumstances involving suspected terrorists, have led Executive authorities - especially security 
agencies but also the military and police – to resist moves to subject their conduct to prompt and 
repeated external examination by independent judges […]”998 
In light of the above, securocrats hold the view that the judiciary lacks the capacity 
to resolve disputes between the free flow of information and National Security on 
account that (i) it lacks the necessary training and expertise in security matters, (ii) it 
lacks the aptitude and facilities to consider matters of National Security, and (iii) the 
absence of judicial training, expertise, aptitude and facilities not only hinders the 
executive in being able to protect National Security when a dispute arises, but 
contributes to putting the state in harm’s way. To put it differently, on the executive’s 
view, only it possesses the ability to analyse and determine if information should be 
contained for reasons of National Security.999 In light of the judiciary’s lack of capacity 
in matters of National Security, the executive holds the position when disputes 
between information and National Security enters the judicial arena, that the judiciary 
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should rather defer to the executive’s ‘unique insights’ since only it can truly appreciate 
the effect of publicising state-held information.1000 
5.2.2 THE SECUROCRATS’ CONCEPTION OF DEFERENCE: LIMITING THE ROLE 
OF THE JUDICIARY 
In its most basic form, deference is a principle which requires the judiciary to decline 
to make a ruling on a specific matter out of respect for the legislature or the 
executive.1001 In the National Security context this principle would require the courts 
to avoid replacing the executive’s decision with one of its own.1002  
However, securocrats sometimes go further than just asking the courts to defer to 
the executive in security matters. Instead, they seem to demand a ‘zone of executive 
immunity’.1003 They base this demand on the fact that they are the specialists in this 
area.1004 On this view, only the executive should make the final decisions on complex 
National Security issues,1005 since only it has the necessary resources, experience 
and knowledge in these areas.1006 Therefore it is not the function of the court in matters 
of National Security to make pronouncements on what needs to be protected, how it 
should be protected and what security threats should be protected against.1007 Where 
a dispute arises between the free flow of information and National Security, the courts’ 
function seems to be restricted to that of an observer. This view seems to want to 
totally oust the jurisdiction of the court in matters of National Security. 
While this approach to National Security seems to ignore that the function of the 
judiciary is to resolve disputes, a common trend amongst courts across the globe in 
the National Security context has been to defer to the state in matters of National 
Security. Additionally, the security laws of various states actually embrace this 
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conception of deference by relaxing ordinary rules of evidence and due process once 
the state has barely shown that its security is at risk.1008 Not surprisingly, the Apartheid 
government favoured this conception of judicial deference.1009 
On this view, courts are to rely solely on the predictions of the state in matters 
concerning National Security.1010 The judiciary is never to second guess the wisdom 
of the state.1011 Since the judiciary lacks the necessary capacity to resolve disputes 
concerning National Security, all it can and should do is to defer to the wisdom of the 
security experts – the executive. Therefore, the court’s sole function is to rubber stamp 
the decision of the state, consequently giving the state’s decision the dressings of 
judicial legitimacy.1012 Ultimately, a court subscribing to this conception of deference 
allows the government’s power to go unchecked.1013  
5.3 THE FUNCTION OF THE JUDICIARY IN MATTERS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
5.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In South Africa the judiciary’s duty in matters of National Security stands in stark 
contrast to that of the executive. At a constitutional level this branch of government is 
vested with all judicial authority and in execution of this duty the courts are:1014 
“[…] independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially 
and without fear, favour or prejudice.”1015 
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The authority of the judiciary to review the constitutionality of all law and conduct 
makes it an important check on the other branches of government.1016 Consequently 
the judiciary possesses the authority to restrain the power of the legislature and the 
executive. As pointed out by the Constitutional Court in Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa: 
“[…] the courts are the ultimate guardians of the Constitution. They not only have the right to 
intervene in order to prevent the violation of the Constitution, they also have the duty to do so.”1017  
It is important to note that Parliament, in executing its duty to protect South Africa’s 
National Security1018 and in recognition of the station which the judiciary occupies in 
the Republic’s constitutional democracy, has vested the courts with the authority to 
resolve disputes between information and security.1019 More specifically, PAIA and 
PIA identify the judiciary as the forum to resolve disputes between the free flow of 
information and National Security.1020 
5.3.2 THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN TERMS OF THE PROMOTION OF 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION ACT 
Section 82(a) of PAIA enables a court to confirm the executive’s original decision 
and deny the application to access state-held information in terms of sections 
41(1)(a)(i) and/or 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA. Alternatively, it may set aside the decision of the 
executive on the basis that its embargo of information was not executed to preserve 
South Africa’s National Security. When disputes between the free flow of information 
and National Security enter the judicial arena to be decided in terms of PAIA, section 
81(3)(a) read together with sections 41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) requires the executive 
to prove that its decision to restrict access to state-held information is to preserve 
South Africa’s National Security. In the context of chapter 3’s proposed conception of 
National Security, the executive would have to demonstrate that a specific security 
                                      
1016 S170. 
1017 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 1 SA 287 (CC) [33]. Footnote omitted. 
1018 Constitution S44(2)(a) & S198(d). 
1019 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 [123]. 




interest (defence, security, constitutional order, sovereignty, the people or territorial 
integrity of the Republic of South Africa) is at risk of being compromised by an act of 
force, or the threat thereof which necessitates the restriction of the free flow of 
information. The executive must provide the judiciary with sufficient information to 
demonstrate that the security exemption is rightly claimed in terms of the act.1021 In 
this regard the Constitutional Court held that: 
“The question is not whether the best evidence to justify refusal has been provided, but whether the 
information provided is sufficient for a court to conclude, on the probabilities, that the record falls 
within the exemption claimed.”1022 
If the executive manages to do so, it will have satisfied its duty as contemplated by 
section 81(3)(a) of PAIA.1023 In light of the above and following the state’s oral 
submissions and presentation of evidence, the judiciary must determine if it will 
confirm, or deny the embargoing of state-held information for purposes of National 
Security on the strength of the evidence put before it. To this end, the judiciary will 
engage in a de novo consideration of the matter to resolve the dispute.1024 In the words 
of the Constitutional Court: 
“In proceedings under PAIA, a court is not limited to reviewing the decisions of the information officer 
or the officer who undertook the internal appeal. It decides the claim of exemption from disclosure 
afresh, engaging in a de novo reconsideration of the merits. The evidentiary burden borne by the 
state pursuant to s 81(3) must be discharged as in any civil proceedings, on a balance of 
probabilities.”1025 
The judiciary follows a three step process before resolving any dispute between the 
free flow of information and National Security in terms of section 82(a) of PAIA. Firstly, 
it will hear the state’s oral submissions in the context of PAIA’s National Security 
exemption. Secondly, it will examine the evidence placed before it by the state 
(voluntarily, or in terms of the Judicial Peek) to determine if the executive has provided 
                                      








sufficient evidence so that the judiciary may assess if the ventilation of the state-held 
information will compromise sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA. Lastly, in 
light of the evidence and oral submissions made, the judiciary will determine to 
support, or set-aside the state’s decision to embargo information for purposes of 
National Security. 
The court followed this approach in Right2Know Campaign v Minister of Police. In 
support of its position to deny access to state-held information the state submitted inter 
alia, that if this information were disclosed the ‘security and defence’ of the Republic 
of South Africa would be compromised.1026 The state submitted that ‘dark forces’ 
represented a risk to the state.1027 In support of this view the state contended that its 
predicament: 
“was illustrated by the experiences of that well known gentleman adventurer and upholder of noble 
causes, James Bond, who […] with his customary charm and grace, declined to disclose a fact to a 
questioner, because were he to do so, he would have to kill him.”1028 
However, the High Court rejected the state’s position. Firstly, the court considered 
the state’s submissions in the context of the exemption claimed. It is important to note 
that the courts specifically recognised that the National Security exemption can be 
employed to test the state’s claim for secrecy.1029 Secondly, the court considered if 
the state provided sufficient evidence so that it could determine if the contested record 
fell within the exemption claimed. Ultimately, the court considered if sufficient 
information was furnished so as to enable it to determine if the executive has satisfied 
the requirements of section 81(3)(a) of PAIA.1030 Lastly, following its examination of 
the oral submissions and evidence the court concluded that the state failed to provide 
sufficient evidence so that it could determine if the information should be concealed 
for purposes of National Security.1031 










The Constitutional Court also followed this approach when the free flow of 
information and National Security came to a head in the Masetlha decision. While this 
matter was not decided in terms of PAIA, it does provide insight into the manner in 
which the judiciary will resolve a dispute between the free flow of information and 
National Security.1032 In an attempt to ensure that the state record did not enter the 
public domain, the Minister of Intelligence firstly argued that it was duly authorised in 
terms of applicable law to conceal state-held information and that once this was done, 
the courts had no authority to undo the concealment.1033 Secondly, the state argued 
that it had not exercised its concealing powers improperly and that the appellant had 
not impugned the manner in which it exercised this authority. Lastly, in the context of 
the separation of powers doctrine, the state argued that the courts cannot arrogate to 
themselves the right to undo a legitimate security classification which prevents a 
record from being publicised.1034 In the alternative the state submitted that if the South 
African courts took the position that they can undo a state classification, they should 
give proper weight to the National Security considerations.1035 
The court relied upon the record to determine whether it should be disclosed for 
purposes of National Security.1036 It concluded that only certain information should be 
concealed for purposes of National Security,1037 while in other instances it regarded 
the state-held information to be innocuous and permitted it to enter the public 
domain.1038 
In attempting to contain the ventilation of state-held information in these two cases, 
the executive falls back on its institutional argument. Ultimately, the executive’s 
position is that due to the judiciary’s lack of proficiency in matters of National Security 
it should be completely deferential in favour of the state. Nevertheless, PAIA clearly 
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contemplates that the judiciary can interrogate the executive’s National Security 
assertions from a legal point of view. In both Right2Know Campaign v Minister of 
Police and the Masetlha decision, the court correctly concluded that the information 
which the state aimed to protect for purposes of National Security should not be 
embargoed.1039  
5.3.3 THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN TERMS OF THE PROTECTION OF 
INFORMATION ACT 
Anyone who expresses state-held information in contravention of sections 3 and 4 
of PIA will be guilty of committing a criminal offence.1040 This has implications for the 
role of the court in such cases. Given the possibility of a criminal record and the 
restriction of personal freedom through imprisonment, it is important that persons who 
are convicted of such a crime should be clear on the reasons why they are losing their 
freedom.1041 For these reasons, the state must prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
the accused has committed a crime.1042 As Nugent J stated in S v Van der Meyden: 
“The onus of proof in a criminal case is discharged by the state if the evidence establishes the guilt 
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The corollary is that he is entitled to be acquitted if it is 
reasonably possible that he might be innocent.”1043 
The state’s onus is no different in matters where an accused is charged with 
unlawfully receiving, or disseminating state-held information in contravention of 
sections 3 or 4 of PIA.1044 The state must place the evidence necessary to discharge 
its onus in front of the judiciary.1045 The reason for this is that South African courts are 
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obligated to examine the state’s evidence in addition to its oral submissions to 
determine if the publicity of state-held information will compromise National Security 
in criminal cases. 1046 If the state’s representations and its evidence do not prove that 
the information’s publicity will compromise National Security, or if the facts do not fit 
together so that the court can conclude that National Security is threatened, then no 
weight can be assigned to the executive’s assertions.1047 South African courts will not 
incarcerate an accused simply on the state’s security assertions. 
A court will not be able to conclude that the publicity of the information will 
compromise National Security unless it actually knows what the content of the 
document is.1048 The court needs to be convinced by the evidence placed before it 
that the publicity of the information presents a real threat to National Security before it 
convicts an accused.1049 Notwithstanding the difference in the standards of proof in 
information and security disputes decided in terms of PAIA and PIA, there does not 
seem to be much difference at a principled level in the approach the courts adopt in 
terms of PIA, when determining if the ventilating of state-held information will 
compromise South Africa’s National Security. The PIA court – like the PAIA court – 
will (i) hear the state’s oral submissions in the context of PIA’s conception of National 
Security, (ii) examine the evidence placed before it by the state to determine if the 
executive has provided sufficient evidence so that the judiciary may assess if the 
ventilation of the state-held information is contrary to sections 3 and 4 of PIA, and (iii) 
in light of the evidence and oral submissions made, determine if the accused by the 
expression or attempted expression of state-held information has committed an 
offence.  
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It is difficult to imagine how the state can discharge its onus in criminal disputes by 
bringing a charge against an accused in terms of sections 3 and/or 4 of PIA, and then 
expect to procure a conviction without placing the necessary evidence before the court 
so that it can determine if a crime has been committed. It seems ludicrous to expect 
the judiciary to fail to deal with the merits of the matter on account that it lacks the 
institutional capacity to make decisions on National Security. It seems equally strange 
to expect the judiciary in these matters to defer to the wisdom of the state on account 
of their purported lack of competence in matters of National Security. Should the 
judiciary decide criminal disputes in the context of National Security in this manner, it 
will be a travesty of justice for several reasons.  
Firstly it is doubtful whether trials of this nature will satisfy the requirements of a fair 
trial as contemplated by sections 34 and 35(3)(c) of the Constitution.1050 
Secondly, it would be reckless for the judiciary to abdicate its duty to resolve 
criminal disputes in light of the state’s history of abusing the defence of National 
Security. History is filled with examples where states have unjustifiably relied on their 
National Security powers to conceal executive corruption, ineptitude, abuse of 
authority, oppression1051 or executive and/or personal interests.1052 As pointed out in 
chapter 2, this allows the executive to present its performance in a positive light, by 
concealing information which would expose the executive’s failings.1053 To incarcerate 
an individual on the say so of the state puts freedom in South Africa in grave danger 
and should not be permitted. 
Thirdly, the judiciary’s expertise lies in the interpretation and application of law and 
it is therefore best placed to determine if the executive’s activities are consistent with 
the relevant security legislation, although it may lack the security dexterity to determine 
how best to protect National Security.1054 It is the judiciary which must decide if specific 
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activities fall within the sphere of protection of PIA’s National Security provisions, not 
the executive.1055 Its decisions on security matters bind all organs of state and the 
executive is obligated to comply with the courts’ directions.1056 If the judiciary could 
not restrain the executive in its functions, it would be near impossible to control this 
branch of government in matters of National Security.1057 The judiciary has limited 
powers in this regard, since it will only be able to exercise this restraint on the power 
of the executive if the dispute between the free flow of information and National 
Security enters the judicial arena.  
In the context of PIA, the judiciary will have to determine if the information protected 
by the executive should be masked in secrecy for purposes of National Security.1058 
This power of the courts originates from the Constitution. Naturally the courts’ authority 
to resolve the tension is not subject to interference by the executive arm of 
government.1059 As was mentioned earlier, the assertions of securocrats that the 
judiciary should not be involved in matters of National Security on account that it lacks 
the necessary capacity, or should defer to the executive, seem unwarranted in the 
context of PIA. The questions concerning judicial competence and deference do not 
seem to arise under PIA, and only need to be decided in the context of PAIA. 
The efficacy of PIA’s procedure is predicated on the supposition that the state-held 
information has not been comprehensively publicised prior to the court’s determination 
whether the information should be protected or released. The judiciary will only be able 
to rule on an alleged contravention of sections 3 and/or 4 of PIA, while also protecting 
South Africa’s National Security throughout a trial, if the holder of the information is 
censored. The danger here is that the need for the judiciary to determine if information 
must be protected in terms of PIA will be rendered superfluous if the state-held 
information is comprehensively publicised prior to the matter being set down to be 
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heard in terms of PIA. However, these pre-trial considerations are beyond the scope 
of this thesis’ examination. 
5.4 EVALUATING JUDICIAL CAPACITY  
Granting an ill equipped bench the authority to determine if information should be 
concealed or publicised could place South Africa’s survival in jeopardy. Based on the 
executive’s expertise in matters of National Security, and the judiciary’s apparent lack 
thereof, it could indeed be argued that the judiciary should rather defer to the decisions 
of the executive. Despite the criticisms by the executive that the judiciary lacks the 
capacity to resolve disputes which concern National Security,1060 its assertions are 
unconvincing in the context of PAIA and the proposed definition of National Security. 
There are three reasons which support this view. 
Firstly, the proposed definition of National Security and the information provided by 
the state in discharging its onus under section 81(3)(a) of PAIA should enable the 
judiciary to determine if an object is at risk of being compromised, to identify the threats 
thereto and to make determinations on the legality and rationality of the state’ security 
action. These outcomes can be achieved by the judiciary even if lacks specific training, 
knowledge or resources in matters of National Security. The definition of National 
Security as proposed by chapter 3 clearly identifies all of the security interests and the 
threats which can compromise them. If the state argues that its decision to restrict 
access to information is for reasons of National Security, section 81(3)(a) of PAIA 
requires it to place sufficient evidence before the court so that the judiciary may make 
a decision thereon.1061 The evidence submitted by the state, and the judiciary’s 
reliance on the proposed definition of National Security will enable courts to determine 
if an interest qualifies as a security interest. Additionally, evidence provided by the 
state and the definition will also enable the judiciary to determine if threats are aimed 
at any of the proposed security interests. Having sufficient evidence on the security 
interests, the threats posed thereto and clarity on the meaning of National Security,1062 
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the judiciary should have no difficulty in determining if the decision to deny access to 
information is warranted. The judiciary would thus be able to assess if the state’s 
actions were legally exercised in terms of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 41(1)(a)(ii) of 
PAIA. It will also be able to determine if the blackout of information has the effect of 
preventing the threat from compromising the security interests, that is, whether the 
denial of access to information is rationally related to the purpose of protecting 
National Security. Therefore no further training or experience is necessary for the 
judiciary to fulfil its duty in terms of PAIA and no questions can be raised concerning 
its capacity in this regard. 
Secondly, the powers granted to the judiciary in terms of section 82(a) of PAIA and 
the utility of the proposed definition of National Security, empower the judiciary to 
make clinical security decisions, instead of frustrating the state’s security actions. 
States exaggerate the risk of publicising state-held information protected for purposes 
of National Security and the courts can guard against this via judicial interrogation.1063 
Executive over-classification has occurred from the time of the Pentagon Papers and 
the Spycatcher cases.1064 The executive in these cases argued that there will be a 
serious impairment of National Security if information was publicised,1065 or continued 
to be disseminated through the public domain.1066 However, National Security was not 
compromised by the publicity of this information. In the modern era, WikiLeaks 
provides the best example of executive attempts to over-classify information when it 
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released thousands of classified secrets. And yet the relevant states’ National Security 
was not compromised as a result.1067 
Additionally, the information used to prove these security risks are often very light 
in substance as has been shown over decades.1068 States often exaggerate the 
threats to their National Security.1069 To date no executive has provided substantive 
information proving that National Security has been seriously compromised by the 
publication of executive secrets.1070 Thus to guard against this, South African courts 
must be able to test the executive’s assertions of National Security. The proposed 
definition of National Security together with the judiciary’s powers in terms of section 
82(a) of the act, and the state’s duty in terms of section 81(3)(a) of PAIA enables the 
judiciary to make accurate pronouncements in the National Security context. The 
above therefore highlights the capacity of the judiciary to resolve disputes between the 
free flow of information and National Security, while at the same time neutralising the 
criticism that the judiciary acts as an obstacle to decisive security action. 
Lastly, defining what National Security means and allowing the judiciary to take 
action in this regard nullifies the argument that matters of National Security remain the 
preserve of securocrats. Section 82(a) of PAIA clearly grants the courts the power to 
decide to publicise state-held information on account that it will not compromise 
National Security.1071 It is important to note that PAIA does not list any instances in 
which the courts are to forgo their decision-making ability in favour of the state.1072 
Chapter 3’s proposed definition provides the court with clear markers which will enable 
it to determine if National Security is at risk. It is submitted that in acknowledgment of 
the judiciary’s duties, the proposed definition of National Security and the state’s duty 
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in terms of section 81(3)(a), makes it difficult to think of a dispute which the judiciary 
cannot resolve given enough time and information.1073  
Allowing the courts to make this determination also avoids state abuse. The South 
African executive has in several instances attempted to unjustifiably limit the free flow 
of information with the purpose of keeping secret the true nature of its actions. The 
Right2Know Campaign v Minister of Police revealed how the executive used the 
National Key Point Act 102 of 1980 to justify its decision to arrest homeless persons 
sleeping in front of the Department of Justice. The same piece of legislation was also 
used to justify the executive’s decision to arrest protestors outside the Rustenburg 
Magistrate Court and to rationalise the executive’s decision when it forcibly destroyed 
pictures taken by journalists of a prisoner being viciously beaten by warders at 
Groenpunt prison.1074 In the Masetlha decision the executive relied on National 
Security in an attempt to cover up a failed surveillance operation.1075 In President of 
the Republic of South Africa v M&G Media Ltd the executive denied a request to 
access a report prepared by Justices Khampepe and Moseneke on the grounds that 
the report would publicise information supplied in confidence by or on behalf of another 
state or international organisation and that the document was prepared for the 
President so that he may make an executive decision.1076 In each of the 
aforementioned instances, the state had the necessary experience, aptitude and 
resources to take decisions of state importance, but still failed to act justly.1077 It was 
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only by way of judicial intervention that the public was able to gain access to, receive 
and impart state-held information that revealed the true nature of the executive’s 
actions. If not for the judiciary, South Africans would not be able to appreciate how the 
executive deliberately attempted to disguise the true nature of their actions by invoking 
secrecy.1078 Therefore, PAIA clearly acknowledges that the judiciary has the 
necessary ability to resolve disputes between the free flow of information and National 
Security. The act together with the proposed definition enables the judiciary to decide 
these cases despite the criticism of the executive. 
5.5 JUDICIAL CAPACITY AND DEFERENCE 
The previous section has demonstrated that, contrary to the assertions of 
securocrats, the South African judiciary possesses the capacity to resolve the tension 
between information and security. The provisions of PAIA and the proposed definition 
will enable the judiciary to make decisions on what is at risk of being compromised, 
from which threat, and to assess the rationality and legality of a decision to embargo 
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state-held information. But despite the judiciary’s ability to resolve disputes, one 
cannot discount the fact that the executive does have expertise in the National Security 
context. In light of the judiciary’s powers and the state’s sphere of competence, it is 
unclear if it would ever be appropriate for the court to defer to the state where a dispute 
arises under PAIA concerning the free flow of information and National Security. 
As explained above, securocrats’ conception of deference sometimes extends to a 
form of ‘executive immunity’ against judicial interference.1079 However, South Africa 
subscribes to a different conception of judicial deference. In an influential contribution, 
Professor Cora Hoexter proposed that: 
“The intensity of the court's scrutiny and its willingness to intervene in a particular case will naturally 
vary according to factors such as the policy content of the decision, the breadth of the discretion and 
the degree of expertise of the decision-maker. Other relevant factors include the impact of the 
decision, the degree of public participation in the decision-making process and the presence or 
absence of an opportunity for internal reconsideration. All of these will be likely to affect the 'margin 
of appreciation' given by the judge to the agency.”1080 
Several years later Cameron J in Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO endorsed 
Hoexter’s notion of deference.1081 Professor Hoexter’s conception of deference was 
also adopted by the courts in several other decisions dealing with reasonableness 
review.1082 South Africa’s highest courts have clearly illustrated how deference applies 
in the separation of powers context. The SCA in Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd pointed out that: 
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“Judicial deference does not imply judicial timidity or an unreadiness to perform the judicial function. 
It simply manifests the recognition that the law itself places certain administrative actions in the 
hands of the executive, not the judiciary.”1083 
Schutz J in the same matter went on to state that: 
“Judicial deference is particularly appropriate where the subject matter of an administrative action is 
very technical or of a kind in which a court has no particular proficiency. We cannot even pretend to 
have the skills and access to knowledge that is available to the Chief Director. It is not our task to 
better his allocations, unless we should conclude that his decision cannot be sustained on rational 
grounds.”1084 
 The Constitutional Court in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism emphasised that: 
“In treating the decisions of administrative agencies with the appropriate respect, a court is 
recognising the proper role of the executive within the Constitution.”1085 
It would be a mistake to assume, in view of the principle of judicial deference, that 
the role of the courts under the Constitution is no different from their role during 
Apartheid where they abdicated their duty to ensure justice by deferring to the state in 
matters which concerned National Security. The courts’ role is far more involved in the 
new dispensation. O’ Regan J in the Bato Star case explains that the courts will not 
blindly follow the state’s declarations: 
“A court should not rubber-stamp an unreasonable decision simply because of the complexity of the 
decision or the identity of the decision-maker.”1086 
Effectually, South Africa’s democratic dispensation requires courts to test the 
state’s assertions, proclamations or incantations and not just abide by the say so of 
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the state.1087 The proposed definition of National Security, together with the courts’ 
duty as contemplated by section 82(a) and the state’s duty in terms of section 81(3)(a) 
of PAIA, clearly enables the judiciary to determine if the ventilation of information will 
compromise South Africa’s National Security. However, that is not to say that the 
judiciary should decide cases without giving due weight or consideration to the state’s 
security assessments. Although the judiciary has extensive tools to resolve the tension 
in terms of PAIA, there are instances where it would be more appropriate for it to defer 
to the state when resolving these disputes. There are two instances which immediately 
come to mind. However, they are not intended to be an exhaustive list.  
The first instance where the judiciary may be inadequately equipped to resolve 
disputes between the free flow of information and National Security is circumstances 
in which threshold problems arise. The scale of a threat will determine if a forceful 
threat will qualify as a National Security or a general threat. The difficult question to 
answer is how ‘forceful or threatening’ should an activity be, for it to be classed as a 
National Security threat. If threats are viewed on a spectrum, a minor threat will not 
qualify as a National Security threat, but if the same threat poses a considerable 
hazard to the state’s interests it will transition into a National Security threat.  
This is best illustrated by two examples. It is difficult to imagine that the South 
African government will conclude that its National Security is at risk, if it is aware that 
a political party intends to force one South African citizen to vote for it during the 
general elections, or if a single foreign religious extremist plans to murder three South 
Africans for ideological reasons. It is, however, highly unlikely that the government will 
take the same position if a million people were to be threatened by the political party 
to vote for it,1088 or if attacks on South Africans were planned or carried out by Boko 
Haram, Al Shabaab, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or any other organised terrorist 
group. The difficulty is determining where the threshold lies. If the threshold is set too 
low, the judiciary can be criticised for being paranoid. Alternatively, if the risk threshold 
is unacceptably high, the courts could expose South Africa to serious security 
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threats.1089 The problem with the scale is that determining when a forceful threat is 
significant enough to qualify as a National Security threat is a very subjective 
assessment.1090 Hall and Chuck-A-Sang argue that the intensity of a threat will 
determine if it will qualify as a National Security threat. By intensity, they mean the 
certainty of the threat, its temporality, the probability that it will occur, its probable 
consequences and whether historical factors contribute to the intensification of the 
threat assessment. Thus, the more intense a threat is, the more likely that it will be 
considered a National Security threat.1091 Helpful as Hall and Chuck-A-Sang’s 
indicators may be, it still does not change the subjective nature of a threat assessment. 
It does however attempt to make the threat assessment more scientific. Since the 
executive possesses better experience, resources and knowledge in the 
circumstances set out above, it would be more appropriate for the courts to defer to 
the wisdom of the executive in these instances. 
Secondly, despite the proposed definition of National Security and an appropriate 
methodology enabling the judiciary to determine if the information should be cloaked 
in secrecy, the court may not have a genuine appreciation of the threats to South 
Africa’s National Security in certain circumstances. Yacoob J’s proposed order in his 
minority judgment in the Masetlha case provides an example.1092 The Minister in the 
matter argued for the Njenje report to remain classified on the grounds that it contained 
the name of a NIA operative, and that publication could possibly disclose his identity 
and put his life in danger,1093 not to mention the risk posed to National Security. 
Yacoob J failed to see how the operative’s life or National Security could be put at risk 
by the publication of the operative’s name and ordered that the report be released.1094 
Yacoob J was the only member of the constitutional bench who would have disclosed 
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the name of the operative.1095 There is no doubt that the release of classified 
information which contains the names of operatives tasked with protecting the 
Republic can have devastating effects for South Africa’s National Security. Froneman 
J in his judgment showed the value of NIA operatives and illustrated the price the 
Republic would have to pay if such classified information were released. In light of this, 
he criticised Yacoob J’s approach to National Security. Froneman J stated that 
Yacoob: 
“[…] may underestimate the dangers potentially faced by operatives in the field when he finds it 
impossible to understand how a surveillance coordinator’s life would be in danger if his name were 
to be released in view of his limited role. Surveillance coordinators are privy to highly sensitive 
information like names, faces and other methods of identification of undercover agents, knowledge 
of tactics of surveillance by the government, and knowledge of particular undercover or surveillance 
operations. This information could be useful to those seeking to threaten national security. Disclosing 
the identity of a person with access to that information and identifying him or her as someone who 
on at least one occasion had access to information may place them at risk. For this reason, I am of 
the view that redaction of the operative’s name in question would have been an appropriate means 
of achieving the government’s need to protect its operatives.”1096 
Yacoob J did not provide a source of law which authorised him to act in this fashion, 
nor did he provide reasons for his incursion into the executive’s sphere of expertise. 
Thus we have no textual guidance as to why he decided to make such a holding.1097 
One line of argument is that he made this ruling based on his own conception of ‘how’ 
National Security should be protected.1098 
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In Yacoob J’s defence, nothing happened since his judgment to release the 
sensitive information. This is because the name of the operative was not actually 
publicised.1099 The JHBP clearly states that no person should be sanctioned for the 
publication of classified information which purportedly threatens National Security, if 
no threats ensue subsequent to the publicising of the information.1100 But what if 
publicity had the opposite effect? What if the walls of National Security came crashing 
down?1101 How could National Security be protected if the decisions of the judiciary 
put South Africa’s National Security in peril? What recourse is available to the 
executive?  
                                      
names of security operatives is fairly self-evident. Publication of names could put the lives of operatives 
in danger, it could jeopardise an operation, and it could make them targets for information or provide 
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respected roles of the court and executive. 
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Florence and Gerke argue that an expedited interlocutory appeal will be useful in 
these instances. It will allow the government to quickly appeal the decision of the sitting 
court if it is unfavourable towards state security.1102 This suggestion is unhelpful in a 
case in which it is the Constitutional Court itself, the highest appeal court that made 
the decision.1103 The amendment of legislation, the removal of the judge or judges 
from the bench, or calling the judicial dexterity of the legal officers into question in the 
media are measures which seem equally useless in the face of danger. There seems 
to be no answer to this conundrum. What is certain is that the criticism against the 
judiciary will not only be that it lacked judicial expertise should such circumstances 
arise. Rather it would be that the judiciary is directly responsible for compromising 
South Africa’s National Security. In these instances it would be more appropriate for 
the judiciary to defer to the state. 
Even though PAIA’s provisions and the proposed definition of National Security 
equip the judiciary with the necessary capacity to resolve disputes between the free 
flow of information and National Security, there are instances where it would be more 
appropriate for it to defer to the executive. This does not and should not amount to an 
abdication of the judiciary’s power to interpret the law and control government action. 
It is simply in recognition of the fact that there are areas in which the executive is better 
placed than judges to make factual determinations, and that in such matters, judges 
should generally be cautious not to substitute their own views for those of the 
executive. 
5.6 JUDICIAL CAPACITY: IDENTIFYING AN APPROPRIATE METHODOLOGY 
Sections 25(3)(b), 77(5)(b), 80(1), 80(3) and 81(3)(a) of PAIA are meant to assist 
the judiciary in determining if a contested record should be ventilated.1104 At the first 
step the judiciary will resolve the dispute without having sight of the record as 
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contemplated by sections 25(3)(b), 77(5)(b) and 81(3)(a) of the act.1105 However, if the 
judiciary cannot resolve the dispute at the first stage, sections 80(1) and 80(3) of PAIA 
can be utilised to resolve the tension if the interests of justice demand this (second 
step). In fact it is only during the second step, that the judiciary can determine if the 
contested record was properly concealed for purposes of National Security. This is 
because it is only at this stage of the proceedings that the judiciary will have sight of 
the record.1106 Effectively, PAIA’s two-step approach limits the judiciary in its ability to 
resolve the dispute between the free flow of information and National Security in two 
ways. The first is that the state can be placed in grave danger if the judiciary resolves 
the dispute without examining the content of the record. Secondly, the judiciary may 
also unjustifiably limit the free flow of information at the first step of PAIA’s process.1107 
As a matter of logic if the state charges an accused with contravening section 3 or 
4 of PIA, it is really aiming to freeze the flow of information. It is highly unlikely that it 
would refer to the content of the protected record to discharge its onus during 
proceedings. This would ultimately undo its attempt to protect South Africa’s National 
Security by limiting the free expression of sensitive security information. Chapter 4 has 
argued that the procedure of section 13 of PIA should be amended and brought into 
line with PAIA’s procedure, to enable the judiciary to decide if a record should be 
contained for purposes of National Security, or ventilated. While this amendment may 
better promote Open Justice without placing National Security at greater risk, there is 
still a danger that the judiciary will not rely on the Judicial Peek and the other legal 
mechanisms (ex parte or in camera proceedings) to resolve the dispute, and thus 
decide the dispute without having sight of the record. To that extent, PIA would still 
suffer from the same drawbacks that PAIA does. 
Both the Constitutional Court and the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI), a not-
for-profit organisation, in its submissions as amicus curiae in the Masetlha 
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decision,1108 created alternative dispute resolution approaches which could potentially 
avoid the drawbacks of PAIA’s two-step approach.1109 For ease of reference these two 
approaches will be referred to as ‘Masetlha’s principled approach’1110 and ‘FXI’s 
procedural approach’.1111 
The legal mechanism which the courts rely on must enable them to decide if a 
contested record should be contained for purposes of National Security. To this end, 
it needs to be determined if PAIA’s two-step approach, ‘Masetlha’s principled 
approach’ or ‘FXI’s procedural approach’ will be most effective in permitting the courts 
to achieve this outcome. Consequently, each of the approaches will be analysed to 
determine if any of them will enable the judiciary to execute its duty effectively. 
5.6.1 THE JUDICIARY AND THE PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
ACT 
5.6.1.1 THE JUDICIARY’S APPROACH PRIOR TO THE RELIANCE ON THE 
JUDICIAL PEEK 
Once trial proceedings have commenced in terms of PAIA, all that the executive 
needs to do in order to ensure that the courts make a decision to deny a request for 
access to information, is to place sufficient information before the courts to discharge 
its onus in terms of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 41(1)(a)(ii) of the act.1112 As mentioned 
before, the executive must discharge this onus without referring to the content of the 
record which is at the centre of the dispute.1113 Consequently, what the executive is 
required to do is to place sufficient evidence before the courts to show that the content 
of the record is cloaked in secrecy for reasons of National Security. 
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In discharging its onus, the executive must not labour under the impression that by 
merely raising the word National Security, the courts will be charmed into deciding a 
matter in its favour.1114 Reciting the text of an act, or PAIA’s National Security 
exemption, will never be sufficient proof that the information is protected by the 
exemption. Nor will the executive’s ipse dixit affidavits or bald assertions discharge the 
executive’s onus.1115 
In an attempt to discharge its onus, the executive can place a number of records 
before the court. The executive could place the classification rubric it used to protect 
the information,1116 together with the legal framework which guided it in its decision to 
protect information, before the court.1117 Additionally, it could place an outline before 
the court listing the type of information which the protected record forms part of and 
the government operation it relates to.1118 The executive could also show that 
international protocols and agreements prohibit the dissemination of the information in 
the record.1119 In support of the above, it could further provide evidence of the threats 
or potential threats which may ensue if the information is ventilated in the public 
domain. Furthermore, the executive could show which security interest will be 
compromised if the information is published. In order to discharge its onus, it could 
also provide evidence that shows that the purpose of the department which produced, 
collected and aggregated the information, is to protect South Africa’s National 
Security.1120 Additionally, it could prove that the executive has the necessary skills, 
institutional capacity and legal authority to protect security information and to gauge 
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the effects which the publication of information could have on executive security.1121 
The executive could also produce affidavits from relevant security personnel whose 
assessment of the record is that National Security will be compromised if the 
information is publicised. The court will only rely on such evidence if it can be proven 
that, due to the nature of the person’s profession, the applicable person has 
knowledge of the record.1122 Additionally, the executive can also provide affidavits 
from the heads of executive institutions like the Director General or the Minister,1123 
provided that they can show due to their work experience and exposure to the record 
that the information concerns issues of National Security and that its publication could 
compromise South Africa’s National Security.1124 Using such evidence other than the 
primary record, the executive would be able to make out a strong case on the papers. 
The above method is just an example of how the executive may attempt to discharge 
its onus in terms of PAIA. It is not meant to be a legal silver bullet when protecting 
information.  
The courts in resolving the dispute can rely on evidence other than the state-held 
information to decide if the publicity of the protected record will compromise National 
Security, without actually having sight of the contested record.1125 The courts have 
followed this approach in the resolution of disputes in terms of PAIA. The High Court 
and SCA resolved a dispute at this stage of proceedings before the Constitutional 
Court was asked to settle the matter. These courts were tasked with the duty of 
ascertaining if the executive’s exemptions were legitimately raised. Neither the High 
Court nor the Supreme Court examined the contested record, but both held that the 
executive failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify its invocation of the legal 
exemptions and consequently ordered that the information be released.1126 The 
majority of the Constitutional Court confirmed that a matter can be resolved without 
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the court having actual sight of the contested record at this stage of PAIA’s 
proceedings.1127  
While the executive can make out a strong case using evidence other than the 
contested record, it is nevertheless difficult to understand how a court will be able to 
resolve the tension between information and security properly without having sight of 
the actual record in order to thoroughly test the executive’s security assertions.1128 
The point here is that courts are relying on the say so of the executive,1129 which would 
mean that they are being highly deferential in favour of the executive. Relying on 
evidence other than the primary record only provides the illusion that a protected 
record contains information which, if publicised, could compromise National Security. 
Not even the proposed definition of National Security can remedy this, since the courts 
have not had sight of the record and therefore cannot compare the record against the 
conception of security. The usefulness of the proposed definition of National Security 
can only have true value under circumstances where the courts have had sight of the 
record.  
The danger here is twofold. Resolving the dispute in this fashion could either 
unjustifiably limit the right to access information, or endanger the security and 
continued existence of the state. Only access to the contested record will determine 
what the effects will be, if any.1130 Additionally, it is submitted that the court will only 
be able to take a view on the legality and the merits of the matter if it has sight of the 
record. If a court relies on the executive’s evidence, it is placing its faith in the 
executive’s speculations dressed up and presented as factual evidence.1131 What then 
is the value of judicial competence in matters of National Security if judges rely on 
indirect information which gives the impression that the executive’s decision is 
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necessary?1132 In fact the court is presuming that a particular fact exists based on the 
form of the evidence placed before it.1133 In other words the courts are just relying on 
the executive’s security assertions.1134 
Resolving a dispute between information and security in this manner is a throwback 
to the Apartheid era. It is ironic that PAIA’s procedural requirements seem to have 
dragged part of the Apartheid era’s approach to judicial deference into South Africa’s 
open democracy.1135 If the executive provides sufficient evidence, the court will 
support the executive’s assessment although neither the court nor the requester has 
any idea of the actual content of the contested record.1136 This type of deference is a 
far cry from the type of deference South Africa subscribes to.1137 A court’s decision 
made on the strength of evidence other than the primary record, is as problematic as 
a decision based on the executive’s bald assertions, ipse dixit affidavits, or verbatim 
recitation of the legal text. In all of these cases, the courts rely on the say so of the 
executive; the only difference is that persuasive evidence other than the contested 
record is provided. Additionally, this approach is providing the state with a ‘zone of 
executive immunity’.1138 
Neither PAIA’s first step in its approach for the resolution of disputes between the 
right to access information and National Security, nor relevant case law provides the 
judiciary with an effective legal mechanism to determine if a record should be cloaked 
in secrecy, prior to the court’s decision to resort to the ‘Judicial Peek’.1139 This 
drawback cannot be remedied by a clear interpretation of National Security, since the 
act and relevant case law permit the courts to decide this dispute without having to 
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rigorously compare the contested record against a definition.1140 Admittedly, the 
proposed definition of National Security would assist the judiciary in determining which 
information to protect for purposes of National Security, since it identifies which 
security interests need to be preserved and from which threats. However, there are 
still a number of reasons why the court could fail to accurately determine if the 
information should be cloaked in secrecy. One of the reasons is that the information 
provided may be terse in detail. Since courts lack the necessary institutional 
knowledge to understand what the effects would be if the information contained in the 
contested record enters the public domain, they would not have the necessary skills 
to rule on whether the information should continue to be concealed. Moreover, the 
courts’ lack of background knowledge on the security risks could impair their ability to 
make proper decisions on the nature of the record.1141 The first step of PAIA’s 
procedural mechanism does not provide the courts with an appropriate legal 
mechanism to decide if information should be protected for reasons of National 
Security.  
Mediating the tension without examining the content of the record also gives rise to 
several additional problems. Firstly, the executive may misuse a security exemption 
at this stage since it need only prove its case by utilising information outside of the 
scope of the contested record, not the contested record itself.1142 National Security 
has on many occasions been employed by the executive to conceal illegal activities, 
the misuse of state machinery,1143 human rights abuses,1144 executive corruption, and 
improper conduct by political parties,1145 as well as to promote corrupt interests.1146 
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Many mistakes have also been committed in the name of security in cases where it 
was later found that the executive had acted on the strength of inaccurate statements, 
human excitement, or outlandish presumptions.1147 It could have serious implications 
for democracy if the free flow of information concerning these activities is 
inappropriately impeded. 
Secondly, courts will not be able to act as an appropriate check on the executive’s 
power. The executive will have wide powers and need only provide generated 
evidence of a persuasive yet indirect character to discharge its onus. The courts’ 
rubber stamp may allow the executive to continue in its misuse of its security 
powers.1148 
Thirdly, the executive’s failure to make out its case sufficiently prior to the court 
having sight of it could result in the release of sensitive information which would 
potentially jeopardise the Republic’s security. Lazy, inefficient or inept legal counsel 
could be the cause of the impairment of South Africa’s National Security.1149 
Fourthly, disposing of a matter in this fashion could unjustifiably limit the 
fundamental rights to access, receive and impart information if state-held information 
which is non-threatening is not released. The Constitutional Court in Brümmer v 
Minister for Social Development put great emphasis on the invaluable contribution that 
the free flow of information makes to South Africa’s democracy and administrative 
transparency.1150 Prohibiting the publication of information without understanding its 
true nature will unjustifiably cut off the life source of democracy.1151 
Lastly, a court will not be able to accurately pronounce on the rationality, merits or 
legality of the executive’s actions without having access to information. Such findings 
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will be impossible unless it can assess if exposure will result in a threat to National 
Security and if an action was taken in terms of the law.1152 
The stakes are high where the right to access information and National Security are 
in tension.1153 If the court decides in favour of the requester, it could have serious 
implications for National Security, while if it is overly deferential in favour of the 
executive, South Africa’s constitutional democracy will be impaired. A failure to 
examine the protected record could unnecessarily place either of these interests in 
harm’s way. In light of the constitutional demands for openness and transparency, the 
sum of the court’s analysis cannot be just reduced to accepting what the executive 
says without at least seeing what the executive has done. It must have some 
mechanism to be used in addition to the proposed definition of National Security as 
articulated in chapter 3 to determine if the information must be protected. 
A possible solution is for the legislature to amend PAIA’s provisions by always 
compelling the courts to take a Judicial Peek in cases involving a conflict between 
security and information. It is submitted that such an amendment could prevent the 
courts from having to resort to a type of deference reminiscent of the Apartheid era. 
5.6.1.2 THE JUDICIARY’S APPROACH FOLLOWING THE JUDICIAL PEEK 
If the dispute between access and security is incapable of being resolved in the 
manner contemplated in section 5.6.1.1 of this thesis, the Constitutional Court held 
that the courts can resort to a Judicial Peek in its de novo reconsideration of the matter 
if the interests of justice require this.1154 In these instances the judiciary must: 
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“[…] test the argument for non-disclosure by using the record in question to decide the merits of the 
exemption claimed and the legality of the refusal to disclose the record. In this sense, it facilitates, 
rather than obstructs, access to information.”1155 
On the instruction of the Constitutional Court, the High Court in M&G Media Ltd v 
President of the Republic of South Africa applied this methodology to determine if 
access to a state-held record should be denied.1156 Once the contested report was 
handed to the bench, the court adjourned and took a Judicial Peek at the record.1157 
The court in its analysis of the contested document concluded that the content of the 
record did not warrant protection from disclosure in terms of the relevant exemptions 
raised in terms of PAIA. In other words, due to the content of the record the executive 
was prevented from relying on PAIA’s exemptions to protect state-held information 
from being publicised. The judiciary reached this conclusion without deferring to the 
executive.1158 
It is important to note that the courts will only resort to a Judicial Peek and assess 
the record against the ‘exemption claimed and the legality of the refusal’ if the interests 
of justice require this as already pointed out in the previous chapter.1159 However, the 
SCA rightly held that the courts must only invoke this power once the executive has 
set out why it aims to deny access to a request for state-held information.1160 Thus the 
executive must at a bare minimum make out what its case is. Once the executive fulfils 
this duty and provided that the interests of justice demand this, the court will require 
access to the record in terms of section 80(1) of PAIA so that it may decide whether 
the facts support the executive security exemption raised.1161  
If the contested record does not persuade the court that its publicity will compromise 
the Republic’s National Security, the court will provide the requester access to the 
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executive’s information.1162 Only once the court has taken a Judicial Peek at the 
record, examined it extensively and independently concluded that its publicity poses 
a threat to National Security, will it confirm the executive’s decision and deny access 
to the requested record.1163 The degree of judicial intervention in terms of PAIA by the 
courts after the Judicial Peek is far greater than prior to it.1164 The court in this type of 
assessment will engage in a brand new examination of the facts of the case and the 
lawfulness of the executive’s action in the context of the contested record. At no time 
during this examination will the court defer to the expertise of the executive.1165 The 
extent to which the court can test the legality and the merits of the state’s case will be 
made more effective if used in conjunction with chapter 3’s proposed definition of 
National Security. This will enable the courts to resolve the dispute in a manner which 
protects the appropriate security interests from identifiable threats. 
The courts’ ability to test the executive’s decision to conceal information in terms of 
PAIA is extensive. Some may even argue that the courts are treading on the terrain of 
the executive. However, this perspective is lacking nuance as stated above. 
Additionally it is also important to note that the Constitution has given the legislature 
the power to protect National Security.1166 In fulfilling its constitutional duty of giving 
effect to the right to access information, Parliament gave the executive the authority 
to deny access to information that could reasonably be expected to cause prejudice 
to National Security.1167 It also placed a check on the executive’s power by permitting 
courts to assess the legality and the merits of the executive’s decision to protect 
National Security information.1168  
This type of decision-making falls into the judiciary’s realm of expertise. PAIA’s 
approach after a court has taken a ‘Judicial Peek’ does not call for blind obedience to 
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the executive’s security assertions.1169 The court following the Judicial Peek gives 
proper protection to both National Security and the constitutional value of Open 
Justice, although it seems as if it treads on to the executive’s terrain by ruling on the 
nature of the record. However, if it were not for this authority, the executive could use 
this exemption to engage in unrestrained nefarious activities.  
It has been argued in the previous chapter that PIA should be amended to bring it 
in line with PAIA. While this legislative adjustment would provide better protection to 
Open Justice without putting National Security at any greater risk, the judiciary could 
possibly unjustifiably limit the free expression of information at the first stage of 
proceedings. The corollary effect of this is that the accused could be incarcerated. 
However, on the strength of the argument made under section 5.3.3 above, it is highly 
unlikely that the court would order the imprisonment of an accused on the say so of 
the state. In instances where uncertainty exists as to the nature of the record it is 
submitted that the judiciary will always take a Judicial Peek at the record. Therefore 
PIA’s procedure should never prevent the judiciary from making a decision on the 
nature of the contested record. 
5.6.2 TOWARDS A PREFERRED METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned earlier, two other approaches have been developed in the security 
context which could enable the judiciary to determine if a record should be protected 
for reasons of National Security. The question arises whether they may be an 
improvement on PAIA’s two-step approach as recorded in sections 25(3)(b), 77(5)(b), 
80(1), 80(3) and 81(3)(a) of PAIA, in that they may better assist the courts in executing 
their duty.1170 
The first approach was created by the Constitutional Court in the Masetlha 
decision.1171 Even though this case was concerned with Open Justice and National 
Security, the case is still relevant in the context of the free flow of information and 
                                      
1169 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism [48]. 
1170 President of the Republic of South Africa v M&G Media Ltd (CC). 
1171 Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd v Minister for Intelligence Services; Freedom of Expression 




security, in that the judgment identifies a specific approach which the courts can 
employ to assist it in determining if a record should be protected for reasons of National 
Security.1172 The Constitutional Court relied on section 173 of the Constitution’s 
inherent powers provision to create this principled approach.1173 The section provides 
that:  
“The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent power to 
protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the 
interests of justice.”1174 
Acting on the strength of this provision, the Constitutional Court created a principled 
approach to resolve the disputes in front of it and recorded its specifics when it held 
that: 
“In deciding whether documents ought to be disclosed or not, a court will have regard to all germane 
factors which include the nature of the proceedings; the extent and character of the materials sought 
to be kept confidential; the connection of the information to national security; the grounds advanced 
for claiming disclosure or for refusing it; whether the information is already in the public domain and 
if so, in what circumstances it reached the public domain; for how long and to what extent it has 
been in the public domain; and, finally, the impact of the disclosure or non-disclosure on the ultimate 
fairness of the proceedings before a court.”1175 
However, only the first factor (the nature of the proceedings) is of importance for 
purposes of this chapter. The balance of the factors is not directly relevant to this 
chapter’s inquiry. At a high level of generality, all of the factors included in the 
Constitutional Court’s approach are aimed at determining if the contested record 
should be concealed for purposes of National Security. However, it is only the first 
factor which needs to be assessed to determine if it enables the courts to perform their 
function more effectively, as opposed to obstructing their capacity like PAIA’s two-step 
approach seems to do.1176 The second (the extent and character of the materials 
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sought to be kept confidential) and third factors (the connection of the information to 
National Security) enable the judiciary to assess if information should be protected or 
disclosed. The second factor requires the judiciary to establish the true nature of the 
record. The court must thus examine the record to understand what it is looking at. 
The third factor is inextricably linked to the second, in that following the examination 
of the record by the judiciary, it must determine if the information is duly protected by 
the legal tenets of National Security. PAIA’s two-step approach already sets out an 
appropriate process which the judiciary can rely on to determine if the publicity of a 
record will compromise the Republic’s National Security. However, what must be 
assessed is if ‘Masetlha’s principled approach’ is an improvement on PAIA’s two-step 
approach, in that it enables the courts to perform their function more effectively, as 
opposed to obstructing their capacity like PAIA’s two-step approach seems to do. 
The fourth factor also does not shed light on whether ‘Masetlha’s principled 
approach’ actually permits the judiciary to make a determination on the nature of the 
record.1177 The fourth factor (the grounds advanced for claiming disclosure or for 
refusing it) would ordinarily be helpful in the security context at a substantive level. 
Like PAIA, it records the grounds upon which the executive can deny access to 
information.1178 However, this factor is unhelpful at a principled level since it fails to 
address whether it enables the judiciary to make a National Security determination. 
The fifth (the entry of the information in the public domain) and sixth factors (for how 
long and to what extent it has been in the public domain) also contribute nothing in 
assessing if ‘Masetlha’s principled approach’ improves the ability of the judiciary to 
make a determination on a contested record than PAIA does.  
The seventh and final factor (impact of the disclosure or non-disclosure on the 
ultimate fairness of the proceedings before a court) is also irrelevant since it is only 
concerned with the fairness of proceedings in considering if the state-held information 
should be ventilated. 
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As stated above only the first factor is of relevance for purposes of this section. The 
first factor (the nature of the proceedings) was created by the Constitutional Court to 
determine how to resolve a dispute between Open Justice and National Security, in 
instances where the judiciary already had access to the contested record.1179 As 
mentioned earlier the judiciary relied on the contested record to determine if National 
Security was at risk of being compromised by the ventilation of state-held 
information.1180 In fact the judiciary could only resolve this dispute since it already had 
access to the record. Understandably, the Constitutional Court did not consider how 
to resolve a dispute between Open Justice and National Security where the court did 
not have access to the record. Therefore we are not given any insight into whether the 
judiciary would be able to identify the nature of the record in instances where it had no 
access to it. While ‘Masetlha’s principled approach’ does enable the judiciary to 
execute its duty by determining the nature of the record in instances where the 
judiciary has access to information, it does not shed light on whether the judiciary 
would be able to determine the nature of the record in circumstances in which it did 
not have access to the contested record. Consequently, ‘Masetlha’s principled 
approach’ enables the judiciary to execute its duty, but does not amount to an 
improvement on PAIA’s two-step approach. 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, ‘FXI’s procedural approach’ was put forward 
in its submissions in the Masetlha decision.1181 FXI attempted to persuade the courts 
to adopt a specific ‘procedural approach’ to deal with matters where a contested record 
already forms part of the court record, but in instances where the general public had 
no access thereto. Its approach is founded on the following five principles: 
“(a) not compromising the legitimacy of the judicial proceedings, which is reflected in their 
adversarial nature; (b) facilitating the public’s interest in opposing an order to restrict access; (c) 
requiring that any order granted which restricts access should state the conclusions reached and be 
accompanied by specific findings and reasons for rejecting less drastic measures; (d) providing the 
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prerequisites for meaningful appellate review; and (e) informing the public of an order granted which 
restricts access to court records.”1182  
The court rejected this flexible principled procedure in favour of an approach which 
seeks to determine: 
“[…] where the interests of justice lie from case to case consistently with our evolving, context-
sensitive jurisprudence that is driven by justice rather than rules.”1183 
Like ‘Masetlha’s principled approach’, ‘FXI’s procedural approach’ is formulated on 
the basis that the judiciary already has access to the contested record.1184 The primary 
thrust of ‘FXI’s procedural approach’ is concerned with providing the judiciary with a 
process which would assist it in making a finding on the nature of the record. It does 
not deal with instances where the judiciary does not have access to information. The 
reason for this is that it is presumed that because the judiciary already has access to 
the record, it would rely on it to resolve disputes. Therefore in substance ‘FXI’s 
procedural approach’ does not seem to be any different from ‘Masetlha’s principled 
approach’ or an improvement on PAIA’s two-step approach.1185 
Consequently, as proposed earlier and for the reasons also set out in chapter 4 of 
this thesis, PAIA should be amended so that the judiciary can always take a Judicial 
Peek at a contested record in National Security matters.1186 Thus the judiciary would 
always be able to determine if the ventilation of the contested record would 
compromise South Africa’s National Security, if it had access to the record.  
5.7 CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of the separation of powers has ascribed different roles to the South 
African legislature, executive and judiciary in the context of National Security.  









The executive is responsible for implementing laws. The preservation of a state’s 
National Security has ordinarily fallen within the executive’s sphere of competence. 
The executive possesses the necessary institutional knowledge, expertise and 
resources to preserve National Security. In execution of its duties the executive may 
contain the publicity of state-held information in terms of sections 41(1)(a)(i) and/or 
41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and sections 3 and/or 4 of PIA. 
The judiciary has the authority to decide disputes which may arise between the free 
flow of information and National Security in terms of the preceding acts. In doing so, 
the judiciary is entitled to make a decision which overrules the state’s decision to 
contain information. However, securocrats argue that the courts are ill-suited to decide 
these matters as they lack the necessary capacity to do so. To support this view the 
executive levels three criticisms against the judiciary. The first criticism is that the 
judiciary lacks the necessary training and expertise in matters of National Security. 
Secondly, securocrats argue that the courts lack the aptitude and facilities to consider 
matters of National Security. The final criticism is that the absence of judicial training, 
expertise, aptitude and facilities in security matters not only hinders the executive in 
being able to protect National Security, but contributes to putting the state in harm’s 
way. Since the judiciary lacks the necessary capacity, securocrats argue that the 
courts should rather defer to the executive’s ‘unique insights’ since only it can truly 
appreciate the effect of publicising state-held information. They thus argue for a ‘zone 
of executive immunity’. In summary the executive requires limited judicial participation 
in matters of National Security. 
Despite these criticisms, the judiciary possesses the capacity to resolve disputes 
between the free flow of information and National Security. In the context of PAIA, the 
judiciary follows a three-step approach. Firstly, it considers the state’s submissions in 
the context of the security exemption claimed. Secondly, it considers if the state 
provided sufficient evidence so that it can determine if the contested record falls within 
the exemption claimed - as contemplated by its duty in terms of section 81(3)(a) of 
PAIA. Lastly, following its examination of the oral submissions and evidence, the 
judiciary determines if the state has provided sufficient evidence so that it could 




While the judiciary’s approach to resolving disputes between information and 
security does not in and of itself demonstrate the judiciary’s capacity, it is really the 
duty of the judiciary as recorded in terms of section 82(a) of PAIA, the state’s 
obligations as set out in section 81(3)(a) of the act, and chapter 3’s proposed definition 
of National Security interacting with each other, which enables the judiciary to resolve 
the dispute. There are three reasons which support this view. Firstly, the proposed 
definition of National Security and the information provided by the state in discharging 
its onus under section 81(3)(a) of PAIA enable the judiciary to determine if an object 
is at risk of being compromised, to identify the threats thereto and to make 
determinations on the legality and rationality of the state’s security action. The judiciary 
can achieve these outcomes without having to procure any specific training, 
knowledge or resources in matters of National Security. Secondly, the powers granted 
to the judiciary in terms of section 82(a) of PAIA and the utility of the proposed 
definition of National Security enable the judiciary to make clinical security decisions, 
instead of frustrating the state’s security actions. Lastly, defining what National 
Security means and allowing the judiciary to take action in this regard nullifies the 
argument that matters of National Security remain the preserve of securocrats. Thus 
not only legally, but from a practical point of view the courts are the appropriate forum 
to resolve the tension between the free flow of information and National Security in 
terms of PAIA.  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, despite the judiciary’s ability to resolve security 
disputes, the expert in the National Security context is the executive. While the 
conception of deference proposed in this chapter does call for the interrogation of the 
state’s averments it also acknowledges that it would be more appropriate to defer to 
the expertise of the state in certain instances. Although the judiciary has extensive 
tools to resolve the tension in terms of PAIA, there are instances where it may be more 
appropriate for it to defer to the state when resolving this dispute. 
The approach that the judiciary relies on to resolve a dispute between the free flow 
of information and National Security in terms of PIA is no different from under PAIA. 
The PIA court – like the PAIA court – will (i) hear the state’s oral submissions in the 
context of PIA’s conception of National Security, (ii) examine the evidence placed 




that the judiciary may assess if the ventilation of the state-held information is contrary 
to sections 3 and 4 of PIA, and (iii) in light of the evidence and oral submissions made, 
determine if the accused by the expression or attempted expression of state-held 
information has committed an offence and whether incarceration of the accused is 
therefore warranted.  
The incarceration of an accused is the most severe form of punishment. It is 
therefore problematic to expect the judiciary to avoid dealing with the merits of the 
matter on account that it lacks the institutional capacity to make decisions on National 
Security. It also seems problematic to expect the judiciary to defer to the state in these 
instances. There are three reasons for this position. Firstly it is doubtful whether trials 
of a criminal nature will ever satisfy the requirements of a fair trial as contemplated by 
sections 34 and 35(3)(c) of the Constitution, if courts are to refrain from resolving 
disputes on the grounds of competence. Secondly, it would be reckless for the 
judiciary to abdicate its duty to resolve criminal disputes especially in light of the state’s 
history of abusing the defence of National Security. Lastly, the judiciary’s expertise lies 
in the interpretation and application of laws and it is therefore best placed to determine 
if the executive’s activities are consistent with the legal tenets of National Security. 
Since the judiciary will always resolve the disputes between the free flow of information 
and National Security, the question of deference and competence of the judiciary 
seems to be a non-factor in terms of PIA. 
To put the above succinctly, the judiciary possesses the necessary capacity to 
resolve disputes between the free flow of information and National Security both in 
terms of PAIA and PIA.  
PAIA requires the judiciary to follow a two-stage process to determine if a record 
should be concealed for purposes of National Security. In chapter 4 of this thesis it 
was submitted that PIA should adopt PAIA’s two-stage process. The rationale for this 
proposal is that Open Justice would be afforded much greater protection without 
putting National Security at any greater risk. However, the approach does suffer from 
one weakness. If a court resolves a dispute at the first stage of proceedings (i.e. 
without examining the content of the record), it may result in one of two drawbacks. 




dispute without examining the content of the record.1187 Secondly, the judiciary may 
unjustifiably limit the free flow of information.  
To protect South Africa’s National Security, and to guard against the unjustified 
limitation of the free flow of information, the courts must be able to make proper 
decisions on whether a contested record should be concealed for purposes of National 
Security, or ventilated. In terms of PAIA, the solution could be to enable the judiciary 
to always engage in a Judicial Peek when mediating the tension. However, on the 
strength of the argument made under section 5.3.3 above in the context of PIA, it is 
highly unlikely that a court would incarcerate an accused on the say so of the state. 
So in instances where uncertainty exists as to the nature of the record, it is submitted 
that the judiciary will always take a Judicial Peek at the record. Therefore PIA’s 
procedure should never prevent the judiciary from making a decision on the nature of 
the contested record. 
oooOooo 
  
                                      







This study concerns the tension between National Security and the rights to access, 
impart and receive information. It is particularly interested in the role of the courts in 
protecting the free flow of information from undue state interference, without 
unnecessarily putting National Security at risk. The study thus raises a number of 
substantive, interpretive, procedural and jurisprudential questions. These include 
questions about: i) the interpretation of constitutional provisions dealing with the rights 
to access, impart and receive information, as well as National Security; ii) the 
interpretation of legislative provisions regulating the relationship between the free flow 
of information and National Security, and the constitutionality of those provisions; iii) 
the meaning of National Security; iv) whether existing court procedures strike an 
appropriate balance between openness and the need to protect National Security; and 
v) whether and to what extent courts should defer to the wisdom of the executive in 
relation to the question whether the dissemination of information is likely to endanger 
National Security.  
Chapter 2 examines the constitutional and legislative framework concerning the 
tension between the free flow of information and National Security. It starts by 
discussing the shift from the culture of secrecy that characterised the Apartheid era to 
the Constitution’s emphasis on openness and democratic accountability. It then 
proceeds to examine the constitutional rights to access, receive and impart information 
in view of the values that underlie them. These values include the pursuit of truth, 
individual self-realisation and democratic self-government, in the case of the right to 
receive and impart information, and openness, accountability and transparency, in the 
case of the right to access information. It also examines the provisions of PAIA which 
give expression to the constitutional right to access state-held information in terms of 
section 32 of the Constitution.  
Next, the chapter analyses legislative provisions which allow the state to restrict the 
free flow of information in order to protect National Security (referred to as the security 
and defence of the Republic under PAIA and as the security of the Republic under 




flaws. They fail to define National Security with the necessary precision; they fail to 
specify the kind of threats that National Security is to be protected from; and they fail 
to refer to a number of interests that are central to South African and international 
understandings of National Security. There is therefore a risk that the two acts may be 
used to place unreasonable restrictions on the free flow of information in the name of 
vaguely defined notions of National Security. On the other hand, they also create the 
risk that important National Security interests may be unprotected. The chapter thus 
concludes that the courts’ ability to mediate conflicts between the free flow of 
information and National Security is hampered to a significant extent by uncertainty 
over the meaning of National Security. 
Chapter 3 then explores the meaning of National Security. It starts with an analysis 
of the terms ‘defence of the Republic’ and ‘security of the Republic’. It finds that, for 
purposes of sections 4(1)(a)(i)(bb) and 4(1)(b)(i)(bb) of PAIA, the defence of the 
Republic refers to the SANDF’s ability to protect the Republic of South Africa, or in 
specific instances, the ability of SAPS, or SAPS in cooperation with the SANDF, to 
combat terrorism. On the other hand, the security of the Republic in terms of these 
sections concerns the capacity of the intelligence services of South Africa and other 
department of state to protect the security of the Republic. It further finds that the 
references to the security of the Republic in sections 3, 4(1)(a)(i)(bb), 4(1)(b)(i)(bb) 
and 4(2) of PIA are concerned with the SANDF’s ability to protect the Republic of 
South Africa in relation to military matters, the ability of SAPS, or SAPS in co-operation 
with the SANDF, to guard against terrorism, and the State Security Agency’s 
intelligence capacity. However, PIA, unlike PAIA, does not protect the security 
capacity of other intelligence services (i.e. SAPS, SANDF and other departments of 
state. To that extent, it is under-inclusive.  
Next, the chapter compares these understandings to other South African and 
international conceptions of National Security. The former include conceptions of 
democracy derived from legislation (NSIA) and case law (the judgments of Moseneke 
DCJ, Yacoob J and Van der Westhuizen J in the Masetlha decision), while the latter 
include international instruments such as the SP and JHBP. On the basis of an 
analysis of the various security interests protected in terms of these other conceptions 




PAIA and sections 3 and 4 of PIA should also protect the constitutional order, territorial 
integrity, state sovereignty and the people of the Republic. Although sections 
41(1)(a)(i) and 41(1)(a)(ii) of PAIA and sections 3 and 4 of PIA are capable of being 
interpreted to include these security interests, it is argued that it would be more 
appropriate if PIA is amended to mention these security interests expressly. The 
chapter then examines different conceptions of the kinds of threats to National Security 
that would justify restrictions on the free flow of information. It argues that threat 
conceptions which focus on force or the threat of force are superior to those that focus 
on (temporal or non-temporal) understandings of imminence. In view of this, the 
chapter proposes that the provisions of PAIA and PIA should be amended to permit 
the state to limit the free flow of information only if it is reasonable to expect that the 
restriction will prevent an act of ‘force or the threat of force’ from compromising 
National Security.  
Chapter 4 then turns to examine the tension between openness and secrecy within 
the judicial process in cases involving conflicts between the free flow of information 
and National Security. The chapter first considers the requirements of the 
constitutional principle of Open Justice in view of case law. In terms of this principle, 
courts are required to resolve judicial disputes in an open manner. Next, it examines 
the extent to which PAIA and PIA i) give effect to the principle of Open Justice, and ii) 
use mechanisms like in camera proceedings to restrict Open Justice in cases in which 
the disclosure of sensitive information in open court could compromise South Africa’s 
National Security. The chapter investigates the relationship between PAIA’s 
procedures and the courts’ discovery procedures, and concludes that the use of the 
latter should not be allowed to frustrate PAIA’s objectives. It also finds that PAIA’s 
procedures are superior to those of PIA, to the extent that it authorises courts to take 
a Judicial Peek at the contested record, and proposes that PIA be amended to include 
this power.  
In addition, the chapter examines the constitutionality of PAIA and PIA’s limitations 
of the rights underpinning Open Justice (i.e. sections 16, 34 and 35(3)(c) of the 
Constitution). It finds that the limitations in terms of sections 80(1) and 80(3)(b) of 
PAIA, which provide for the Judicial Peek and in camera hearings respectively, are 




which authorises the judiciary to prohibit the publication of information that is already 
in the public domain, is not rationally connected to a legitimate government objective, 
and is therefore unconstitutional. Moreover, if PIA is amended to provide for a Judicial 
Peek and for ex parte representations, it would also be constitutional.  
Finally, chapter 5 examines the capacity of the judiciary to adjudicate, in a principled 
manner, conflicts between the free flow of information and National Security, in view 
of debates about courts’ institutional capacity and the perceived need for judicial 
deference in areas in which the executive, and not the judiciary, has special expertise. 
To that end, it evaluates the views of securocrats who criticise judicial intervention in 
cases in which National Security is at stake. The chapter is not only concerned with 
theoretical debates about the separation of powers, institutional capacity and 
deference, but links those debates to questions about the procedures used by courts 
to adjudicate conflicts between the free flow of information and National Security. For 
that reason, it closely examines the procedures used by courts under PAIA and PIA 
to determine whether information should be released, or suppressed in the interest of 
National Security. On the basis of that analysis, the chapter concludes that the courts 
have the capacity to decide such disputes, provided that they work with an adequate 
definition of the relevant National Security interests and the kinds of threats that 
National Security must be protected against. The task of courts is not to second-guess 
the choices of the executive, but to consider whether the executive advanced sufficient 
evidence in support of its claim that particular information should fall under a National 
Security exemption. Judges are well-positioned to this, despite the fact that they have 
not undergone National Security training.  
The chapter finds that the procedure followed by the courts under PAIA to determine 
whether an information officer justifiably restricted access to a record is consistent with 
this view of the judicial function, and allows courts to adjudicate disputes in a principled 
manner, without overstepping the bounds of the judicial function. The securocrats’ 
criticisms are therefore misplaced. Calls for judicial deference to the executive in the 
context of sections 3 and 4 of PIA are similarly problematic, as it could lead to an 
infringement of the right of an accused person to a fair trial, and as the judiciary is well 
positioned to determine whether the executive’s activities are consistent with PIA’s 




Constitution, the chapter concludes that there are certain circumstances in which 
deference may be appropriate. This is premised on the idea that there are certain 
areas in which the executive is better placed than judges to make factual 
determinations, and that in such matters, judges should be cautious not to substitute 
their own views for those of the executive. However, this should never amount to an 
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